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Abstract: Courts and commentators have compared oppression law's
reasonable expectations inquiry to an implied-in-fact contract analysis.
This Article reveals that oppression law and contract law are actually
more dissimilar in operation than they might appear. Although contract
law has the tools to protect the close corporation shareholder, this
Article illustrates how well-entrenched doctrinal hurdles will likely
prevent it from doing so. The Article then argues that because
oppressive majority conduct nevertheless breaches an actual bargain
struck between the shareholders, and because the oppressive majority's
actions often result in a theft of the minority's investment, contract law
should take action • to enforce the "deal" and to protect the minority
shareholder. Thus, the Article concludes that when the oppression
doctrine safeguards reasonable expectations, oppression law is
effectively stepping in for contract law and is accomplishing what
contract law itself should be doing. By coming to this conclusion, this
Article answers a fundamental question—is the shareholder oppression
doctrine needed in light of the established principles of contract law?
By picking up where contract law leaves off, the shareholder oppression
doctrine serves a critical protective function that justifies its
independent existence.
INTRODUCTION
The law of shareholder oppression protects the close corporation
minority investor from the improper exercise of majority control.'
'0 Associate Professor of Law, University of Houston Law Center. 13,S. 1991, University
of Virginia; ID. 1994, Harvard Law School. The author wishes to thank Adam Goldberg,
Ryan Maierson, Stefanie Moll, Zelda Moll, Robert Ragazzo, and Robert B. Thompson for
their helpful comments. In addition, the author thanks the University of Houston and the
University of Houston Law Foundation for providing financial support for this Article.
I The terms "majority shareholder" and "minority shareholder" (or "majority" and
"minority") are used in this Article "to distinguish those shareholders who possess the ac-
tual power to control the operations of the . firm from those who do not." jA.C. Hethering-
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The law of contracts applies more generally, as it seeks to enforce
agreements between parties regardless of a close corporation context.
When a close corporation dispute is at issue, however, it is often
difficult to tell where contract law leaves off and where oppression law
begins. Consider the following decision:
In Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., Stanley Wilkes, Leon
Riche, Edward Quinn, and Hubert Pipkin founded a close corpora-
tion engaged in the operation of a nursing home. 2 Each of the four
founders invested $1,000 initially and obtained a 25% ownership stake
in the company. They all drew an equivalent salary and participated
actively in the management of the business. 5 Years later, Quinn, Riche,
and Lawrence Connor4 unjustifiably removed Wilkes as an officer and
director of the corporation. 5 In addition, even though the other
shareholders continued to receive their pay, Wilkes' salary was termi-
nated. 6
As a result of these actions, Wilkes sued the corporation and the
individual shareholders.? In finding for Wilkes, the court stated the
following:
At the time of incorporation it was understood by all of the
parties that each would be a director of [the corporation]
and [that] each would participate actively in the manage-
ment and decision making involved in operating the corpo-
ration. It was, further, the understanding and intention of all
the parties that, corporate resources permitting, each would
receive money from the corporation in equal amounts as
long as each assumed an active and ongoing responsibility
ton & Michael P. Dooley, Illiquidity and Exploitation: A Proposed Statutory Solution to the Re-
maining Close Corporation Problem, 63 VA. L. REV. 1, 5 n.7 (1977). Such power is most often
determined by the size of the shareholdings. See id.
2 See 353 N.E.2d 657, 659-60 (Mass. 1976).
See id.
4 By this time, Pipkin had sold his shares in the corporation to Connor. See id. at 659
n.4.
5 See id. at 661. The Wilkes court noted that the majority stockholders ... have not
shown a legitimate business purpose for severing Wilkes from the payroll of the corpora-
tion or for refusing to reelect him as a salaried officer and director." Id. at 663; see id. at 661
("The severance of Wilkes from the payroll resulted not from misconduct or neglect of
duties, but because of the personal desire of Quinn, Riche and Connor to prevent him
from continuing to receive money from the corporation.").
See id. at 661.
7 See Wilkes, 353 N.E.2d at 658-59.
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for carrying a portion of the burdens necessary to operate
the business. 8
In addition, the court cited Wilkes' testimony that "all four men were
guaranteed directorships," and it noted that "Riche's understanding
of the parties' intentions was that ... they all would be directors."9
Finally, the court observed that Quinn's, Riche's, and Connor's ac-
tions were "in disregard of a long-standing policy of the stockholders
that each would be a director of the corporation and that employ-
ment with the corporation would go hand in hand with stock owner-
ship. "10
By referencing the parties' mutual "understandings," "inten-
tions," "guarantees," and "policies," the Wilkes opinion has the flavor
of a breach of contract decision. After all, Wilkes' victory was prem-
ised, at least in part, on Quinn's, Riche's, and Connor's "disregard" of
the policies and understandings that were shared between the inves-
tors. Such disregard, of course, seems closely related to a breach of an
implied agreement between the parties. Moreover, the court awarded
Wilkes damages for the amount of salary that he would have received
if he had remained an officer and director of the company. 11 Such a
remedy reflects a standard award of expectation damages that is
prevalent in breach of contract actions. 12
The Wilkes court grounded its decision, however, in oppression
law rather than in contract law. Wilkes asserted that "he should re-
cover damages because the defendants, as majority stockholders in
[the corporation], breached their fiduciary duty to him as a minority
stockholder by their action [s],"" and the court similarly concluded
that "a judgment shall be entered declaring that Quinn, Riche and
Connor breached their fiduciary duty to Wilkes as a minority stock-
8 Id. at 659-60 (footnote omitted).
9 /d. at 660 n.7.
1 ° Id. at 664.
11 See id. at 664-65 ("Wilkes shall be allowed to recover ... the salary he would have
received had he remained an officer and director of [the corporation].").
12 By awarding Wilkes the salary that he would have received as a continuing officer
and director of the corporation, the court is attempting to place Wilkes in the position
that he would have been in if Quinn, Riche, and Connor had not disregarded the policies
and understandings of the shareholders. This is the purpose, of course, of an expectation
damages award. See infra notes 239-245 and accompanying text.
18 Wilkes, 353 N.E.2d at 659; see infra notes 47-49 and accompanying text (observing
that some courts define oppression as a breach of an enhanced fiduciary duty).
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holder in [the corporation]."14 Thus, although the Wilkes court
sounded contractual themes in its discussion, the decision is based on
the separate corporate law doctrine of shareholder oppression. By
using contractual themes as part of its shareholder oppression analy-
sis, however, the Wilkes court clearly draws a connection between the
oppression and contract doctrines.
This connection between oppression law and contract law is also
revealed in the language of other oppression precedents. For exam-
ple, a number of courts describe oppression as the "frustration of the
reasonable expectations of the shareholders."15 When courts attempt
to define a "reasonable expectation" in the shareholder oppression
context, the language used is nearly identical to the conventional de-
scription of an implied-in-fact contract. Indeed, in the shareholder
oppression setting, a reasonable expectation has been defined as an
expectation (I) that is "known to or assumed by the other sharehold-
ers and [is] concurred in by them'16; (2) that is "embodied in under-
standings, express or implied, among the participants' 17; and (3) that
is often derived "from the parties' actions and course of conduct:18
Similarly, in a contractual setting, an implied-in-fact contract is gener-
ally described as a "true contract" that is "grounded in the parties'
agreement and tacit understanding" and whose "existence and terms
are inferred from the conduct of the parties. "19
14 Wilkes, 353 N.E.2d at 664. It should be noted that Wilkes actually brought two
claims—a shareholder oppression claim as well as a claim for "breach of the alleged part-
nership agreement." Id. at 659 ("Wilkes alleged that he, Quinn, Riche and ... Pipkin
entered into a partnership agreement ... which	 was breached ... when Wilkes's salary
was terminated and he was voted out as an officer and director of the corporation."). The
court granted relief to Wilkes on the shareholder oppression claim, but it upheld the
lower court's dismissal of Wilkes's breach of partnership agreement claim. See id.
15 2 F. HODGE O'NEAL & ROBERT B. THONIPSON, O'NEAL'S CLOSE CORPORATIONS
§ 9.29, at 132 (3d ed. 1996) [hereinafter CLOSE CORPORATIONS]; see infra notes 54-57 and
accompanying text.
Meiselman v. Meiseltnan, 307 S.E.2d 551, 563 (N.C. 1983); see infra note 60 and ac-
companying text.
Meiselman, 307 S.E.2d at 563; see infra note 61 and accompanying text.
18 Douglas K. Moll, Shareholder Oppression in Close Corporations: The Unanswered Question
of Perspective, 53 VAND. L. REV. 749, 811 (2000); see infra note 68 and accompanying text.
19 Kennedy v. Forest, 930 P.2d 1026, 1029 (Idaho 1997); see, e.g., Reali, Giampetro &
Scott v. Soc'y Nat'l Bank, 729 N.E.2d 1259, 1263 (Ohio Ct. App. 1999) (stating that, in an
implied contract, "the meeting of the minds must be established by demonstrating that the
circumstances surrounding the parties' transaction make it reasonably certain that the
contract exists as a matter of tacit understanding") (internal quotation omitted); Staley v.
Taylor, 994 P.2d 1220, 1224 (Or. Ct. App. 2000) ("In an implied-in-fact contract, the par-
ties' agreement is inferred, in whole or in part, from their conduct.").
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As these descriptions reveal, both a reasonable expectation and
an implied-in-fact contract are based on shared "understandings" be-
tween the participants—i.e., understandings that the participants have
"concurred in" or reached "agreement" upon. In addition, both rea-
sonable expectations and implied-in-fact contracts are derived from
the "conduct" or "actions" of the participants themselves.
Presumably as a result of these similarities, some commentators
have explicitly linked the reasonable expectations analysis of oppres-
sion law to the implied agreement analysis of contract law. Reasonable
expectations have been described "as an implied multilateral contract
among the shareholders,"" and the reasonable expectations inquiry
has been referred to as an "implied contract analysis." 21
 Similarly, just
as contract law seeks to enforce the bargain of the parties, so too does
oppression law "help insure that innocent shareholders will realize
their bargained-for benefit. "22
What has not been emphasized, however, is the implication of
this comparison. After all, to the extent that the reasonable expecta-
tions analysis of oppression law is rooted in contractual concepts, one
could fairly ask whether an independent oppression doctrine is
needed at all. Instead of concluding that a close corporation share-
holder is entitled to corporate law relief because of a frustrated reason-
able expectation, a court seemingly could reach the same conclusion
on the contract law ground that majority action has breached an im-
m Ralph A. Peeples, The Use and Misuse of the Business Judgment Rule in the Close Corpora-
tion, 60 NOIRE DAME L. REV. 456, 501 (1985); see infra note 21 and accompanying text.
21 Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Death of Fiduciary Duty in Close Corporations, 138 U. PA. L.
REV. 1675, 1724 n.214 (1990); see Terry A. O'Neill, Self-Interest and Concern for Others in the
Owner-Managed Firm: A Suggested Approach to Dissolution and Fiduciary Obligation in Close Cor-
porations, 22 SETON HALL L. REV. 646, 694 (1992) (describing the reasonable expectations
approach as a "contractarian" approach); Peeples, supra note 20, at 503 (comparing a rea-
sonable expectations analysis to an "implied contract"); id. at 504 n.371 ('The analogy to
an implied contract is a favorite one of the courts in this (oppression] area."); see also Ste-
ven C. Bahls, Resolving Shareholder Dissension: Selection of the Appropriate Equitable Remedy, 15 J.
CORP. L. 285, 326 n.247 (1990) ("Courts should analyze a claimed change in expectation
in the same way they analyze a claiMed codification of a contract, looking for both assent
by the parties and consideration or detrimental reliance."); id. at 326 n.248 (noting that
"an analogy to the law modifying contracts is appropriate").
22 Bahls, supra note 21, at 321; see infra note 305. Moreover, just as the purpose of the
oppression doctrine is to protect the reasonable expectations of shareholders that invest in
close corporations, see infra Part II(C), the purpose of contract law is to "attempt the reali-
zation of reasonable expectations that have been induced by the making of a promise." 1
ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1, at 2 (2d ed. 1963); see hi. (noting
that the attempt to realize reasonable expectations "is believed to be the main underlying
purpose" of contract law); Balls, supra note 21, at 322 (stating that "(clontract law protects
the reasonable expectations of parties to contracts").
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plied-in-fact contract between the shareholders." Put differently,
there is no need for the shareholder oppression doctrine if an inves-
tor's reasonable expectations can be enforced as a right stemming
from contract law, rather than as a right stemming from the investor's
status as a close corporation shareholder.
To the extent that a reasonable expectation and an implied-in-
fact contract are similar, therefore, why were the well-accepted princi-
ples of contract law" not used directly to remedy the plight of the
close corporation shareholder? Why did contract law defer to corpo-
rate law to establish protections for minority shareholders in close
corporation settings? Given that contract law strives to enforce bar-
gains struck between parties, should contract law have deferred in this
manner?
By analyzing facets of the liability and damages components of
both oppression law and contract law, this Article squarely address
these significant questions. 25 Moreover, by examining how the share-
holder oppression doctrine operates in practice to protect reasonable
expectations, this Article cuts through the rhetoric of oppression
precedents and demonstrates what is actually transpiring in the habil-
23 Similarly, if a reasonable expectation were roughly equivalent to an implied-in-fact
contract, the evidence used to establish a reasonable expectation would presumably suffice
to establish an implied-in-fact contract. Instead of trying to prove a reasonable expectation
of management, for example, the oppressed shareholder could offer the same evidence as
proof of an implied-in-fact contract for management. But see infra Part 111(B) (1) (discuss-
ing problems of indefiniteness when attempting to establish an implied contract).
24 In general, contract law has been accepted by all jurisdictions for a considerable pe-
riod of time. In contrast, the shareholder oppression doctrine has only recently developed,
see, e.g., Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 328 N.E.2d 505, 513-15 (Mass. 1975), and a
mere handful of state supreme courts has adopted the doctrine. See infra note 56 and ac-
companying text. Compared to contract law, therefore, oppression law is far less devel-
oped, and unanswered questions abound. See Moll, supra note 18, at 754 (observing that
courts and commentators have not adequately considered whether shareholder oppres-
sion should be viewed from a majority or minority perspective even though the choice of
perspective can make an outcome-determinative difference). In attempting to protect
close corporation shareholders, therefore, it seems easier and more efficient to find such
protection in established contract law rather than in newly-developed oppression law.
23 Some commentators have implied, with no discussion, that indefiniteness and rem-
edy problems may prevent contract law from fully protecting the reasonable expectations
of close corporation shareholders. Cf. Bahls, supra note 21, at 326 & n.248 (suggesting that
changes in reasonable expectations might "not [be] sufficiently definite," and citing to the
"definiteness requirement found in contract law"); Robert W. Hillman, The Dissatisfied
Participant in the Solvent Business Venture: A Consideration of the Relative Permanence of Partner-
ships and Close Corporations, 67 MINN. L. REV. 1, 84 (1982) (noting that if oppressive major-
ity conduct frustrates a minority's expectations and breaches an agreement between the
parties, "it may be appropriate to grant relief under the [reasonable] expectations-based
analysis if the remedies for a breach of the agreement are inadequate") (emphasis added).
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ity inquiries of many oppression courts. In so doing, this Article also
raises issues regarding whether the protective rationale of the oppres-
sion doctrine can apply to other contexts and relationships.
Ultimately, this Article reveals that oppression law and contract
law are more dissimilar in operation than they might appear. Al-
though contract law has the tools to protect the close corporation
shareholder, well-entrenched doctrinal hurdles (e.g., indefiniteness,
expectation damages) will likely prevent it from doing so. Neverthe-
less, because oppressive majority conduct breaches an actual bargain
struck between the shareholders, and because the oppressive major-
ity's actions often result in a theft of the minority's investment, con-
tract law should take action to enforce the "deal" and to protect the
minority shareholder. Thus, when the oppression doctrine safeguards
reasonable expectations, oppression law is effectively stepping in for
contract law and is accomplishing what contract law itself should be
doing.
It is important to note that this Article focuses on whether con-
tract law could protect the oppressed shareholder through implied
contracts. In the rare case where the shareholders have entered into
express contracts for protection, such explicit agreements should
govern. Whether the oppression doctrine is obviated by a share-
holder's ability to enter into express contracts, however, is a separate
question that is beyond the scope of this Article.
Part I of this Article discusses the nature of the close corporation
and describes the development of the corporate law doctrine of
shareholder oppression. Part II examines the operation of the share-
holder oppression doctrine by analyzing oppression courts' usage of
pattern and conduct evidence, economic understandings, and buyout
remedies to establish and protect reasonable expectations. Building
on this analysis, Part III explores whether contract law could use simi-
lar tools to establish and protect reasonable expectations as implied-
in-fact contracts. As mentioned, because of various doctrinal hurdles
associated with existing contract law, this Part argues that contract law
is presently unlikely to take the broader perspective that is necessary
to mimic the protections of the oppression doctrine. Part IV contends
that the shareholder oppression doctrine is justified—even though
protected reasonable expectations may not rise to the level of an en-
forceable contract—because oppressive majority conduct breaches an
actual investment bargain and creates opportunities for theft. Finally,
Part V considers the possibilities of extending the shareholder op-
pression framework to other contexts and relationships where the
protection of contract law is similarly lacking.
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I. THE DOCTRINE OF SHAREHOLDER OPPRESSION
A. The Nature of the Close Corporation
A close corporation is a business organization typified by a small
number of stockholders, the absence of a market for the corpora-
tion's stock, and substantial shareholder participation in the man-
agement of the corporation." In the traditional public corporation,
the shareholder is normally a detached investor who neither contrib-
utes labor to the corporation nor takes part in management responsi-
bilities.27 In contrast, within a close corporation, "a more intimate and
intense relationship exists between capital and labor."28 Close corpo-
ration shareholders "usually expect employment and a meaningful
role in management, as well as a return on the money paid for [their]
shares."29 Moreover, close corporation investors are often linked by
family or other personal relationships that result in a familiarity be-
tween the participants."
" See, e.g., Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 328 N.E.2d 505, 511 (Mass. 1975); Daniel
S. Kleinberger, Why Not Good Faith? The Foibles of Fairness in the Law of Close Corporations, 16
Wm. MITCHELL L. REV. 1143, 1148 (1990) ("Close corporations have a limited number of
shareholders, and most, if not all, of the shareholders are active in the corporation's day-
to-day business.").
There is some variation in the definition of a close corporation. See WILLIAM L.
CARY & MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 389 (7th ed.
1995) (unabridged) ("Exactly what constitutes a close corporation is often a matter of
theoretical dispute. Some authorities emphasize the number of shareholders, some the
lack of a market for the corporation's stock, and some the existence of formal restrictions
on the transferability of the corporation's shares."); 1 CLOSE CORPORATIONS, supra note 15,
§ 1.02, at 4-7 (noting the following possible definitions of a "close corporation": a corpora-
tion with relatively few shareholders; a corporation whose shares are not generally traded
in the securities markets; a corporation in which the participants consider themselves
partners inter se; a corporation in which management and ownership are substantially iden-
tical; and any corporation _which elects to place itself in a close corporation grouping).
Nevertheless, the typical close corporation possesses most, if not all, of the attributes de-
scribed in these various definitions.
" Seel CLOSE ConrouxrioNs, supra note 15, § 1.08, at 31-32.
" Robert B. Thompson, The Shareholder's Cause of Action for Oppression, 48 Bus. LAW.
699, 702 (1993).
" Id. (footnotes omitted); see, e.g., Pedro v. Pedro, 963 N.W.2d 285, 289 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1990) ("[T1he primary expectations of minority shareholders include an active voice
in management of the corporation and input as an employee."); 2 CLOSE CORPORATIONS,
supra note 15, § 7.02, at 4 ("Ownership and management frequently coalesce in closely
held corporations, where not uncommonly all the principal shareholders devote full time
to corporate affairs. Even where one or two shareholders may be inactive, the business is
normally conducted by the others without aid from nonshareholder managers.").
" See, e.g., Robert B. Thompson, Corporate Dissolution and Shareholders' Reasonable Expec-
tations, 66 WASH. U. L.Q. 193, 196 (1988).
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Conventional corporate law norms of majority rule and central-
ized control can lead to serious problems for the close corporation
minority shareholder. 31 Traditionally, most corporate power is central-
ized in the hands of a board of directors." In a close corporation, the
board is ordinarily controlled "by the shareholder or shareholders
holding a majority of the voting power."s Through this control of the
board, the majority shareholder has the ability to take actions that are
harmful to the minority shareholder's interests. Such actions are of-
ten referred to as "freeze-out" or "squeeze-out" techniquesm that "op-
press"35 the close corporation minority shareholder. Common freeze-
out techniques include the termination of a minority shareholder's
employment, the refusal to declare dividends, the removal of a minor-
ity shareholder from a position of management, and the siphoning of
corporate earnings through high compensation to the majority
shareholder." Quite often, these tactics are used in combination. For
example, the close corporation investor typically looks to salary rather
than dividends for a share of the business returns because the
31 See 1F, HODGE O'NEAL & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, O'NEAL'S OPPRESSION OF MINOR-
ITY SHAREHOLDERS § 1:02, at 3-4 (2d ed. 1985) [hereinafter OPPRESSION] (characterizing
majority rule and centralized management as the "traditional pattern of corporate man-
agement," and noting the dangers that this management pattern presents to close corpo-
ration minority shareholders); Thompson, supra note 28, at 702-03 (In a closed setting,
the corporate norms of centralized control and majority rule easily can become instru-
ments of oppression.").
32 See REVISED MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 8.01(b) (1993) [hereinafter RMBCA] ("Al
corporate powers shall be exercised by or under the authority of, and the business and
affairs of the corporation managed under the direction of, its board of directors ....");
Kleinberger, supra note 26, at 1152 (In traditional theory, ultimate authority resides with
the board of directors . . . .").
33 Kleinberger, supra note 26, at 1151-52; see, e.g., 1 OPPRESSION, supra note 31, § 1:02,
at 3 ("Indeed, in most closely held corporations, majority shareholders elect themselves
and their relatives to all or most of the positions on the board.").
34 See 1 OPPRESSION, supra note 31, § 1:01, at 3 n.2 ("The term 'freeze-out' is often
used as a synonym for 'squeeze-out.'"). It has been noted that the term "squeeze-out"
means "the use by some of the owners or participants in a business enterprise of strategic
position, inside information, or powers of control, or the utilization of some legal device
or technique, to eliminate from the enterprise one or more of its owners or participants."
Id. at I. Similarly, a "partial squeeze-out" is defined as "action which reduces the participa-
tion or powers of a group of participants in the enterprise, diminishes their claim on earn-
ings or assets, or otherwise deprives them of business income or advantages to which they
are entitled." Id. at 1-2. See generally 1 id. §§ 3:01-3:20, 4:01-4:08, 5:01-5:39 (discussing
various squeeze-out techniques); 2 id. §§ 6:01-6:10 (same).
" See infra text accompanying notes 52-54 (describing judicial definitions of "oppres-
sion").
38 See 1 OPPRESSION, supra note 31, §§ 3:04, 3:06, 3:07, at 13-20, 37-58; see also Donahue,
328 N.E.2d at 513 (noting some of the possible freeze-out techniques).
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arnings of a close corporation often are distributed in major part
in salaries, bonuses and retirement benefits."37 When actual dividends
are not paid, therefore, a minority shareholder who is discharged
from employment and removed from the board of directors is effec-
tively denied any return on his or her investment as well as any input
into the management of the business. 38 Once the minority share-
holder is faced with this "indefinite future with no return on the capi-
tal he or she contributed to the enterprise," 39 the majority often pro-
poses to purchase the shares of the minority shareholder at an
unfairly low price.40
37 1 CLOSE CORPORATIONS, supra note 15, § 1.08, at 32; see Kleinberger, supra note 26,
at 1148 ("Payout is frequently in the form of salary rather than dividends.").
Reasonable salaries paid to employees of a close corporation can be deducted by
the close corporation when calculating its taxable income "and will thereby reduce the
amount of income tax that the company pays." Thompson, supra note 30, at 197 n.12 (cit-
ing I.R.C. § 162). The corporation, however, cannot deduct dividends paid to close corpo-
ration shareholders. As a consequence, corporate income paid as dividends is subject to
double taxation—once as business income at the corporate level, and once as personal
income at the shareholder level. See id. Because of the tax system's discouragement of divi-
dends in favor of salaries, "most close corporations provide a return to participants in the
form of salary or other employee-related benefits." Thompson, supra note 28, at 714 n.90;
see also 1 OPPRESSION, supra note 31, § 1:03, at 4-5 ("[A] close corporation, in order to
avoid so-called 'double taxation,' usually pays out most of its earnings in the form of sala-
ries rather than as dividends.").
" See, e.g., Balvik v. Sylvester, 411 N.W.2d 383, 388 (N.D. 1987) ("Balvik was ultimately
fired as an employee of the corporation, thus destroying the primary mode of return on
his investment. Any slim hope of gaining a return on his investment and remaining in-
volved in the operations of the business was dashed when Sylvester removed Balvik as a
director and officer of the corporation."); I CLOSE CORPORATIONS, supra note 15, § 1.15, at
89 ("An investor taking a minority investment position in a close corporation, expecting to
receive a return on the investment in the form of a regular salary, would face the risk that,
after a falling out among the participants, the directors would terminate the minority
shareholder's employment and deprive that investor of any return on the investment in
the corporation.").
" Thompson, supra note 28, at 703; see 1 CLOSE CORPORATIONS, supra note 15, § 1.16,
at 96 ("If, for example, the minority shareholder is fired from the employment that was
providing the return on the investment in the close corporation, the minority may face an
indefinite period with no return on the investment."); Charles W. Murdock, The Evolution
of Effective Remedies for Minority Shareholders and its Impact Upon Valuation of Minority Shares, 65
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 425, 447 (1990) ("[T]he primary vulnerability of a minority share-
holder is the specter of being 'locked-in,' that is, having a perpetual investment in an en-
tity without any expectation of ever receiving a return on that investment.").
90 See, e.g., Donahue, 328 N.E.2d at 515 ("Majority 'freeze-out' schemes which withhold
dividends are designed to compel the minority to relinquish stock at inadequate prices.
When the minority stockholder agrees to sell out at less than fair value, the majority has
won.") (citations omitted); 2 CLOSE CORPORATIONS, supra note 15, § 8.13, at 68 (noting
that "[a] squeeze-out usually does not offer fair payment to the `squeezees' for the inter-
ests, rights or powers which they lose"); Thompson, supra note 28, at 703-04 (noting that
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In a public corporation, the minority shareholder can escape
these abuses of power by simply selling his or her shares on the mar-
ket. By definition, however, there is no ready market for the stock of a
close corporation.'" Thus, when a close corporation shareholder is
treated unfairly through termination or otherwise, the investor "can-
not escape the unfairness simply by selling out at a fair price."42
B. The Cause of Action for Oppression
Over the years, state legislatures and courts have developed two
significant avenues of relief for the "oppressed" close corporation
shareholder. First, many state legislatures have amended their corpo-
rate dissolution statutes to include "oppression" by the controlling
shareholder as a ground for involuntary dissolution of the corpora-
tion,'" Moreover, when oppressive conduct has occurred, actual disso-
lution is not the only remedy at the court's disposal. Both state stat-
utes and judicial precedents have authorized alternative remedies that
are less drastic than dissolution." As the alternative forms of relief
in a classic freeze-out, 'the majority first denies the minority shareholder any return and
then proposes to buy the shares at a very low price").
41 See Donahue, 328 N.E.2d at 514 ("In a large public corporation, the oppressed or dis-
sident minority stockholder could sell his stock in order to extricate some of his invested
capital. By definition, this market is not available for shares in the close corporation.");
Brenner v. Berkowitz, 634 A.2d 1019, 1027 (NJ. 1993) ("[U]nlike shareholders in larger
corporations, minority shareholders in a close corporation cannot readily sell their shares
when they become dissatisfied with the management of the corporation."); 2 CLOSE COR-
PORATIONS, supra note 15, § 9.02, at 4 (IA] shareholder in a close corporation does not
have the exit option available to a shareholder in a publicly held corporation, who can sell
his shares in a securities market if he is dissatisfied with the way the corporation is being
operated."); Thompson, supra note 28, at 703 ("[T] he economic reality of no public mar-
ket deprives investors in close corporations of the same liquidity and ability to adapt avail-
able to investors in public corporations."); see also FRANK EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R.
FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 230-31 (1991) (noting that "the
lack of an active market in shares" prohibits close corporation shareholders from creating
"homemade dividends" by selling stock).
42 Kleinberger, supra note 26, at 1149.
43 See Thompson, supra note 28, at 708. See generally Murdock, supra note 39, at 452-61
(describing the development of oppression as a ground for dissolution).
44 See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 802A.751 SUbd. 1 (West Supp. 2000) (authorizing any
equitable relief and specifically authorizing a buyout of the shareholder's interest); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 14A:12-7 (West Supp. 1999) (providing a nonexclusive list of possible relief
that includes the order of a buyout and the appointment of a provisional director or cus-
todian); Brenner, 634 A.2d at 1033 ("Importantly, courts are not limited to the statutory
remedies [For oppression], but have a wide array of equitable remedies available to
them."); Balvik, 411 N.W.2d at 388-89 (listing alternative forms of relief for oppressive
conduct such as appointing a receiver, granting a buyout, and ordering the declaration of
a dividend); Masinter v. Webco Co., 262 S.E.2d 433, 441 & n.12 (W. Va. 1980) (listing ten
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have broadened over the years, orders of actual dissolution have be-
come less frequent." Thus, "oppression" has evolved from a statutory
ground for involuntary dissolution to a statutory ground for a wide
variety of relief."
Second, particularly in states without an oppression-triggered dis-
solution statute, some courts have imposed an enhanced fiduciary
duty between close corporation shareholders and have allowed an
oppressed shareholder to bring a direct cause of action for breach of
this duty. 47 In the seminal decision of Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co.,
the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court adopted such a standard:
[W]e hold that stockholders in the close corporation owe
one another substantially the same fiduciary duty in the op-
eration of the enterprise that partners owe to one another.
In our previous decisions, we have defined the standard of
duty owed by partners to one another as the "utmost good
faith and loyalty." Stockholders in close corporations must
discharge their management and stockholder responsibili-
ties in conformity with this strict good faith standard. They
may not act out of avarice, expediency or self-interest in
derogation of their duty of loyalty to the other stockholders
and to the corporation."
possible forms of relief for oppressive conduct such as ordering the reduction of excessive
salaries and issuing an injunction against further oppressive acts). But see Giannotti v.
Hamway, 387 S.E.2d 725, 733 (Va. 1990) (stating that the dissolution remedy for oppres-
sion is "exclusive" and concluding that the trial court is not permitted "to fashion other ...
equitable remedies").
4. See Thompson, supra note 28, at 708; cf. Harry J. Haynsworth, The Effectiveness of In-
voluntary Dissolution as a Remedy for Close Corporation Dissension, 35 CLEV. Sr. L. REV. 25, 50
(1986) (finding that courts ordered remedies other than dissolution in the majority of 37
involuntary dissolution cases studied). See generally Murdock, supra note 39, at 461-64 (dis-
cussing the development of alternative remedies).
46 See 2 CLOSE CORPORATIONS, supra note 15, § 9.29, at 132 ('The inclusion of 'oppres-
sion' and similar grounds as a basis for involuntary dissolution or alternative remedies has
opened up a much broader avenue of relief for minority shareholders caught up in a close
corporation wracked with dissension."); Thompson, supra note 28, at 708-09 ("[Ilt makes
more sense to view oppression not as a ground for dissolution, but as a remedy for share-
holder dissension.").
47 See Thompson, supra note 28, at 726; see also id. at 739 ("It should not be surprising
that the direct cause of action is developed particularly in states without an oppression
statute, and [it] provides a vehicle for relief for minority shareholders in a close corpora-
tion where the statutory norms reflect no consideration for the special needs of such en-
terprises."). See generally Murdock, supra note 39, at 433-40 (discussing the development of
the shareholder fiduciary duty).
45 Donahue, 328 N.E.2d at 515 (citations omitted) (footnotes omitted). The Donahue
duty of "utmost good faith and loyalty," however, was later scaled back by the same court.
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Following the lead of the Donahue court, several courts outside of
Massachusetts have also imposed an enhanced fiduciary duty running
from shareholder to shareholder in a close corporation: 19
The development of the statutory cause of action and the en-
hanced fiduciary duty reflect "the same underlying concerns for the
position of minority shareholders, particularly in close corporations
after harmony no longer reigns." 5° Because of the similarities between
the two remedial schemes, it has been suggested that "it makes sense
to think of them as two manifestations of a minority shareholder's
cause of action for oppression."51 In the close corporation context,
therefore, it is sensible to view the parallel development of the statu-
tory cause of action and the enhanced fiduciary duty action as two
sides of the same coin—i.e., the shareholder's cause of action for op-
pression.
C. Analyzing Oppression Through "Reasonable Expectations"
The development of a shareholder's cause of action for oppres-
sion requires courts to determine when "oppressive" conduct has oc-
curred. In wrestling with this issue, the courts have developed three
principal approaches to defining oppression. First, some courts define
oppression as "burdensome, harsh and wrongful conduct . . . a visible
departure from the standards of fair dealing and a violation of fair
play on which every shareholder who entrusts his money to a corpora-
Due to concerns that the "tin tempered application of the strict good faith standard enun-
ciated in Donahue... will result in the imposition of limitations on legitimate action by the
controlling group in a close corporation which will unduly hamper its effectiveness in
managing the corporation in the best interests of all concerned," the Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts suggested a balancing test in Wilkes u Springside Nursing Home, Inc.,
353 N.E.2d 657, 663 (Mass. 1976). If the controlling group can demonstrate a "legitimate
business purpose" for its actions, no breach of fiduciary duty will be found unless the tni-
nority shareholder can demonstrate "that the same legitimate objective could have been
achieved through an alternative course of action less harmful to the minority's interest."
Id.
45 See, e.g., Guy v. Duff & Phelps, Inc., 672 F. Supp. 1086, 1090 (N.D. 111. 1987); Orchard
v. Covelli, 590 F. Supp. 1548, 1556-59 (W.D. Pa. 1984); W&W Equip. Co. v. Mink, 568
N.E.2d 564, 574 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991); Evans v. Blesi, 345 N.W.2d 775, 779 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1984); Fought v. Morris, 543 So. 2d 167, 170-71 (Miss. 1989); Crosby v. Beam, 548
N.E.2d 217, 220 (Ohio 1989); Estate of Schroer v. Starnco Supply Inc., 482 N.E.2d 975, 981
(Ohio Ct. App. 1984).
50
 Thompson, supra note 28, at 739.
51 Id. at 700. See generally id. at 738-45 (describing the "combined cause of action for
oppression").
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tion is entitled to rely."52 Second, some courts link oppression to
breach of an enhanced fiduciary duty owed from one close corpora-
tion shareholder to another. 55
 Third, a number of courts tie oppres-
sion to the "frustration of the reasonable expectations of the share-
holders."54
 Of these three approaches, the "reasonable expectations"
standard garners the most approval, and courts have increasingly used
it to determine whether oppressive conduct has taken place. 55 The
highest courts in several states have adopted the reasonable expecta-
tions approach,56 and commentators have generally been in favor of
the reasonable expectations standard.57
52 Thompson, supra note 28, at 711-12 (alteration in original) (quoting Fix v. Fix Ma-
terial Co., 538 S.W.2d 351, 358 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976)); see, e.g., Skierka v. Skierka Bros., Inc.,
629 P.2d 214, 221 (Mont. 1981); see also Haynsworth, supra note 45, at 36-39 (describing
judicial definitions of oppression).
55 See, e.g., supra notes 47-49 and accompanying text.
" 2 CLOSE CORPORATIONS, supra note 15, § 9.29, at 132; see In re Kemp & Beatley, Inc.,
973 N.E.2d 1173, 1179 (N.Y. 1984) (equating oppression with conduct that "defeats the
'reasonable expectations' held by minority shareholders in committing their capital to the
particular enterprise").
" See, e.g., 2 CLOSE CORPORATIONS, supra note 15, § 9.30, at 141 ("One of the most
significant trends in the law of close corporations in recent years is the increasing willing-
ness of courts to look to the reasonable expectations of shareholders to determine
whether 'oppression' or similar grounds exist as a justification for involuntary dissolution
or another remedy."); see infra notes 56-57 and accompanying text.
56 See, e.g., Stefano v. Coppock, 705 P.2d 443, 496 n.3 (Alaska 1985); Fox v. 7L Bar
Ranch, 645 P.2d 929, 933-34 (Mont, 1982); Brenner, 634 A.2d at 1029; In re Kemp, 473
N.E.2d at 1179; Meiselman, 307 S.E.2d at 563-64; Balvik, 411 N.W.2d at 388; Masinter, 262
S.E.2d at 442. But see Kiriakides v. Atlas Food Sys. & Serv., Inc., 541 S.E.2d 257, 265-66 (S.C.
2001) ("We find [that] adoption of the 'reasonable expectations' standard is inconsistent
with [the South Carolina oppression-triggered dissolution statute], which places an em-
phasis not upon the minority's expectations but, rather, on the actions of the majority."). A
number of intermediate appellate courts in other states have adopted the reasonable ex-
pectations standard as well. See, e.g., Maschmeier v. Southside Press, Ltd., 435 N.W.2d 377,
380 (Iowa Ct. App. 1988); McCauley v. Tom McCauley & Son, Inc., 724 P.2d 232, 237 (N.M.
Ct. App. 1986); Davis v. Sheerin, 754 S.W.2d 375, 382 (Tex. App. 1988). In states without
an oppression-triggered dissolution statute, the reasonable expectations standard has also
been used to determine whether a breach of the enhanced fiduciary duty has occurred.
See, e.g., Wilkes, 353 N.E.2d at 662-63; Merola v. Exergen Corp., 648 N.E.2d 1301, 1305
(Mass. App. Ct. 1995). Finally, Minnesota and North Dakota have explicitly incorporated
the reasonable expectations standard into their dissolution statutes. See MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 302A.751 (3) (a) (West 1992); N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-19.1-115 (1985).
57 See 2 OPPRESSION, supra note 31, § 7:20, at 149 ("The reasonable expectations of the
shareholders, as they exist at the inception of the enterprise, and as they develop thereaf-
ter through a course of dealing concurred in by all of them, is perhaps the most reliable
guide to a just solution of a dispute among shareholders ...."); Haynsworth, supra note
45, at 31 (The third definition of oppression, initially derived from English case law, and
long advocated by Dean F. Hodge O'Neal as well as other leading close corporation ex-
perts, is conduct which frustrates the reasonable expectations of the investors."); Thomp-
son, supra note 30, at 211 ("Recognition of the intimate, illiquid relationship within a close
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The New York decision of In re Kemp & Beatley, Inc. has been par-
ticularly influential in giving some context to the reasonable expecta-
tions framework. In Kemp, the Court of Appeals stated that "oppres-
sive actions ... refer to conduct that substantially defeats the
`reasonable expectations' held by minority shareholders in commit-
ting their capital to the particular enterprise. "58 As the court contin-
ued:
A court considering a petition alleging oppressive conduct
must investigate what the majority shareholders knew, or
should, have known, to be the petitioner's expectations in
entering the particular enterprise. Majority conduct should
not be deemed oppressive simply because the petitioner's
subjective hopes and desires in joining the venture are not
fulfilled. Disappointment alone should not necessarily be
equated with oppression.
* * *
Rather, oppression should be deemed to arise only when the
majority conduct substantially defeats expectations that, ob-
jectively viewed, were both reasonable under the circum-
stances and were central to the petitioner's decision to join
the venture.
* * *
A shareholder who reasonably expected that ownership in
the corporation would entitle him or her to a job, a share of
corporate earnings, a place' in corporate management, or
some other form of security, would be oppressed in a very
real sense when others in the corporation seek to defeat
those expectations and there exists no effective means of sal-
vaging the investment. 59
corporation therefore provides the necessary foundation for judging whether relief should
be granted and, if so, what relief is appropriate; the shareholders' reasonable expectations
has become the standard which best facilitates that approach.").
55 In re Kemp, 473 N.E.2d at 1179.
59 Id.; see also Meiselman, 307 S.E.2d at 563 ("In order for plaintiff's expectations to be
reasonable, they must he known to or assumed by the other shareholders and concurred
in by them. Privately held expectations which are not made known to the other partici-
pants are not 'reasonable.' Only expectations embodied in understandings, express or
implied, among the participants should be recognized by the court.").
The Kemp court's focus on the shareholder's expectations at the time he decided
to join the venture has been criticized as unduly narrow. See, e.g., 2 CLOSE CORPORATIONS,
supra note 15, § 9.30, at 143 (stating that the Kemp court's focus "on the petitioner's expec-
tations at the time he decided to join the enterprise is too narrow and may reflect the par-
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II. PROTECTING THE REASONABLE EXPECTATION VIA SHAREHOLDER
OPPRESSION
In order to compare oppression law's protection of reasonable
expectations with contract law's protection of reasonable expecta-
tions, a deeper understanding of the operation of the oppression doc-
trine is needed. This Article contends that the shareholder oppression
doctrine establishes and protects reasonable expectations in the fol-
lowing manner: (I) by requiring evidence suggesting that the share-
holders' course of conduct in the particular dispute fits a common
pattern of behavior in close corporations; (2) by understanding the
economic rationale that leads a typical close corporation shareholder
to commit capital to a venture; and (3) by providing a buyout remedy
that effectively removes the oppressed shareholder from the company.
The first two factors, of course, are primarily relevant to a liability in-
quiry (i.e., determining whether a reasonable expectation has been
established), while the third factor is primarily relevant to a damages
inquiry (i.e., determining how a frustrated reasonable expectation
should be remedied). Each of these factors will be discussed in turn.
Before doing so, however, an additional observation should be made.
One must understand that courts conducting a reasonable expecta-
tions inquiry do not explicitly reference (at least typically) the above-
mentioned pattern and economic factors in their liability inquiries.
Instead, most published oppression decisions merely recite that rea-
sonable expectations "must be known to or assumed by the other
shareholders and concurred in by them,"6° or that reasonable expec-
tations are "embodied in understandings, express or implied, among
the participants. "61
 These decisions generally provide little or no dis-
ticular facts of that case," and expressing a preference for a broader standard that looks "to
the shareholders' reasonable expectations as they existed at the inception of the enter-
prise, and as they developed thereafter through a course of dealing").
Meiselman v. Meiselman, 307 S.E.2d 551, 563 (N.C. 1983); see also In re Kemp, 473
N.E.2d at 1179 ("A court considering a petition alleging oppressive conduct must investi-
gate what the majority shareholders knew, or should have known, to be the petitioner's
expectations in entering the particular enterprise."); id. at 1179 (noting that unfulfilled
"subjective hopes and desires in joining the venture" are insufficient to establish an oppres-
sion claim) (emphasis added) ;' Meiselman, 307 S.E.2d at 563 ("Privately held expectations
which are not made known to the other participants are not 'reasonable.'"); Bahls, supra
note 21, at 322 n.229 ("[C]ourts have been careful to protect only those expectations of
the minority known by and acquiesced to by the majority.").
(11
 Meiselman, 307 S.E.2d at 563; see also Gimpel v. Bolstein, 477 N.Y.S.2d 1014, 1019
(Sup. Ct. 1984) ("[T]he 'reasonable expectations' test is indeed an examination into the
spoken and unspoken understanding upon which the founders relied when entering into
the venture."); Robblee v. Robblee, 841 P.2d 1289, 1293 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992) (—Reason-
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cussion of how these "understandings" are formed or how "knowl-
edge" and "concurrence" are to be proven. Thus, the above-
mentioned contention—that a court's liability inquiry into whether a
reasonable expectation has been established involves pattern and
economic factors—should be understood as an attempt to explain
what is actually transpiring (or, at least, what appears to be transpir-
ing) in the liability inquiries of oppression courts.
A. The Pattern Determination
Courts and commentators have observed that reasonable expec-
tations are based on understandings shared by all of the stockholders
at the outset of a venture.° When an aggrieved shareholder asserts
that majority conduct has frustrated his or her reasonable expectation
of employment or management, therefore, it has been suggested that
a court should first satisfy itself that all of the investors shared a basic
understanding of employment or management at the inception of the
venture.° More precisely, "the aggrieved shareholder must offer evi-
dence indicating that the stockholders shared a basic understanding at
the venture's inception of an entitlement to certain specific benefits
(e.g., employment, management participation) due to their commit-
ments of capital to the business."1 Thus, for a court to find oppres-
sion liability, the aggrieved shareholder should be required to offer
evidence establishing the existence of a mutual understanding (i.e., a
reasonable expectation) that was ultimately frustrated by the major-
ity's actions.°
able expectations' are those spoken and unspoken understandings on which the founders
of a venture rely when commencing the venture."); Hillman, supra note 25, at 78 ("[O]nly
expectations embodied in understandings, express or implied, among the participants
should be recognized."); Thompson, supra note 30, at 224 (observing that a reasonable
expectations standard is based "on the parties' understandings").
62 See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
63 See, e.g., Moll, supra note 18, at 810.
at Id. at 810 (emphasis added). For example, a minority shareholder complaining that
his or her termination from employment improperly frustrated his or her reasonable ex-
pectation of working for the company should offer evidence establishing that the majority
and minority shareholders, at the inception of the business, mutually understood that a
commitment of capital to the venture entitled an investor to company employment.
05 See Exadaktilos v. Cinnaminson Realty Co., 400 A.2d 554, 561 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law
Div. 1979) (noting that "Wile expectations of the parties in the instant suit with regard to
their participation in corporate affairs are not established by any agreement; they must be
gleaned from the evidence presented"); see also Thompson, supra note 30, at 217 ("Courts
permit expectations to be established outside of formal written agreements, but the minor-
ity shareholder retains the burden of proving the existence of the expectations.").
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In practice, however, any evidentiary "requirement" is loosely ap-
plied. Although explicit evidence of mutual understandings between
the shareholders will occasionally be present—particularly where writ-
ten documents exist that spell out those understandings 66—such ex-
plicit evidence is usually absent. Indeed, close corporations typically
operate on a more informal basis.67
 As a consequence, generic infor-
mation reflecting the parties' actions and course of conduct is often
the only specific evidence of a reasonable expectation before the
court." When that evidence matches a pattern of behavior that occurs
in the typical close corporation, courts appear to be satisfied that a
reasonable expectation has been established." Thus, from an eviden-
tiary standpoint, the courts' reasonable expectation analyses seem to
require two types of pattern-related evidence: (1) general evidence of
a behavioral pattern that appears in typical close corporations; and
(2) specific evidence that the shareholders' actual course of conduct
in the company at issue fits within the pattern. These two evidentiary
components of the "pattern determination" will be discussed below.
1. The Behavioral Pattern in Close Corporations
To ascertain the reasonable expectations of close corporation
shareholders, one could gather empirical evidence by asking a large
number of stockholders about the entitlements they expected to re-
ceive as a result of their investments in close corporations." Short of
66 See, e.g., In re Topper, 433 N.Y.S.2d 359, 366 (Sup. Ct. 1980) ("The Court may deter-
mine the understanding of the parties as to the role the complaining shareholder is ex-
pected to play from agreements and evidence submitted."); Willman, supra note 25, at 78
('The clearest type of expectation is one which is set forth in a shareholder's agreement
signed by all of the parties."); cf. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.751(3a) (West Supp. 2000)
("litmny written agreements, including employment agreements and buy-sell agreements,
between or among shareholders or between or among one or more shareholders and the
corporation are presumed to reflect the parties' reasonable expectations concerning mat-
ters dealt with in the agreements.").
07 See infra note 215.
68 See, e.g., In re Topper, 433 N.Y.S.2d at 365 ("The parties' full understanding may not
even be in writing but may have to be construed from their actions."); Thompson, supra
note 30, at 217 ("Expectations ... must be gleaned from the parties' actions as well as their
written documents."); infra note 74 and accompanying text; cf. Meiselman, 307 S.E.2d at
563 ("The reasonable expectations of the shareholders, as they exist at the inception of the
enterprise, and as they develop thereafter through a course of dealing concurred in by all of them, is
perhaps the most reliable guide to a just solution of a dispute among shareholders, at least
a dispute among shareholders in the typical close corporation.") (emphasis added).
69
 See infra Parts II (A) (1), II (A) (2).
70
 It should be noted that Professors O'Neal and Thompson state in the preface to
their leading oppression treatise that "this work was prepared by a combination of field
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this empirical approach, however, one could simply observe what
many close corporation shareholders do in fact receive once they
commit capital to a venture. Such observations would constitute at
least circumstantial evidence of the reasonable expectations possessed
by many close corporation shareholders.
In oppression disputes, this latter approach is mimicked to a
great degree. A noticeable pattern of behavior is observed in many (if
not most) close corporations—i.e., shareholders invest in the com-
pany (generally as founders at the inception of the venture); they quit
their prior jobs and immediately begin working for the company and
serving in a management role; and they remain in employment and
management positions unless dissension arises between the majority
and minority investors.' 1 Such a pattern implies that typical close cor-
poration shareholders invest with the expectation that their invest-
ments entitle them to employment and management participation
with the company.72 Significantly, oppression courts appear to recog-
nize this pattern's and to accept the pattern's implication. After all,
work and library investigation." 1 OPPRESSION, supra note 31, at vi (Stipp. 1999). Thus, the
information contained in this source is based, at least in part, on empirical evidence. The
treatise goes on to state that close corporation investors "usually expect to be actively in-
volved in the management and operation of the enterprise." 2 OPPRESSION, supra note 31,
§ 7:15, at 89.
71 See, e.g., Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, 353 N.E.2d 657, 658-61 (Mass. 1976);
Pedro v. Pedro, 489 N.W.2d 798, 799-800 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992); In re 7bpper, 433 N.Y.S.2d
at 361-62; Balvik v. Sylvester, 411 N.W.2d 383, 384-85, 388 (N.D. 1987); see also 2 CLOSE
CORPORATIONS, supra note 15, § 7.02, at 4 ("Ownership and management frequently coa-
lesce in closely held corporations, where not uncommonly all the principal shareholders
devote full time to corporate affairs. Even where one or two shareholders may be inactive,
the business is normally conducted by the others without aid from nonshareholder man-
agers.").
72 See, e.g., infra notes 74-76 and accompanying text. It is important to note that typical
close corporation shareholders do possess "general" reasonable expectations that stern
solely from their status as stockholders rather than from any pattern of behavior. These
"general" expectations are fully protected by the shareholder oppression doctrine. See infra
note 137 and accompanying text,
73 The highest court of West Virginia discussed the following two "factual patterns" of
close corporation conduct that often result in oppression:
The first is where the minority shareholder has made a parity of capital in-
vestment with the other shareholders with the expectation of full-time remu-
nerative employment with the corporation, and this expectation has been re-
alized. Characteristically, the minority shareholder has worked for the
corporation over a period of time, only to find that through no fault of his
own and not as a result of any legitimate business purpose, his services and all
remuneration are terminated.
The second pattern is where the minority holder has originally been in-
volved in the formation of the corporation, or induced to invest in it, with the
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many courts use this course of conduct—investment, followed by
company employment and management—to aid their conclusion that
reasonable expectations of employment and management existed. 74
Moreover, judicial acceptance of the pattern's implication is revealed
by the general assertions of numerous courts that close corporation
shareholders possess reasonable expectations of employment and
management participation. 75 The Minnesota decision of Pedro v. Pedro,
expectation of some return on his investment. Further, he has received some
return, either by salary or dividend, but finds that this return has been sev-
ered for no legitimate business purpose and not as a result of any dereliction
on his part.
Masinter v. Webco Co., 262 S.E.2d 433, 441 (W. Va. 1980) (citations omitted); see, e.g.,
Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 328 N.E.2d 505, 511 (Mass. 1975) ("We deem a close
corporation to (be] typified by (3) substantial majority stockholder participation in the man-
agement, direction and operations of the corporation.") (emphasis added); id. at 512 ("In es-
sence, though, the enterprise remains one in which ownership is limited to the original
parties ... [and] in which ownership and management are in the same hands ...."); Kiri-
akides v. Atlas Food Sys. & Serv., inc., 527 S.E.2d 371, 387 (S.C. Ct. App. 2000) (noting the
"ubiquitous pattern of other cases in which a minority shareholder's employment is termi-
nated from a company, salary and benefits cease, and the shareholder is deprived of par-
ticipation in management"); cf CARY & EISENBERG, supra note 26, at 539-40 ("One way in
which a court determines that reasonable expectations have been defeated by majority
shareholders is by asking itself what similarly situated shareholders would have probably
expected."); O'Neill, supra note 21, at 659 (1.11n drawing inferences about [shareholders']
expectations, the law will inevitably be guided by a particular vision of what motivates the
reasonable shareholder.").
74 See, e.g., Gunzberg v. Art-Lloyd Metal Prods. Corp., 492 N.Y.S.2d 83, 85 (App. Div.
1985) ("As a result of their long history of taking an active part in the running of the cor-
poration, petitioners demonstrated that they had a reasonable expectation that they would
continue to be employed by the company, and have input into its management."); Balvik,
411 N.W.2d at 388 ("Balvik quit his former job to join Sylvester in the new business enter-
prise, making a relatively substantial investment in the process. It is apparent from the
record that Balvik's involvement with [the business] constituted his primary, if not sole,
source of livelihood and that he quite reasonably expected to be actively involved in the
operations of the business."); cf. Muellenberg v. Bikon Corp., 669 A.2d 1382, 1388 (NJ.
1996) (in this case, it is reasonable to conclude that Burg's fair expectations were that
should he give up his prior employment with a competitor company and enter this small
corporation, he would enjoy an important position in the management affairs of the cor-
poration.").
" See, e.g., Wilkes, 353 N.E.2d at 662-63 ("[B]y terminating a minority stockholder's
employment or by severing him from a position as an officer or director, the majority ef-
fectively frustrate the minority stockholder's purposes in entering on the corporate ven-
ture and also deny him an equal return on his investment."); Ingle v. Glamore Motor Sales,
Inc., 535 N.E.2d 1311, 1319 (N.Y. 1989) (Hancock, J., dissenting) ("A person who buys
a minority interest in a close corporation does so not only in the hope of enjoying an in-
crease in value of his stake in the business but for the assurance of employment in the
business in a managerial position."); In re Topper, 433 N.Y.S.2d at 365 ("Unlike their coun-
terparts in large corporations, minority shareholders in small corporations often expect to
participate in management and operations."); Balvik, 411 N.W.2d at 386 ("[I]t is generally
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for example, stated rather absolutely that "the primary expectations
of minority shareholders include an active voice in management of
the corporation and input as an employee." 76 In short, the recurring
pattern of behavior in close corporations is often treated as general
evidence that contributes to whether a reasonable expectation will be
found.
2. Specific Evidence of Fitting Within the Pattern
Even if a broader pattern in close corporations is recognized,
specific evidence from the particular dispute before the court (i.e.,
specific evidence establishing a reasonable expectation) seems to be
necessary as well." As mentioned, however, the amount of evidence
needed to satisfy this "requirement" is slight at best. For example,
proof (via testimony or otherwise) that the minority shareholder was a
company founder who served as an employee and a manager after his
or her initial investment satisfies many courts that the shareholder's
situation fits within the general pattern. Correspondingly, this proof
satisfies many courts that reasonable expectations of employment and
management have been established. 78 This "specific evidence," of
understood that, in addition to supplying capital and labor to a contemplated enterprise
and expecting a fair return, parties comprising the ownership of a close corporation ex-
pect to be actively involved in its management and operation."); see also 1 OPPRESSION,
supra note 31, § 1:03, at 4 ("Quite commonly when a participant invests in a close corpora-
tion he expects to work in the business on a full-time basis."); Thompson, supra note 28, at
702 (noting that close corporation shareholders "usually expect employment and a mean-
ingful role in management, as well as a return on the money paid for [their] shares").
76 463 N.W.2d 285,289 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990).
77 This "specific evidence" requirement is sensible. Otherwise, in concluding that a
reasonable expectation has been established, courts would be relying on the broader pat-
tern and would be ignoring the fact-specific evidence that arises from the particular dis-
pute before the court. See supra notes 63-65 and accompanying text (describing the need
to offer evidence).
" See, e.g., Wilkes, 353 N.E.2d at 664 (listing factors relevant to an oppression finding
and including the following: "Wilkes was one of the four originators of the nursing home
venture"; "Wilkes, like the others, had invested his capital and time for more than fifteen
years with the expectation that he would continue to participate in corporate decisions";
and "[the majority's] action was in disregard of a long-standing policy of the stockholders
that each would be a director of the corporation and that employment with the corpora-
tion would go hand in hand with stock ownership"); supra note 68 and accompanying text;
infra note 79.
Even if a shareholder's actions fall within the general pattern (i.e., investment
followed by employment and management), there may be other evidence contradicting
the notion that reasonable expectations of employment and management have been estab-
lished. For example, the language of an express shareholder's agreement may negate any
inference of a mutual understanding that the investor was entitled to employment. See, e.g.,
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course, is minimal, as it often reflects the undisputed facts of the
case."
In some oppression lawsuits, however, this proof cannot be ad-
duced, and an aggrieved shareholder is unable to demonstrate that
his or her dispute matches the broader pattern of close corporation
behavior. In Merola v. Exergen Corp., for example, the plaintiff minority
shareholder was terminated from his employment with the com-
pany.8° Merola sued, asserting that his termination constituted a
In re Apple, 637 N.Y.S.2d 534, 535 (App. Div. 1996) (noting that a buyout agreement ex-
plicitly bound each shareholder to sell "after ceasing for any reason, either voluntarily or
involuntarily, to be in the employ of the corporation," and stating that the terminated
shareholder-employee "cannot be heard to argue that he had a reasonable expectation
that he would be employed and would be a shareholder for life"); Ingle, 528 N.Y.S.2d at
603 ('The plaintiff was aware throughout his employment of the possibility that he could
be discharged at the will of the defendants since he repeatedly signed agreements which
provided for his discharge 'for any reason' and for the repurchase of his interest in the
corporation at that time."). When an aggrieved stockholder challenges his or her denial of
employment in these shareholder agreement situations, a court should not find that a
basic understanding of employment has been established. Instead, despite the fact that the
shareholder's actions fall within the general pattern, a court should conclude that the
alleged frustrated expectation of employment is unreasonable and unenforceable. See also
Douglas K. Moll, Shareholder Oppression v. Employment at Will in the Close Corporation: The In-
vestment Model Solution, 1999 U. ILL. L. REv. 517, 559-61 (noting that not all close corpora-
tion shareholders reasonably expect that their investments entitle them to employment);
cf. Woodard v. Southwest States, Inc., 384 S.W.2d 674, 674 (Tex. 1964) ("Where there exists
a valid express contract covering the subject matter, there can be no implied contract.").
19 See, e.g., In re Topper, 433 N.Y.S.2d at 361-62. As the Topper court stated:
The petitions and supporting affidavits in this case show conclusively, and
respondents do not deny, that petitioner Topper associated himself with [the
close corporations] in the expectation of being an active participant in the
operation of both corporations. To that end, petitioner terminated an em-
ployer-employee relationship in the drug business of twenty-five (25) years
duration ... and uprooted himself and transported his family from ... Flor-
ida to New York.... Petitioner put his life savings into the venture.... The
controlling shareholders do not deny that petitioner's expectations, not ex-
pressed in any written agreement, formed a necessary component of the cor-
poration's formation.
Id. (footnote omitted); see also In re Williamson, 687 N.Y.S.2d 53, 54 (App. Div. 1999) ("We
agree ... that petitioner's allegations that he was involuntarily ousted from any involve-
ment or ownership in respondent corporation, of which he was a founding one-third
shareholder, by the other two one-third shareholders, not only stated a cause of action for
involuntary dissolution based on oppressive action, but also warranted the granting of the
application [for relief], given papers on respondent's motion to dismiss that effectively
constituted an answer but which failed to raise any genuine issues of fact on the question
of oppression."); id. ("We note that ... petitioner's employment was an incident of his
stock ownership, cloaking him with a reasonable expectation of continued employment.").
8° See 668 N.E.2d 351, 352-53 (Mass. 1996).
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breach of fiduciary duty. 81 In rejecting Merola's claim, the court ob-
served that Merola was not a founder of the company, and it noted
that he had been working for the company as a part-time employee
before ever investing in the business. 82 Moreover, the court com-
mented that "Where was no general policy regarding stock ownership
and employment, and there was no evidence that any other stock-
holders had expectations of continuing employment because they
purchased stock. "83 Merola, simply put, was unable to adduce even the
minimal amount of evidence that is required for a protected reason-
able expectation. In other words, Merola was unable to prove that his
particular dispute fit within the broader pattern of behavior in close
corporations. 84 Without any other evidence to establish a reasonable
expectation of employment, the court refused to credit Merola's
clai m.88
In summary, the liability inquiries of many oppression courts
seem to turn in large part on general evidence of a behavioral pattern
in close corporations as well as on specific evidence that the share-
holders' actual course of conduct fits within the pattern. This "pattern
determination," however, is only one facet of a court's inquiry into
whether a reasonable expectation exists. The economics behind close
corporation investments also plays a significant role.
81 See id. at 352.
82 See id. at 354. Recall that the typical pattern of close corporation behavior involves
shareholders who do not begin serving as employees and managers until after investing
their capital in the company. See supra text accompanying note 71; see also 1 OPPRESSION,
supra note 31, § 3:06, at 42 (Supp. 1998) (noting that the shareholder oppression doctrine
is unlikely to be applied "when the employment relationship dominates the shareholder
relationship, for example where the individual was an employee before becoming a share-
holder .. . .").
Merola, 668 N.E.2d at 359.
64 See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
88 See Merola, 668 N.E.2d. at 354-55. In terms of "other evidence" to establish a reason-
able expectation, a stockholder may have entered into an express agreement that guaran-
tees his or her employment or management for a particular period of time. See, e.g.,
McQuade v. Stoneham, 189 N.E. 234, 235 (N.Y. 1934). In such situations, a reasonable
expectation of employment or management would seem to exist even if the shareholder
cannot demonstrate that his or her dispute matches the broader pattern of close corpora-
tion behavior. Alternatively, regardless of whether there is sufficient pattern-related evi-
dence, some reasonable expectations (aside from employment and management) can be
established merely by the investor's status as a "stockholder." See infra note 137 and accom-
panying text.
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B. The Economic Rationale for Close Corporation Investments
Courts may be willing to find reasonable expectations based on a
broader pattern and thin specific evidence because they understand
the economics behind an investor's commitment of capital to a close
corporation. In other words, courts seem to appreciate that a rational
minority stockholder would not invest in a close corporation without
reaching a shared understanding of continued employment and
management participation with the majority stockholder. As a conse-
quence, a court may be more willing to credit an alleged reasonable
expectation of employment or management participation based
merely on the aggrieved shareholder's status as an employee-manager
since the company's founding.
1. The Employment Interest
For many close corporation investors, the desire for employment
is the principal enticement motivating their decision to commit capi-
tal to a venture.86 Compared to similar employment in other contexts,
a close corporation job is frequently associated with a higher salary, 87
96 See, e.g., In re Kemp, 473 N.E.2d at 1178 ( -As a matter of fact, providing employment
for himself may have been the principal reason why he participated in organizing the cor-
poration.") (internal quotation omitted); 1 CLOSE CORPORATIONS, supra note 15, § 1.08, at
31-32 ("Providing for employment may have been the principal reason why the share-
holder participated in organizing the corporation."); see also Wilkes„ 353 N.E.2d at 662 ("A
guaranty of employment with the corporation may have been one of the basic reason(s)
why a minority owner has invested capital in the firm.") (internal quotation omitted); In re
Wiedy's Furniture Clearance Ctr. Co., 487 N.Y.S.2d 901, 903 (App. Div. 1985) ("Although
the exact amount of the capital contribution is disputed, petitioner utilized his own funds
in getting this new venture underway, not simply as an investment, but to provide em-
ployment and a future for himself."); Alyse J. Ferraro, Ingle u Glamore Motor Sales, Inc.: The
Battle Between Ownership and Employment in the Close Corporation, 8 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. U.
193, 215 (1990) ("As the majority emphasizes, Ingle was compensated for the sale of his
shares, but to believe that the dollar amount received met his expectations would be to
dismiss his purpose in acquiring those shares. Ingle had reasonably expected his employ-
ment to continue until he chose to retire or to acquire his own Ford dealership ....");
Murdock, supra note 39, at 468 ("that people often invest in a closely-held corporation to
provide a job is almost self-evident ...."); id. ("[TJo deny a minority shareholder employ-
ment when a job was part of his rationale in investing is oppressive, as is the failure to pay divi-
dends to nonemployee shareholders when employed shareholders are receiving de facto
dividends through salaries.") (emphasis added) (footnote omitted); id. at 472 ("[W] hat is
at stake in the 'oppression' cases is often a job—a very attractive job."); Robert A. Ragazzo,
Toward a Delaware Common Law of Closely Held Corporations, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 1099, 1110
(1999) (noting that a close corporation shareholder "often invests for the purpose of hav-
ing a job").
87 This assertion, of course, assumes a comparison between similar jobs in businesses at
similar stages of development. See 1 OPPRESSION, supra note 31, § 3:07, at 57 n.5 (noting
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a prestigious management position,88 and intangible benefits stem-
ming from working for oneself" Relatedly, many close corporations
are small start-up businesses that,face a high risk of failure." Because
that "the special prerogatives enjoyed by a majority in a dose corporation not infrequently
block the sale of a close corporation because the majority has difficulty obtaining such
lucrative employment elsewhere" (citing J.C. Hetherington, Special Characteristics, Problems,
and Needs of the Close Cinporation, 1969 ILL. LE 1, 20 n.72)); SHANNON R PRATT ET AL.,
VALUING A BUSINESS: THE ANALYSIS AND APPRAISAL OF CLOSELY FIELD COMPANIES 121 (3d
ed. 1996) ("It is not uncommon to find an owner/manager of a successful closely held
company earning a greater amount in annual compensation than the amount an equiva-
lent nonowner employee would earn as compensation."); Ragazzo, supra note 86, at 1109
("The shareholder may invest for the purpose of having a job that produces higher com-
pensation than could be garnered through employment by third parties."); see also
Bonavita v. Corbo, 692 A.2d 119, 124 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1996) ("[W]hile there is no
claim that the [close corporation] salaries are excessive, neither was there a showing that if
the `inside' employment were terminated those family members could earn as much else-
where."); Nelson v. Martin, 958 S.W.2d 643, 644 (Tenn. 1997) (noting that the annual
compensation of a shareholder-employee of a commercial printing business "was in excess
of $250,000").
See 1 OPPRESSION, supra note 31, § 3:07, at 54 (referring to the "prestige, privileges,
and patronage that come from controlling a corporation and occupying its principal
offices"); id. § 3:06, at 38 ("[L]osing the prestige of a directorship may be of considerable
consequence to the shareholder."); see also Wilkes, 353 N.E.2d at 659-60 & ti.9 (observing
that all of the close corporation participants were directors of the company and that the
offices of president, treasurer, and clerk were held by each of the participants over the
years); Balvik, 411 N.W.2d at 384 (noting that both participants in a close corporation were
directors of the company and observing 'that one shareholder-employee served as the
president while the other served as the vice-president).
" See Ingle, 535 N.E.2d at 1319 (Hancock, J., dissenting) (noting "the challenge, the
independence, the prestige, the feeling of achievement, and the other intangible benefits
of being part of the management of a successfully run small company"); Bahia, supra note
21, at 290-91 (noting that close corporation ownership includes "the social status and
challenge of operating one's own company and the satisfaction of providing employment
to one's children"); id. at 319 n,212 (mentioning the "loss of satisfaction and other qualita-
tive perks associated with operating a business"); O'Neill, supra note 21, at 668, 671 (de-
scribing the "psychological payoffs" that an "owner-manager" anticipates as a result of in-
vesting in a venture, including "the pleasure of being one's own boss, the feeling of
satisfaction in creating a viable enterprise and even the excitement of taking a substantial
risk"); Ragazzo, supra note 86, at 1110 ("Additionally, the employee may simply derive satis-
faction from working in a business that he himself takes a substantial part in managing.").
90 See, e.g., MICHAEL E. GERBER, THE 'E-MYTH REVISITED: WHY MOST SMALL BUSI-
NESSES DON'T WORK AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 2 (1995). As Gerber observes:
Businesses start and fail in the United States at an increasingly staggering
rate. Every year, over a million people in this country start a business of some
sort. Statistics tell us that by the end of the first year at least 40 percent of
them will be out of business. Within five years, more than 80 percent of them
, will have failed . 	 [M]ore than 80 percent of the small businesses that
survive the first five years fail in the second five.
Id.; see also 1 OPPRESSION, supra note 31,'§ 1:04, at 8 (describing close corporations as
"small business enterprises"); U.S. SMALL Bus. ADMIN., THE ANNUAL REPORT ON SMALL
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of the uncertainty surrounding whether the business will have any
earnings at all, let alone earnings growth or consistency,91 the close
corporation shareholder's initial decision to invest is often based pri-
marily on the definitive benefits of close corporation employment,
rather than on the speculative possibilities of earnings growth. 92 The
observations of one commentator capture both of these ideas:
In a closely held corporation, a shareholder-employee has
interests in his job and stock that are often economically in-
tertwined. Holding stock in a closely held corporation,
viewed purely as an investment decision, seems almost irra-
tional from an economic perspective. Small businesses are
exceedingly risky enterprises with high failure rates. To
compensate fairly for this level of risk, the expected return
would also have to be disproportionately large. Moreover,
many investors in small businesses invest a significant por-
tion of their life savings in the business. This practice defeats
their ability to diversify their investment portfolios and ex-
poses them to company- and industry-specific risk. As a re-
sult, investors in closely held corporations would seem well
advised to trust their capital to diversified mutual funds
rather than a small corporation.
* * *
BUSINESS AND COMPETITION 29`(1997) ("Fewer than half of all new firms are in operation
after five years."); U.S. SMALL Bus. ADMIN., OFFICE OF ADVOCACY, SMALL BUSINESS AN-
SWER CARD, available at http://www.sbaonline.sba.gov/advo/stats/ec_anscd.html
 (last
modified Apr. 20, 1999) ("Business turnover is the domain of small business."); O'Neill,
supra note 21, at 668 n.84 ('The risk of failure of the small business enterprise is notori-
ously high,"); Ragazzo, supra note 86, at 19 ("Small businesses are exceedingly risky enter-
prises with high failure rates.").
91 See, e.g., GERBER, supra note 90, at 2 (noting that "hundreds of thousands of people
every year ... pour their energy and capital—and life—into starting a small business and
fail," and stating that "many others ... struggle along for years simply trying to survive").
92 See, e.g., Donahue, 328 N.E.2d at 514 ("Typically, the minority shareholder in a close
corporation has a substantial percentage of his personal assets invested in the corporation.
The stockholder may have anticipated that his salary from his position with the company
would be his livelihood.") (citation omitted); Muellenberg, 669 A.2d at 1385 (noting that
participation in the business is the "principal source of employment and income" for many
close corporation shareholders); In re Kemp, 473 N.E.2d at 1178 (noting that a share-
holder's "participation in [a close] corporation is often his principal or sole source of in-
come"); 1 OPPRESSION, supra note 31, § 1:03, at 4 ("[A close corporation shareholder] may
put practically everything he owns into the business and expect to support himself from
the salary he receives as a key employee of the company. Whenever a shareholder is de-
prived of employment by the corporation ... he may be in effect deprived of his principal
means of livelihood."); supra notes 87-89 and accompanying text.
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If investors in closely held corporations are economically ra-
tional, it can only be because such investments have com-
pensating benefits not available to investors in publicly held
corporations. In many cases, a shareholder in a closely held
corporation expects to receive such compensating benefits
[e.g., a higher salary, job security, and job satisfaction]
through employment . . . . Thus, a shareholder in a closely
held corporation often has a significant investment interest
in his job. He often invests for the purpose of having a job,
and the salary and other benefits he receives are conceived
to be part of the return on his investment."
A close corporation investor, therefore, considers employment with
the company to be the critical component of his or her overall in-
vestment return. As a consequence, it is likely that a rational share-
holder would only purchase a minority stake in a close corporation if
continued employment was part of the bargain struck with the major-
ity shareholder."
2. The Management Interest
Along with the related employment interest, investors are also
motivated to commit capital to a close corporation because of their
desire for management participation as a director or officer of the
company.'" Aside from the prestige and other intangibles associated
with holding a director or officer position," a management role also
presents an opportunity to effectively monitor the shareholder's in-
vestment.97
Within a close corporation, such a monitoring ability is vitally
important. After all, close corporation shareholders often invest a
substantial portion of their life savings in the company98 and, as a con-
" Ragazzo, supra note 86, at 1109-10 (footnotes omitted).
94 See infra Part IV(A) (discussing the investment bargain struck between close corpo-
ration shareholders).
" See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
9° See supra notes 88-89 and accompanying text.
97 Cf. Ingle, 535 N.E.2d at 1321 (Hancock, J., dissenting) rile same features of the
minority owner-participant's status which make him particularly vulnerable to action by
the majority obviously work to compel him to stay on the job. He needs to do so to protect his
investment and to share in any increase in its value.") (emphasis added); I OPPRESSION,
supra note 31, § 3:06, at 38 ("[R]emoval of a minority shareholder from the hoard reduces
his access to information on what is going on in the corporation and thereby his ability to
protect himself against squeeze plays.").
98 See supra note 92.
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sequence, they need some way of protecting their investment. Unfor-
tunately, a mere shareholder has no say in routine corporate deci-
sionmaking.99
 Moreover, although shareholders have the statutory
right to inspect a company's books and records with a proper pur-
pose,m that right is easily hindered by a majority shareholder intent
on obstructing such an inspection. 191 As a consequence, mere share-
holders often lack both a voice in the company's decisionmaking pro-
cess as well as access to information about the company's affairs. Be-
cause management has the ability to make corporate decisions and
has access to corporate information, 102 however, a management role
provides a direct opportunity for a shareholder to effectively partici-
pate in and monitor the company's activities. 103 Ideally, such an op-
portunity allows the shareholder to try and steer the business away
from investment-threatening decisions.
Because of the importance of a monitoring ability in a close cor-
poration, shareholders in such ventures expect that their investments
entitle them to an active management role in the company. 104 Indeed,
it is likely that an economically rational shareholder would forego in-
vesting in a close corporation unless the majority stockholder shared a
basic understanding of management participation in the company. 195
" See, e.g., Ragazzo, supra note 86, at 1115 (noting that the "shareholder has little or no
say in the day-to-day management of the corporation,"); Robert B. Thompson & D.
Gordon Smith, Fiduciary Duty and "Sacred Space" in Corporate Takeovers 5 (October 15,
2000) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (noting that in the corporate gov-
ernance structure, "the role for shareholders is limited" as "Whey vote, sell or sue, each in
carefully measured doses"); id. at 5 n.16 (observing that shareholders vote only on electing
directors, amending the articles, approving mergers, approving extraordinary sales of as-
sets, and approving dissolution).
too See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 220(b) (1998).
tot See, e.g., Sec. First Corp. v, U.S. Die Casting & Dev. Co., 687 A.2d 563, 566 (Del.
1997) (involving a lawsuit filed by a plaintiff shareholder after its written demand to in-
spect books and records was rejected); Compaq Computer Corp. v. Horton, 631 A.2d 1, 3
(Del. 1993) (same).
102 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (1998) ( -The business and affairs of every
corporation organized under this chapter shall be managed by or under the direction of a
board of directors ...."); id. § 220(d) ("Any director ... shall have the right to examine
the corporation's stock ledger, a list of its stockholders and its other books and records for
a purpose reasonably related to his position as a director.").
1 °3 See Willits, 353 N.E.2d at 662 ("Other noneconomic interests of the minority stock-
holder are likewise injuriously affected by barring him from corporate office. Such action
severely restricts his participation in the management of the enterprise, and he is relegated to enjoy-
ing those benefits incident to his status as a stockholder.") (emphasis added); supra note
89.
1154
 See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
105 See infra notes 302-303 and accompanying text.
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In short, the courts' apparent understanding and acceptance of
the economic rationale underlying close corporation investments is
an important component of a shareholder oppression liability inquiry.
Put differently, the courts' understanding and acceptance of the eco-
nomics behind a close corporation investment decision seem to con-
tribute to judicial determinations that reasonable expectations have
been established.
C. The Buyout Remedy
Once reasonable expectations have been established, the share-
holder oppression doctrine protects them through an expansive
range of remedies. It has previously been noted that legislatures and
courts have authorized remedies for oppressive conduct that are less
drastic than dissolution. 108 The Minnesota legislature, for example,
drafted a statute that authorizes "any equitable relief" for oppressed
minority shareholders."? In addition, judicial opinions often list vari-
ous forms of relief for oppressive conduct, including the appointment
of a receiver, the declaration of a dividend, the reduction of excessive
salaries, and the issuance of an injunction against further oppressive
actions. 108 The most common alternative remedy, however, is a "fair
value" buyout of the oppressed investor's stockholdings. 109 In opera-
105 See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
107 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.751 subd. 1 (West Supp. 2000).
1 °0 See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
105 See 1 CLOSE CORPORATIONS, supra note 15, § 1.16, at 97 (noting that buyouts "are
the most common remedy for dissension within a close corporation"); Murdock, supra
note 39, at 470 (*The most common form of alternative remedy is the buy-out of the mi-
nority shareholder."); Thompson, supra note 30, at 231 ('The increased use of buyouts as a
remedy for deadlock or dissension is the most dramatic recent change in legislative and
judicial thinking on close corporations problems."); see also RMBCA § 14.34(a) (1993) ("In
a proceeding under 14.30(2) to dissolve a corporation ... the corporation may elect or, if
it fails to elect, one or more shareholders may elect to purchase all shares owned by the
petitioning shareholder at the fair value of the shares.") (emphasis added); Thompson,
supra note 28, at 718 (noting that "[s]everal of the largest commercial states permit a cor-
poration or its majority shareholders to avoid involuntary dissolution by purchasing the
shares of the petitioning shareholders at their 'fair value'").
Support for the buyout remedy exists in half the states, although the relevant
statutes and judicial decisions differ in their operation. See Thompson, supra note 28, at
718. In some states, the corporation or the shareholders are permitted by statute to pur-
chase the shares of a minority shareholder seeking involuntary dissolution. See, e.g.,
ALASKA STAT. § 10.06.630 (Michie 1989); CAL. CORP. CODE § 2000 (West 1990); MICH.
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 450.1189 (West 1990); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.751 (subd. 2) (West
Supp. 2000); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:12-7(8) (West 1992); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW §§ 1104-a,
1118 (McKinney Supp. 1992); N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-19.1-115 (1985); RMBCA § 14.34(a)
(1993). In other states, statutes authorize a court to order a buyout as one of several possi-
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tion, the buyout awards the aggrieved shareholder his or her propor-
tionate share of the corporation's value. ]]o This corporate "appraisal"
is commonly conducted by calculating the company's investment
value—a measurement which is typically based upon the earnings of
the close corporation at issue over a specified period of time. 111
The breadth of remedies for shareholder oppression provides the
courts with great flexibility to choose a remedial scheme that most
appropriately responds to the aggrieved shareholder's harm. 112
 For a
number of reasons, the buyout remedy itself is particularly significant.
First, the buyout remedy functions as a "market" for the aggrieved
minority shareholder by allowing the shareholder to recover the capi-
tal that he or she invested in the company. 113 Given that a close corpo-
ration, by definition, lacks a market for its shares,'" the buyout rem-
edy offers a court-authorized exit right for close corporation
shareholders that allows them to recover the earnings-based value of
their investments.
ble remedies in dissolution proceedings or in other litigation between shareholders. See,
e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-216 (West 1990); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 13A, § 1123
(West 1992); S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-14-310(d) (4) (Law. Co-op. 1994); MODEL STAT. CLOSE
CORP. SUPP. §§ 41, 42 (1993). Courts have also ordered buyouts as part of their general
equitable authority. See, e.g., Orchard v. Covelli, 590 F. Supp. 1548, 1560 (W.D. Pa. 1984);
Davis v. Sheerin, 754 S.W.2d 375, 380, 383 (Tex. App. 1988); Thompson, supra note 28, at
720-21 ("Courts increasingly have ordered buyouts of a shareholder's interest by the cor-
poration or the other shareholders even in the absence of specific statutory authoriza-
tion."). Finally, it should be noted that, in certain situations, the minority shareholder may
be able to buy out the holdings of the majority shareholder. See, e.g., Muellenberg v. Bikon
Corp., 669 A.2d 1382, 1389 (N.J. 1996).
110
 A 30% shareholder, for example, owns 30% of the company and has a correspond-
ing claim to 30% of the company's value.
III See Thompson, supra note 30, at 233 ("The most common method for determining
fair value is to calculate investment value, usually based on the company's earnings."); id.
("Mite most commonly utilized formula [for calculating investment value] treats com-
pany earnings as determinant of investment value."); see also Hendley v. Lee, 676 F.
Supp. 1317, 1329 (D.S.C. 1987) (valuing a close corporation based upon the company's
earnings); In re Fleischer, 486 N.Y.S.2d 272, 274-75 (App. Div. 1985) (same); Blake v. Blake
Agency, Inc., 486 N.Y.S.2d 341, 348 (App. Div. 1985) ("Investment value is usually a func-
tion of the earning power of the corporation.").
II! See Thompson, supra note 28, at 722 (observing that "most courts and legislatures
have given an expansive interpretation to remedies"); cf. Pedro, 463 N.W.2d at 288 ('The
courts should be left with as much flexibility as possible to provide an adequate remedy for
the case before them.") (internal quotation omitted).
"3 See Moll, supra note 18, at 793 ("By ordering a buyout of the minority's interest at
`fair value,' the courts are effectively replicating a market for close corporation minority
interests and are allowing oppressed shareholders to 'cash out' of the business.") (footnote
omitted).
114 See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
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Second, and similarly, the buyout remedy creates an equitable
"parting" between the majority shareholder and the aggrieved minor-
ity shareholder. The majority shareholder continues to operate the
close corporation and to participate in the company's successes and
failures, while the minority shareholder recovers the value of the
shareholder's invested capital and removes himself or herself from
the company's affairs."'" In a shareholder oppression context, this eq-
uitable parting may be necessary for an effective resolution of the dis-
pute. Alternative remedies, in other words, are often inadequate in a
shareholder oppression context. For example, assume that a minority
shareholder's reasonable expectation of employment is frustrated
when he or she is terminated without justification116 by the majority
shareholder. A specific performance order of reinstatement is a re-
medial option" 7 but, in an oppression context, forcing the share-
holders to continue working together is often undesirable. After all,
in most oppression disputes, the dissension between the majority and
minority shareholders "will hamper, if not eliminate, their ability to
continue working together" such that "it would be counterproductive
for the oppression doctrine to require a resumption of the share-
holder's involvement.""s To put it bluntly, "[i]t no doubt is futile to
expect a closely held corporation to operate smoothly when a share-
holder has been frozen out, litigation has ensued, and the court has
compelled the shareholder's return."" 9
"6 See, e.g., 2 OPPRESSION, supra note 31, § 10:09, at 60 ("The buy-out feature in these
statutes is desirable because it permits shareholders who want to preserve the enterprise as
a going concern to buy out dissenters, and at the same time it provides an oppressed
shareholder a fair price for his holdings."); Ragazzo, supra note 86, at 1119 ("[The buyout]
is less harsh than dissolution and often gives both parties what they want most. The major-
ity gets to run the business as it sees fit, unfettered by the continued participation of the
minority, while, at the same time, the minority receives the fair value of its investment,");
Sandra L. Schlafge, Comment, Pedro v. Pedro: Consequences for Closely Held Corporations and
the At-Will Doctrine in Minnesota, 76 MINN. L. REV. 1071, 1080 n.46 (1992) ("[T] he buyout is
the preferred remedy for shareholder disputes because it allows a return of the share-
holder's capital while not crippling the business."); id. at 1093 ("[T]he statute provides for
a buyout, which the Minnesota Legislature described as the preferred remedy because it
returns the shareholder's capital while leaving the business entity intact.").
"6 If the majority's allegedly oppressive action (e.g., terminating the minority's em-
ployment) is justifiable in light of the minority's misconduct or incompetence, a finding of
shareholder oppression is unwarranted. See Moll, supra note 18, at 800-01, 813.
" 7 See Ragazzo, supra note 86, at 1117 (noting that "the remedy for an illegal discharge
of a minority shareholder might be reinstatement ....").
us Mont supra note 78, at 540.
" 6 Deborah A. Schmedemann, Fired Employees and/or Frozen-Out Shareholders (An Essay),
22 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1435, 1466 (1996); see also RMBCA § 14.34 mu. (1993) ("[Al
resort to litigation may result in an irreparable breach of personal relationships among the
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An award of compensatory damages may likewise prove inade-
quate in an oppression context. Returning to our example of the
terminated shareholder, assume that the discharged stockholder re-
tains his or her management position (e.g., a director) as well as his
or her general stockholder right to receive a proportionate share of
the corporation's income. 120 Stated differently, assume that the share-
holder's reasonable expectation of employment was the only expecta-
tion that was frustrated by the majority's actions. From a damages
standpoint, a court could award conventional wrongful termination
damages such as back pay121 and, in appropriate cases, front pay. 122
Such an award would appear to make the aggrieved shareholder
shareholders of a closely-held firm, making it impossible for them to continue in business
to their mutual advantage."); III E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS
§ 12.7, at 184 (2d ed. 1998) (noting that the refusal to grant specific performance in a
personal services context is partially based "on the undesirability of compelling the con-
tinuance of personal relations after disputes have arisen and confidence and loyalty have
been shaken"); 1 OPPRESSION, supra note 31, § 3:06, at 51 n.22 ("[S]pecific performance
may be denied on the ground that goodwill and a cooperative spirit among the executives
is essential to successful operation of the enterprise."); Murdock, supra note 39, at 428
(1111 the problem is triggered by animosity among the shareholders, there may be an
endless parade back to court to seek additional relief, should the animosity not be re-
solved. Therefore, in many instances, the only permanent resolution to the problem would
be to eliminate the complaining minority interest by a repurchase of shares.") (footnote
omitted); Ragazzo, supra note 86, at 1118 ("[Bly the time such shareholder disputes get to
court, the relationship between the parties has usually deteriorated to such an extent that
it is impractical to expect the parties to continue in business together.").
120 See infra note 137 and accompanying text.
121 See 2 MARK A. ROTHSTEIN ET AL., EMPLOYMENT LAW § 9.24, at 583 (1994) ("[A] ma-
jor element of damages in any discharge action is the compensation (wages, salary, com-
missions, or other payments, plus fringe benefits) the employee lost by reason of the dis-
charge."); id. ("As a general matter, the employee should recover back pay damages, less
any mitigation amounts, from the date of the discharge until the date of trial, unless his or
her employment would have ended earlier for a lawful reason."); see also Wilkes, 353 N.E.2d
at 665 (awarding a discharged shareholder "the salary he would have received had he re-
mained an officer and director of [the company]").
122 M commentators have noted:
In addition to compensation lost in the past, plaintiffs often seek future dam-
ages, or front pay, for some period of time beyond the date of the trial. The
duty to mitigate means that, if the court permits awards of front pay, they can
go only to those plaintiffs who have not been able to find other comparable
employment after their discharge; in many future damages cases, however,
the employee has another job that pays less than the former employment and
argues that the defendant should have to compensate him or her for the life-
time earnings differential.
2 ROTHSTEIN ET AL., supra note 121, § 9.24, at 583.
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whole in light of the unjustified termination of employment. 123 Given
the track record of oppressive majority behavior, however, the damage
award is arguably inadequate, as it leaves the other aspects of the
shareholder's investment bargain (e.g., management role, dividends)
subject to the majority's control. In other words, it seems problematic
to grant a remedy that keeps the investment of the aggrieved share-
holder locked into the company and, relatedly, forces the aggrieved
shareholder to trust that a previously oppressive majority shareholder
will not oppress again.124 This is particularly true given that a termina-
tion of employment is rarely the only oppressive action taken by a ma-
jority shareholder. In fact, a termination of employment is usually
only one component of a broader freeze-out scheme that ultimately
involves removal from management as well as cessation of divi-
dends. 125 Even if the damages award was coupled with an injunction
forbidding subsequent oppressive actions (e.g., an injunction requir-
ing the corporation to pay reasonable dividends in the future),126 the
supervision required by the injunction would cause a court to be con-
tinually involved in the "acrimonious relationship" between the par-
ties—a situation that courts typically attempt to avoid. 127
12 ' Back pay and front pay awards may not make the terminated shareholder com-
pletely "whole." Such awards do not compensate the shareholder for any loss of prestige
caused by removal from a management position (except to the extent that the prestige of
the position was represented by a higher salary). Furthermore, such awards do not com-
pensate the shareholder for any loss of intangible "be your own boss" value. See supra notes
88-89 and accompanying text.
124 See, e.g., Ragazzo, supra note 86, at 1118 ("[A]fter substantial illegal conduct has
been proved, it is unfair to a minority shareholder to require him to continue to trust the
majority to treat him and his investment in a fair manner."); see also Baker v. Commercial
Body Builders, Inc., 507 P.2d 387, 394 (Or. 1973) (noting the possibility that "those in con-
trol of the corporation are so incorrigible that they can no longer be trusted to manage it
fairly in the interests of the stockholders").
125 See, e.g.', Willies, 353 N.E.2d at 661, 663 n.13 (involving a minority shareholder who
was terminated from employment and removed from management in a company where no
dividends were paid); Burack v. I. Burack, Inc., 524 N.Y.S.2d 457, 459-60 (App. Div. 1988)
(same); In re Topper, 433 N.Y.S.2d at 362 (same).
140
	 e.g., Patton v. Nicholas, 279 S.W.2d 848, 857 (Tex. 1955) ("The respondents are
further entitled to have the injunction provide for reasonable dividends to be thereafter
declared annually from future profits of the corporation ...."); Ragazzo, supra note 86, at
1117.
127 Ragazzo, supra note 86, at 1118 (observing that one difficulty with "purely compen-
satory forms of relief" for oppression is that "they involve the court in continued supervi-
sion of an acrimonious relationship"); see JOHN D. CALAMARI & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, THE
LAW OF CONTRACTS 16-5, at 668 (4th ed. 1998) ("Courts have been reluctant to enforce
even non-personal services contracts on grounds of difficulty of supervision."); 111 FARNS-
WORTH, MPH] note 119, § 12.4, at 164 ("Courts have also been reluctant to order perform-
ance if difficulties of supervision or enforcement are foreseen ."); cf. CALAMARI & PER-
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Third, the buyout remedy does not require the bargain between
the shareholders to be articulated with precision. Although a frus-
trated expectation of employment or management can trigger op-
pression liability and a subsequent buyout remedy, the buyout does
not award damages for the value of the lost job or the lost manage-
ment position. 128 Instead, the conventional buyout remedy provides
the aggrieved shareholder only with the value of his or her financial
investment—i.e., the value of the shareholder's proportionate interest
in the company. 1" Thus, the oppression doctrine operates with an
asymmetry between its liability and damages inquiries. The loss of a
job or a management position often serves as a trigger of oppression
liability, but the conventional buyout remedy fails to directly compen-
sate for this liability trigger.
This asymmetry, however, does provide some benefit. Because the
buyout remedy does not compensate for a frustrated employment or
management expectation, there is no need for those expectations to
be stated with precision. For example, if damages stemming from a
termination of employment were awarded as part of a buyout remedy,
a court would need to know more than the mere liability fact that a
general understanding of employment was shared between the inves-
tors.'" Indeed, to calculate a proper front pay award, a court, at a
minimum, would need to know the term of employment (i.e., the du-
ration) that the discharged shareholder was supposed to complete." 1
two, supra, § 16-10, at 672 ("In many cases, courts have refused to grant specific perform-
ance on grounds that supervision of performance would involve an undue investment of
judicial time and effort."); III FARNSWORTH, supra note 119, § 12.7, at 182-83 ("A court will
not grant specific performance or an injunction if this would impose on it burdens of en-
forcement or supervision that are disproportionate to the advantages to be gained
The burdens may be particularly heavy if judging the quality of the performance poses
difficult problems or if supervision will be required over an extended period of time.").
125 See Moll, supra note 78, at 571-72; see also Raids, supra note 21, at 298-99 (observing
that "[a]warding the fair market value of a shareholder's interest does not compensate for
the loss of an expectation of a voice in management" because "[Oroblems inherent in
quantifying the value of this expectation to intangible amenities often preclude the court
from awarding any value for loss of the expectation").
129 See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
130 See supra notes 63-65 and accompanying text (noting that a mutual understanding
between the shareholders can suffice to establish a reasonable expectation).
131 For example, assume that a shareholder has a three-year employment agreement
with a close corporation. Under the agreement, the shareholder is to be paid a salary of
$80,000 per year. After one year, the shareholder is terminated without cause in violation
of the agreement. Despite the best efforts of the shareholder, comparable employment can
only he obtained at a $60,000 salary. The termination, therefore, robbed the shareholder
of the ability to earn an additional $20,000 for the remaining two years of his or her
agreement. A properly discounted award of $40,000 (i.e., the $20,000 salary differential for
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Because the buyout remedy does not provide damages for a frustrated
employment expectation, however, such additional detail is unneces-
sary. Simply put, the oppression doctrine can tolerate more
indefiniteness in the employment and management "terms" of the
overall investment bargain because, although such terms serve an im-
portant function as broad liability triggers, they have no part in the
conventional "fair value" buyout. Thus, as long as a court is satisfied
that a general understanding of employment or management was
shared between the investors, no further detail on these understand-
ings is typically needed. Majority conduct that unjustifiably frustrates
such general understandings (e.g., an unjustified removal from man-
agement) will trigger oppression liability and will typically allow for
application of the buyout remedy.
D. Summary
In summary, oppression courts seem to use evidence of pattern
and conduct in conjunction with an understanding of close corpora-
tion investment economics to help them determine whether a rea-
sonable expectation has been established. Once established, however,
reasonable expectations are protected under the shareholder oppres-
sion doctrine by a wide range of remedies, including a "fair value"
buyout that, in operation, is sensitive to the realities of an oppression
setting. Armed with this understanding of the liability and damages
facets of the shareholder oppression doctrine, our attention turns to
contract law and its potential for handling oppression disputes.
III. PROTECTING THE REASONABLE EXPECTATION VIA CONTRACT LAW
With an understanding of how the courts use the oppression doc-
trine to protect reasonable expectations, it is appropriate to ask
whether contract law can provide similar protection under the guise
the two remaining years of the agreement) would represent an accurate front pay award.
Without knowledge of the three-year duration of the employment agreement, however,
calculating an accurate front pay award would be impossible. As a consequence, the share-
holder would presumably be unable to recover front pay damages.
Even if a court decided to reinstate the discharged employee rather than to
award damages, it is likely that the court would still require significant detail about the
original terms of employment. Cf. III •ARNSWORTH, supra note 119, § 12.9, at 164 ("[Tihe
practical exigencies of drafting decrees to guide future conduct under the threat of the
severe sanctions available for contempt have moved courts to require that contract terms
be expressed with greater certainty if specific relief is to be ordered than if damages are to
be awarded.").
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of safeguarding implied-in-fact contracts.'" This Article contends that
contract law will likely be unable to protect the reasonable expecta-
tions of close corporation shareholders because, in practice, courts
tend to apply contract law in a narrow manner. Put differently, be-
cause of indefiniteness, employment at will, and statute of frauds
problems, courts are likely to conclude that the oppression doctrine's
reliance on pattern, conduct, and economic evidence is insufficient to
establish an implied-in4act contract. Moreover, conventional reme-
dies in a contract dispute are probably inadequate in a shareholder
oppression context.'" Nevertheless, if an expansive view of contract
law was taken, contract law could be used to protect the minority
shareholder's reasonable expectations. In that instance, the need for
an independent oppression doctrine would be minimized, if not
eliminated.
A. The "Contract" Between Close Corporation Shareholders
If contract law can be used in lieu of the oppression doctrine to
protect the minority's reasonable expectations of employment, man-
agement, and a share of the corporate earnings, 134 such reasonable
1 s2 Because there is a paucity of cases and commentary that discuss both a shareholder
oppression claim and a breach of contract claim for the same wrongful majority conduct,
there are no clear answers regarding whether contract law could handle disputes that are
presently handled by the shareholder oppression doctrine. Due to this minimal amount of
precedent, this Article's discussion of potential problems that could derail the efforts of
contract law to handle oppressive conduct should be understood as "best guesses"—i.e.,
best guesses of how courts would actually respond to a breach of contract claim that is
premised on allegedly oppressive activity.
I" For many years, contract law had little ability to protect the reasonable expectations
of close corporation shareholders because of a separate corporate law problem. Indeed,
shareholder agreements for continuous employment or management participation were
previously unenforceable under corporate law, as they were considered to be improperly
infringing on the management powers of the board of directors. See, e.g., McQuade v.
Stoneham, 189 N.E. 234, 236 (N.Y. 1934) ("[I]t must be ... true that the stockholders may
not, by agreement among themselves, control the directors in the exercise of the judgment
vested in them by virtue of their office ... ."); id. ("Directors may not by agreements en-
tered into as stockholders abrogate their independent judgment."); id. (noting that the
stockholders' "power to unite" is "limited to the election of directors and is not extended
to contracts whereby limitations are placed on the power of directors to manage the busi-
ness of the corporation"). Modern state statutes, however, have largely eliminated this
corporate law restriction. See Edward B. Rock & Michael L. Wachter, Waiting for the Omelet to
Set: Match,Specific Assets and Minority Oppression in Close Corporations, 24 J. CORI'. C. 913, 914
(1999).
1 m See Moll, supra note 18, at 794 ("In a close corporation	 the shareholder typically
commits his capital with the expectation that his investment entitles him to employment
and to a management role, as well as to a proportionate share of the company's earn-
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expectations must be described in the language of contracts. To ac-
complish this task, it is necessary to conceptualize the contract or con-
tracts that are arguably formed when a typical investor commits capi-
tal to a close corporation One plausible conception views the core
ings."); supra note 29 and accompanying text; see also Michaud v. Morris, 603 So. 2d 886,
888 (Ala. 1992) ("Certain basic expectations of investors are enforceable in the courts, and
among those is a right to share proportionally in corporate gains."); Bahls, supra note 21,
at 330 ("Shareholders in close corporations expect proportional distribution of the earn-
ings of the corporation while it is operating.").
135 When investors commit capital to a close corporation, it could be argued that the
investors have entered into a "contract" whose terms are established by the company's
charter, the company's bylaws, and the state's corporations statutes. These sources primar-
ily define the "contractual" relationship between the directors, officers, and shareholders
on the one hand, and the corporation itself on the other hand. The "contract" discussed
in this Article, however, is different, as it involves the bargain between the majority share-
holder and the individual minority shareholders. In close corporations, in other words, the
charter, bylaws, and corporate statutes dol not represent the entirety of the bargain be-
tween the participants. See, e.g., In re Topper, 433 N.Y.S.2d 359, 365 (Sup. Ct. 1980) (Mils
Court ... recognizes that in a close corporation the bargain of the participants is often not
reflected in the corporation's charter, by-laws nor even in separate signed agreements."); F.
Hodge O'Neal, Close Corporations: Existing Legislation and Recommended Reform, 33 Bus. LAW.
873, 886 (1978) ("In a close corporation; the corporation's charter and bylaws almost
never reflect the full business bargain of the participants."); id. at 887 ("[Acts] which, in
law, are a valid exercise of powers conferred by the articles may nevertheless be entirely
outside what can fairly be regarded as having been in the contemplation of the parties
when they became members of the company.") (internal quotation omitted); id. ("[E]ven
when there has been nothing done in excess of power it is necessary to consider whether
the situation which has arisen is not quite outside what the parties contemplated ... and
whether what has been done is not contrary to the assumptions which were the foundation
of their agreement."); D. Prentice, Protection of Minority Shareholders, 1972 CURRENT LEGAL
PROBS. 124, 134 (1972) (finding unsatisfactory the argument "that the minority share-
holder has no one to fault but himself in that his exclusion from participation in the man-
agement of the company is merely a consequence of the contract between himself and the
company established by the articles of association, a contract which putatively he has freely
entered into," and noting that "[ills establishing the nature of the relationship between
the members of a private company, it is necessary for the courts to go beyond the provi-
sions in the articles of association and in addition to take into consideration the expecta-
tions of the parties when the company was originally formed") (footnote omitted); see also
EASTERBROOK & FISCHE', supra note 41, at 12 ("[W]e often speak of the corporation as a
'nexus of contracts' or a set of implicit and explicit contracts. This reference, too, is short-
hand for the complex arrangements of many sorts that those who associate voluntarily in
the corporation will work out among themselves. This form of reference is a reminder that
the corporation is a voluntary adventure, and that we must always examine the terms on
which real people have agreed to participate."); Krishnan S. Chittum, Resolving Close Corpora-
lion Conflicts: A Fresh Approach, 10 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POLY 129, 159 (1990) (stating that
"[title public corporation can be viewed as a standard form multiparty contract, some of
the terms of which are specified by statute," and noting that "[t]he close corporation does
not involve the same 'standard form' contract, or the consequential grant of power");
Prentice, supra, at 146 ("Where [expectations] have been interfered with or are in some
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contract as an exchange of investment capital for a stock certificate
that represents the right to be a shareholder in the company. 136 Just as
in a public corporation, of course, the status of "shareholder" entitles
an investor to such benefits as a proportionate share of the corporate
earnings (e.g., a proportionate share of the dividends, if declared), a
right to any stock appreciation, a right to inspect company books and
records (with a proper purpose), a right to vote on shareholder issues,
and a right to be recognized as a shareholder.'" Unlike the public
corporation, however, shareholder status in a close corporation typi-
cally conveys additional rights as well—i.e., rights to employment and
management participation in the company.' 38 In this "money-for-
stock" conception, therefore, the minority shareholder parts with
consideration (i.e., money) 139
 and receives in return a stock certificate
that conveys, inter alia, a right to employment, a right to an active
way unfulfilled, then this should prima facie constitute oppression whether or not there
was any legal impropriety.").
138 See generally DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 158 (1998) ( -The shares of a corporation shall
be represented by certificates .... [E]very holder of stock represented by certificates and
upon request every holder of uncertificated shares shall be entitled to have a certificate
signed by, or in the name of the corporation ...."). The stock certificate, of course, also
conveys the rights that are provided to all shareholders under the corporate law of the
state (for example, the right to a proportionate share of the company's earnings). See infra
note 137 and accompanying text.
"7 See, e.g., Michaud, 603 So. 2d at 888 ("Certain basic expectations of investors are en-
forceable in the courts, and among those is a right to share proportionally in corporate
gains."); Exadaktilos v. Cinnaminson Realty Co., 400 A.2d 554, 560 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law
Div. 1979) ("Profit is expected through the payment of dividends or sale of stock at an
appreciated value."); Davis v. Sheerin, 754 S.W.2d 375, 382 (Tex. App. 1988) ("[W]e find
that conspiring to deprive one of his ownership of stock in a corporation, especially when
the corporate records clearly indicate such ownership, is ... oppressive. Appellant's con-
duct not only would substantially defeat any reasonable expectations appellee may have
had ... but would totally extinguish any such expectations."); O'Neill, supra note 21, at
663 ("The shareholder of a publicly traded corporation may realize a return on her in-
vestment in either of two ways: directly, by a distribution of dividends, or indirectly, by an
increase in the market value oilier shares."); Schlafge, supra note 115, at 1077 n.29 ("Both
[public corporation and close corporation] investors expect appreciation in the value of
their investment."); supra notes 99-100 and accompanying text (discussing voting rights
and inspection rights). See generally Moll, supra note 78, at 553-56 (discussing general rea-
sonable expectations).
"8 See, e.g., Exadaktilos, 400 A.2d at 561 ("Unlike their counterparts in large corpora-
tions, [close corporation minority shareholders] may expect to participate in management
or to influence operations, directly or indirectly, formally or informally. Furthermore,
there generally is an expectation on the part of some participants that their interest is to
be recognized in the form of a salary derived from employment with the corporation.")
(citation omitted); supra notes 75-76 and accompanying text.
I" See infra note 203 (noting that a shareholder's contribution of capital can be
treated as "consideration").
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management role, and a right to a proportionate share of the com-
pany's earnings (e.g., dividends, stock appreciation). Employment,
management, and a proportionate stake in the company's profits,
therefore, would be viewed as terms of this money-for-stock contract.
A single money-for-stock contract with a number of accompany-
ing terms, however, is not the only way to conceptualize the close cor-
poration investment contract. 14° A court may find that the close cor-
poration bargain is comprised of a number of smaller contracts—e.g.,
a money-for-employment contract, a money-for-management contract,
a money-for-dividends contract, etc. Such a characterization is not
necessarily a stretch given that a single consideration (the minority's
investment capital) can support multiple promises (e.g., the majority's
promise of employment, the majority's promise of management) . 141
As will be discussed, the choice between a single money-for-stock
contract and multiple money-for-benefit contracts may be important.
In fact, the way in which the court conceptualizes the close corpora-
tion investment contract may significantly affect the ability of contract
law to handle a typical shareholder oppression dispute.
B. The Failure of the Pattern Determination
1. Indefiniteness
a. The Significance of Indefiniteness
The indefiniteness of a communication can affect a contract
analysis at two levels. First, as a threshold matter, an indefinite com-
munication is some evidence that the parties lacked the intent to con-
tract in the first place. 142 Before concluding that a contract has re-
142 See Morey W. McDaniel, Bondholders and Corporate Governance, 41 Bus. LAW. 413, 416
(1986) (noting that the average stockholder can be described as a holder of an "invest-
ment contract").
141 See, e.g., Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 171 Cal. Rptr. 917, 925 (Ct. App. 1981) ("A sin-
gle and undivided consideration may be bargained for and given as the agreed equivalent
of one promise or of two promises or of many promises.") (internal quotation omitted);
CALAMAR1 & PERILLO, supra note 127, § 4.15, at 218 ("The rule is that one consideration
will support many promises.").
142 See CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 127, § 2.9, at 50 ("The more terms that are
omitted the more likely it is that the parties do not intend to contract."); see also Soar v.
National Football League Player's Ass'n, 550 F.2d 1287, 1290 (1st Cir. 1977) ("While an
enforceable contract might be found in some circumstances if one or more of such ques-
tions were left unanswered, the accumulation in the instant case of so many unanswered
questions is convincing evidence that there never was a consensus ad item between the
parties."); Owen v. Owen, 427 A.2d 933, 937 (D.C. 1981) ("One of the essential elements
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suited, courts typically Search for proof that both parties assented to
be bound) ." Under traditional contract law, such a search involves an
inquiry into offer and acceptance)" A . determination that words or
conduct amount to an offer, however, is not a determination that is
lightly made. Indeed, "[c]ourts have reason for caution, since to hold
the maker of a proposal to a contract exposes the maker to liability
based on the recipient's expectation interest, even in the absence of
any reliance. "145 Thus, it is generally stated that the indefiniteness of
the suggested bargain is a factor weighing against the conclusion that
an offer—a manifestation of intent to be bound—has been estab-
Iished.196
 As the Southern District of New York stated:
It is true that there is much room for interpretation once the
parties are inside the framework of a contract, but it seems
that there is less in the field of offer and acceptance. Greater
precision of expression may be required, and less help from
the court given, when the parties are merely at the threshold
of a contract. 147
Second, even if there is an intent to contract, the indefiniteness
of the contract terms themselves may render the agreement unen-
forceable)" Although older authorities typically required contract
terms to be stated with a high degree of specificity)" the modern view
for formation of a contract is a manifestation of agreement or mutual assent by the parties
to the terms thereof; in other words, to establish a contract the minds of the parties must
be in agreement as to its terms. The failure to agree on or even discuss an essential term of
a contract may indicate that the mutual assent required to make or modify a contract is
lacking.") (internal quotation omitted) (citations omitted).
148 See 1 FARNSWORTH, supra note 119, § 3.1, at 184.
144 See 1 id. § 3.10, at 234 (defining an offer as "a manifestation of assent that empow-
ers another to enter into a contract by manifesting assent in return").
148 1 Id. § 3,10, at 237.
146 See CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 127, § 2.6, at 46 (noting that an "important
factor[]" to be considered "kin determining whether a communication is an offer or not"
is whether there are "detailed terms or ... only relatively few terms covered"); I FARNS-
WORTH, supra note 119, § 3.10, at 237 (listing "the completeness of the suggested bargain"
as a factor relevant to determining whether a particular proposal amounts to an offer).
147 United States v. Braunstein, 75 F. Supp. 137, 139 (S.D.N.Y. 1947).
148 See CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 127, § 2.9, at 50 ("[E]ven if the parties intend
to contract, if the content of their agreement is unduly uncertain no contract is formed
because an agreement must be sufficiently definite before a court can determine if either
party breached it.") (footnote omitted).
149 See, e.g.id. § 2.9, at 53 ("[U]nder the traditional rule where the parties have pur-
ported to agree upon a material term and left it indefinite, the agreement is too vague and
indefinite."); cf. 1 SAMUEL WILLISTON & WALTER H.E. JAEGER, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
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permits a degree of imprecision so long as the contract terms "pro-
vide a basis for determining the existence of a breach and for giving
an appropriate remedy." 15°
Although these two facets of indefiniteness are technically dis-
tinct, they are closely related in practice. The absence of essential
terms affects a court's assessment of whether the parties intended to
contract at all, as well as a court's ability to enforce any purported
bargain. Nevertheless, depending on how the close corporation in-
vestment contract is conceptualized, the distinction between "no in-
tent to contract" and "indefinite terms" may still have some practical
significance.
b. The Definiteness of the Close Corporation Bargain
It has previously been suggested that courts, as part of their rea-
sonable expectations analyses, typically rely on evidence drawn from
the parties' actions and course of conduct. As mentioned, this eviden-
tiary inquiry generally requires nothing more than proof that the ag-
grieved shareholder invested in the company (often as a founder)
and immediately thereafter began serving as an employee and man-
ager of the corporation. Many courts have been willing to find that
such circumstantial evidence suffices to create an enforceable reason-
able expectation. 151 As a matter of contract law, however, such a
minimal amount of proof is problematic. Although the circumstantial
evidence in close corporation disputes typically establishes very gen-
eral understandings of employment and management participation,
there is rarely any further evidence allowing a court to flesh out the
details of these generic understandings. For example, although a
shared understanding of employment and management participation
may be established through evidence that the shareholders founded
the close corporation, committed capital to the business, quit their
prior jobs, and immediately began serving as employees and manag-
ers, 152 there is usually no evidence of the details of the arrangement
CONTRACTS § 37, at 107 (3c1 ed. 1957) ("[AI n agreement, in order to be binding, must be
sufficiently definite to enable a court to give it an exact meaning.").
150 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 33(2) (1981); see also Pyeatte v.
Pyeatie, 661 P.2d 196, 200 (Ariz. 1982) ("Although the terms and requirements of an en-
forceable contract need not be stated in minute detail, it is fundamental that, in order to
be binding, an agreement must be definite and certain so that the liability of the parties
may be exactly fixed."),
151 See supra notes 77-79 and accompanying text.
155 See supra notes 77-79 and accompanying text; infra Part lV(A).
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(e.g., salary, benefits, duration of employment, specific management
position, termination provisions). 1" Many contracts, of course, con-
tain vague and indefinite terms, and traditional contract doctrine has
mechanisms for dealing with such imprecision. 154
 The critical differ-
ence in the close corporation context, however, is that detailed terms
are often completely absent.'" Depending upon how a court concep-
tualizes the close corporation investment contract, this degree of
indefiniteness may be problematic. 156
For example, if the investment contract is viewed as multiple
money-for-benefits contracts such as money-for-employment and
money-for-management, the total absence of detailed employment
and management terms would likely cause difficulties for courts at-
tempting to find the necessary intent to contract. Simply put, it is
hard to imagine a viable money-for-management contract when no
position, duration, compensation, and responsibility terms are pres-
ent.'" Taken as a whole, the cumulative absence of terms about the
management "agreement" may lead a court to conclude that the par-
ties did not assent to be bound to any management arrangement..
An alternative money-for-stock conceptualization, however, could
potentially overcome this hurdle, as an actual exchange of capital for
stock certificates is generally understood in all investment situations
to reflect a mutual intent to be bound—i.e., the investor binds herself
to the restrictions on stock ownership that are contained in the com-
pany's articles and bylaws, and the company binds itself to provide, at
a minimum, the benefits of stock ownership that the state's corporate
laws require (e.g., the right to vote in the same manner as similar
stockholders). 158
 Even if the money-for-stock contract does convey an
153 Se 	 In re Topper, 433 N.Y.S.2d at 361 ( -These shareholder agreements provide
no method for transfer or purchase of shares (except in case of death), nor do they specify the
terms of employment for Topper and shareholder Goldstein who were intended to play active manage-
ment roles.") (emphasis added); infra note 215 and accompanying text (observing that close
corporations typically operate informally with little or no explicit terms).
154 See, e.g., infra Part III (B) (1) (c) (discussing trade usage, course of performance, and
course of dealing evidence).
155 See supra note 153 and accompanying text.
156 See, e.g., JOHN EDWARD MURRAY, JR., MURRAY ON CONTRACT'S § 38, at 83 (3d ed.
1990) ("At some point ... the terms of the agreement may be so unclear, or the agreement
may be silent on such important terms or so many terms, that courts will not be able to
determine whether any breach occurred because they cannot be certain of what may have
been breached.").
157 See supra note 156; cf. Pyeatte, 661 1'.2d at 200 (noting that "compensation, penalty
provisions, and other material requirements of the agreement" are frequently terms that
are "necessary for the required definiteness").
136 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 212(a) (1998) (granting the right to vote).
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intent to be bound, however, the complete absence of detailed terms
would spur more indefiniteness problems, as the lack of detail would
make it quite difficult for a court to make breach and remedy deter-
minations. 159 Without any specificity regarding the duration of a man-
agement term, for example, a court would have no basis for determin-
ing whether, after five years of service, the removal of a minority
shareholder from a director position constitutes a breach of contract.
Similarly, without detail as to salary, it would be difficult to calculate
back pay and front pay awards that are based on the salary differential
between the close corporation job and the post-discharge employ-
ment. 160 In short, under either conceptualization of the investment
contract, such pervasive indefiniteness makes it highly questionable
whether traditional contract principles could protect a minority inves-
tor in the typical shareholder oppression dispute. 161
The Delaware decision of Litle v. Waters is a rare precedent that
nicely exemplifies the differing judicial treatment of breach of con-
tract claims and shareholder oppression claims when indefiniteness is
at issue.I62 In Litle, Thomas Litle and James Waters were shareholders
in two close corporations—Direct Order Sales Corporation (DOSCO)
and Direct Marketing Guaranty Trust Corporation (DMGT). 165 Waters
owned two-thirds of the stock of both companies and Litle owned the
remaining one-third of the shares of both firms)" Litle allegedly con-
sented to DMGT electing Subchapter S corporate status 165 "in reliance
159 See, e.g., Neely v. Banker's Trust Co. of Tex., 757 F.2d 621, 627 (5th Cir. 1985) (not-
ing the "practical difficulties of enforcing obscure, imprecise, or otherwise incomplete
promises").
leo Cf, Pyeatte, 661 P.2d at 200 (observing that "compensation" is frequently a term that
is "necessary for the required definiteness"); 2 ROTHSTEIN ET AL., supra note 121, § 9.24, at
583 (IA) major element of damages in any discharge action is the compensation (wages,
salary, commissions, or other payments, plus fringe benefits) the employee lost by reason
of the discharge.").
1st Cf. Bahls, supra note 21, at 326 ("Assent to alleged changes in expectations is not
adequate if the terms and specifics of the changed expectations are not sufficiently
definite for the court to fashion an appropriate order to protect the changed expecta-
tion.").
162 Civ. A. No. 12155, 1992 WL 25758 (Del. Ch. Feb. 11, 1992).
169 See id. at * 1.
164 See id.
169 Companies meeting certain criteria can elect Subchapter S corporation status tin-
der the Internal Revenue Code. See, e.g., CARY & EISENBERG, supra note 26, at 119-20 (de-
scribing the S-corporation criteria). Such an election means that "the federal government
[will] not tax the income of the entity on the entity level, rather, it [will] pass through the
income to its shareholders in a fashion similar to that of a partnership, notwithstanding
whether or not the entity made cash distributions to its shareholders." Lille, 1992 WL
25758, at *1.
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on Waters' alleged promise that the company always would make
available sufficient funds to the shareholders to cover any taxes in-
curred as a result of the company's S-corp[] election." 166 No written
document, however, reflected this purported promise. 167
Waters ultimately fired Litle from his positions as president and
CEO of DMGT and of DOSCO. DMGT and DOSCO were subse-
quently merged, and the new combined entity prospered. 168 Accord-
ing to Litle, the new company failed to distribute dividends even
though the earnings of the business had resulted in a $560,000 tax
liability to Litle. 169 As the court noted, "Litle has had to pay, or borrow
in order to pay, the taxes out of his own pocket rather (than] from
cash distributions from the corporation."'"
Litle asserted that the company's continual failure to provide
dividend distributions from the corporation constituted a breach of
contract as well as an oppressive abuse of discretion.m In assessing
the breach of contract claim, the court repeated Litle's allegation that
an agreement to make funds available had been entered into between
Litle and Waters. The court, however, concluded that the alleged
agreement was "too vague and indefinite to be enforceable as a con-
tract." As the Litle court noted:
Even if I assume that the parties intended to make a con-
tract, material provisions of an agreement can be so
indefinite that the agreement will not be enforced. The ma-
terial terms are uncertain where they fail to provide a rea-
sonable basis for determining the existence of a breach and
for giving the appropriate remedy. Although vagueness and
indefiniteness are matters of degree, no reasonable person could find
that the alleged agreement at issue contains a sufficient delineation
of the material terms: the agreement has no provisions as to how
much will be paid, how it will be paid, when it will be paid and to
whom it will be paid. Therefore, I dismiss the allegation as fail-
ing to state a claim for breach of a contract right . . . . 175
166 Litle, 1992 WL 25758, at *1.
167 See id.
168 See id. at *1-2.
169 See id. at *2.
170 Id.
171 See Litle, 1992 WL 25758, at *6-7.
112 Id. at *6.
173 Id. {emphasis added) (citations and internal quotations omitted).
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With respect to the oppression claim, however, the Litle court did
not view indefiniteness as an obstacle. Although Litle's allegation was
nearly identical to his breach of Contract claim—i.e., he asserted that
the refusal to declare dividends constituted oppressive conduct 174—
the court found that Litle's contentions stated a cognizable
oppression claim that survived a motion to dismiss. As the court
observed:
As far as whether plaintiff makes an adequate argument that
defendants violated his reasonable expectations, it is only
reasonable to believe that when Waters and Litle entered
into these ventures that neither expected that the other
would use their power so as to make the stock a liability
when the company was making money in order to effectuate
a squeeze out. Plaintiff makes an adequate argument that
defendants violated this reasonable expectation. For exam-
ple, he alleges that the company was rich with cash and that
the only reason that the company did not make dividends
was to aid Waters to buy Litle out for less than fair value . . . .
[T] his failure to pay dividends can be especially devastating
in a Subchapter S corporation setting, as this case is, since
the corporation passes its income through to its sharehold-
ers even though the corporation has not made any distribu-
tions to the shareholders. 175
Although the indefiniteness of the Litle-Waters "agreement"
proved fatal to the breach of contract claim, such indefiniteness was
not an obstacle to recognizing an oppression claim. Litle, therefore,
supports the proposition that traditional contract law requires more
"4 Litle alleged that "[t]tle Director Defendants' refusal to declare dividends so that
Litle would suffer an oppressive tax burden constitutes a gross and oppressive abuse of
discretion." Id. (internal quotation omitted). He also contended that "defendants' contin-
ual failure to provide distributions from the corporation so that he can pay his substantial
tax liability while the corporation provides such distributions via loan repayments to the
other stockholder and while the corporation is rich with cash sufficiently alleges oppressive
abuse of discretion." Id, at *7.
175
 Lille, 1992 WL 25758, at *9. This passage is also significant because it illustrates the
Litle court's understanding of the economics behind this particular close corporation in-
vestment. By highlighting the S-corporation setting and the tax implications of such an
entity, the Lide court seems to appreciate that a rational minority stockholder would not
have invested in such a venture without reaching a shared understanding of reasonable
dividend payments with the majority stockholder. Cf. supra Part 1I(B) (discussing the eco-
nomic rationale for close corporation investments). Because of this economic understand-
ing, the Lide court may have been more willing to credit Litle's alleged reasonable expecta-
tion of dividend payments.
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evidence to establish an implied-in-fact contract than the oppression
doctrine requires to establish a reasonable expectation. 17° Put differ-
ently, whereas pattern and conduct evidence helps to establish rea-
sonable expectations, such evidence is likely too thin and too
indefinite to help establish similar implied-in-fact contracts. 177
c. Combatting Indefiniteness Through Trade Usage and Course of Perform-
ance
As mentioned, modern contract law does have mechanisms for
dealing with indefinite agreements. Trade usage and course of per-
formance evidence, for example, can be used to interpret existing
terms of a contract and to add supplemental terms to a contract.'"
176 See Orchard v. Covelli, 590 F. Supp. 1548, 1556, 1558 (W.D. Pa. 1984) (rejecting a
shareholder-employee's wrongful discharge claim on several grounds, including the
ground that there was "no evidence of the existence of a contract for employment, oral or
written," but granting oppression-based relief by concluding that the termination was part
of a breach of fiduciary duty); cf. Jaffe Commercial Fin. Co. v. Harris, 456 N.F.2d 224, 229,
231-32 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983) (rejecting, on indefiniteness and other grounds, a minority's
assertion that his exclusion from the company violated "an actual agreement" between the
shareholders, but rejecting the same claim on completely different grounds when the ex-
clusion from the company was recharacterized as an "oppressive freeze-out").
m For this reason, a claim of promissory estoppel would likely fail as well. See, e.g., I
FARNSWORTH, .supra note 119, § 2.19, at 159 ("Although some courts have held that the
promise [in a promissory estoppel claim] need not contain all the elements of an offer, it
must be 'clear and definite' to use a phrase favored by courts.") (footnote omitted). In
addition, courts have observed that "promissory estoppel only operates as a substitution
for consideration." Lille, 1992 WL 25758, at *6 (citation omitted). Although attempts to
protect the close corporation investment bargain as an implied-in-fact contract will proba-
bly encounter indefiniteness, employment at will, and statute of frauds problems, the issue
of adequate consideration is unlikely to pose any difficulties. See supra notes 140-141 and
accompanying text; infra note 203.
178 See, e.g., CAIAMARI	 PERILLO, supra note 127, § 2.9, at 53 (noting that "missing
term [s] may be supplied by external sources, including standard terms, usages by which
the parties are bound, a course of dealing between the parties prior to the agreement, and
a course of performance after it. The term becomes part of the contract by implying that
the parties contracted on the basis of these sources."); id. § 3.17, at 161-64 (explaining
that trade usage and course of performance evidence can be used to interpret meaning as
well as to add terms); MURRAY, supra note 156, § 89, at 430 ("(Tirade usage may be used
by courts to interpret the expression of the parties, or it may be seen as supplying terms in
the agreement of the parties."); see also U.C.C. § 1-205(3) (2000) ("A course of dealing
between parties and any usage of trade in the vocation or trade in which they are engaged
or of which they are or should be aware give particular meaning to and supplement or
qualify terms of an agreement.".
It is worth noting that common-law decisions often describe trade usage, course
of dealing, and course of performance collectively as 'custom." See CALAMARI & PERILLO,
supra note 127, § 3.17, at 161 Mlle UCC has drawn a careful distinction among 'course of
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Thus, it is worth asking whether trade usage and course of perform-
ance" evidence can be used to remedy indefinite terms in an alleged
close corporation "investment contract."180
i. Trade Usage
Given that shareholder oppression courts tend to look to a pat-
tern of close corporation behavior as part of their oppression deter-
mination, one might think that the concept of trade usage is analo-
gous. After all, a "pattern" and a "trade usage" seem comparable, at
least superficially, due to their focus on repeated actions between
similar parties in similar situations. 181 Contract law, however, tends to
dealing,' 'course of performance' and 'trade usage,' whereas the common law decisions
often inartistically meshed the three together under the classification of custom.").
"9 As the above citations indicate, course of dealing evidence can also be used to in-
terpret existing terms and to add supplemental terms. See supra note 178 and accompany-
ing text. After all, "[a] course of dealing is a sequence of previous conduct between the
parties to a particular transaction which is fairly to be regarded as establishing a common
basis of understanding for interpreting their expressions and other conduct." U.C.C. § 1-
205(1) (2000). As the definition indicates, a course of dealing relates to conduct that oc-
curred prior to the purported agreement between the parties. See CALAMAILI & PEmLLO,
supra note 127, § 3.17, at 161. Before investing in a close corporation, the majority and
minority shareholders usually have not been associated as investors in another close corpo-
ration venture. Most often, therefore, there is no course of dealing evidence available to a
court. Course of performance evidence relating to conduct occurring after the purported
investment agreement, however, is available in most (if not all) oppression disputes. See
U.C.C. § 1-205 ant. 2 (2000) ("Course of dealing is restricted, literally, to a sequence
of conduct between the parties previous to the agreement. However, the provisions ... on
course of performance make it clear that a sequence of conduct after or under the agree-
ment may have equivalent meaning."). Such evidence may be crucial to a court wanting to
fill in missing terms in order to overcome an indefiniteness problem. As a consequence,
whereas course of performance evidence is independently discussed in this Article, see
supra Part III(A) (1) (c)(ii), course of dealing evidence is not. Many of the issues related to
a course of performance, however, are also applicable to a course of dealing.
Igo It is important to note that trade usage and course of performance evidence typi-
cally combat indefiniteness at the terms stage—not at the "intent to contract" formation
stage. Thus, when thinking about the function that trade usage arid course of performance
evidence can serve, it is easier to view the investment contract as a money-for-stock ar-
rangement where the terms, rather than the intent to contract, pose the primary
indefiniteness problems. See supra notes 136-139, 158-160 and accompanying text. As
mentioned, however, indefiniteness at the formation stage and the terms stage are closely
related. See supra note 150 and accompanying text. To the extent that courts conclude that
there was no intent to contract because of the complete absence of detailed terms, trade
usage and course of performance evidence are relevant to the indefiniteness inquiry at the
formation stage. In fact, by adding detail to the terms of the alleged bargain, trade usage
and course of performance evidence help to counteract the lack of express detail that
might otherwise prompt a "no intent to contract" finding.
191 Cf. U.C.C. § 1-205 cmt. 9 (2000) (describing a "usage" as a "dominant pattern").
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define trade usage in a more restrictive manner. The Uniform Com-
mercial Code, for example, defines "usage of trade" as "any practice
or method of dealing having such regularity of observance in a place,
vocation or trade as to justify an expectation that it will be observed
with respect to the transaction in question." 182 This more detailed
definition does not seem to coincide with the pattern and conduct
evidence used to analyze a shareholder oppression claim. Although
post-investment employment and management participation is a regu-
lar "practice or method of dealing" in close corporations, such a prac-
tice or method is generally observed in other close corporation ven-
tures, not in a specific ."place, vocation or trade. 983 More precisely,
this practice or method is observed in a particular setting—i.e., close
corporations—that cuts' across geographic regions and particular oc-
cupations. Similarly, a practice observed in a "trade" generally refers
to conduct occurring in a particular industry. 184 Without some
stretching, of course, close corporation investing does not fit easily
into an industry classification. Nevertheless, if contract law was ap-
plied more expansively, perhaps trade usage notions could be used to
incorporate pattern and conduct evidence in shareholder oppression
situations.
Yet even if post-investment employment and management par-
ticipation in a close corporation—i.e., pattern and conduct evi-
dence—was considered by contracts courts as evidence of trade usage,
it is unclear how this would solve the indefiniteness problem that po-
tentially results from the cumulative absence of detailed terms. At
best, the trade usage would establish that close corporation investors
usually receive employment and management participation as a result
182 U.C.C. § 1-205(2) (2000).
las If close corporation investing can be viewed as a "vocation," perhaps post-
investment employment and management could be characterized as a usage of trade. Such
a construction seems unlikely, however, given that a "vocation" is defined as "Rifle activity
on which one spends [the] major portion of his time and out of which he makes his liv-
ing." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1573 (6th ed. 1990). Although close corporation share-
holders may spend a good deal of time with the initial investment decision and with subse-
quent monitoring of the investment, most shareholders make their living off of the salary
received as a close corporation employee, rather than off of the financial return on the
investment itself. See supra notes 91-92 and accompanying text.
154 See MURRAY, supra note 156, § 89, at 428 ("In a given trade, profession, or calling,
parties may adhere to certain practices to such an extent that the practices may appear to
be the 'standard' within that industry or vocation."); cf. U.C.C. § 1-205 cmt. 5 (2000)
("Under the requirement [ot- 1-205(2) on trade usage] full recognition is thus available
for new usages and for usages currently observed by the great majority of decent dealers, even
though dissidents ready to cut corners do not agree.") (emphasis added).
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of their investments. Trade usage could not provide any further detail,
however, as it is highly unlikely that there are common salaries, dura-
tions, etc. among close corporation employment and management
positions that would constitute evidence of trade usage. As a conse-
quence, both breach and remedy determinations would be difficult to
make. 185 Even if the pattern and conduct evidence used by oppression
courts could be characterized as trade usage, therefore, it is unlikely
that such a characterization would overcome the indefiniteness prob-
lems suggested by Litle and other decisions. 186
ii. Course of Performance
A course of performance "involves conduct after the agreement
has been made." 187 Like the pattern and conduct evidence of the
shareholder oppression doctrine, course of performance evidence
can establish general understandings between the shareholders (e.g.,
employment, management). Where a minority shareholder has
worked for the company and served in a management role since in-
vesting, for example, such conduct could be characterized as course
of performance evidence indicating that employment and manage-
ment are terms of the investment bargain.
Moreover, and in contrast to trade usage, a course of perform-
ance between the shareholders can potentially fill in the details of a
generic employment or management bargain. For example, assume
that a minority shareholder receives a $50,000 salary along with
health benefits as an employee of a close corporation. After three
years of employment, the shareholder is unjustifiably terminated. In
theory, the $50,000 compensation plus benefits over the prior three
years may serve as course of performance evidence that provides the
salary and benefit details of the employment arrangement. In addi-
tion, a court may consider the lengths of employment of other share-
holders in the close corporation as course of performance evidence
l" See supra notes 159-160 and accompanying text.
Ibe In other words, even if close corporation pattern and conduct evidence was charac-
terized as trade usage, it would only establish basic agreements, such as agreements for
employment and management. Without further trade usage evidence to fill in the details
of these agreements, the indefiniteness hurdle would probably not be overcome.
1" CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 127, § 3.17, at 161; see also U.C.C.  § 2-208(1)
(2000) ("Where the contract for sale involves repeated occasions for performance by ei-
ther party with knowledge of the nature of the performance and opportunity for objection
to it by the other, any course of performance accepted or acquiesced in without objection
shall be relevant to determine the meaning of the agreement.").
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that aids the inquiry into the employment term of the discharged
shareholder. 188
 As mentioned, these additional details are critically
important to the calculation of termination-related damages. 189 As
more details are filled in, of course, the likelihood diminishes that a
court will refuse to enVarce a purported contract on indefiniteness
grounds.'"
Courts may encounter difficulty, however, when attempting to
combat indefiniteness through course of performance evidence. First,
oppressive majority conduct may occur relatively soon after the mi-
nority's commitment of capital to the venture. Because of this short
time frame, a court may conclude that the shareholders' actions have
not persisted long enough to constitute an established course of per-
formance. 191
 Second, in some circumstances, there may be no estab-
lished course of performance at all. For example, assume that a mi-
nority shareholder alleges that the majority's failure to declare
dividends constitutes a breach of an implied-in-fact contract for rea-
sonable dividends (a money-for-benefit conception). 192
 If the close
corporation has never declared a dividend in the past, 193 there is no
188
 If other shareholders in the close corporation have been working for five years, in
other words, perhaps a court will conclude that five years should be considered the em-
ployment term of the discharged stockholder (such that damages can be assessed on the
notion that the shareholder was terminated two years early).
109 See supra note 159-160 and accompanying text.
'9° Cf. CALAMAR1 & PERILLO, supra note 127, § 2.9, at 52 ("Indefiniteness ... can be
cured by the subsequent conduct of the parties.").
191 Cf.	 § 2-208(1) (2000) (stating that course of performance is based on "re-
peated occasions for performance") (emphasis added). This argument may also be applica-
ble to a reasonable expectations inquiry under the shareholder oppression doctrine, For
example, if a minority shareholder is removed from management after only one month of
service, there may be insufficient specific evidence of "fitting within the pattern" to estab-
lish a reasonable expectation. Courts applying the shareholder oppression doctrine, how-
ever, may compensate for this paucity of specific evidence by relying on their understand-
ing of the economics behind close corporation investing. See supra Part II(B) (discussing
the economic rationale for close corporation investments); cf. In re Topper, 933 N.Y.S.2d at
361-62, 365-66 (finding that a minority shareholder's reasonable expectations were frus-
trated even though the minority was terminated from employment and removed as an
officer within one year of investing). It is unclear whether courts applying contract law
would rely on economics in a similar manner. See infra Part III (C).
192
 Alternatively, the minority shareholder's allegation of a failure to pay dividends
could be conceptualized as an allegation that the majority shareholder has breached a
term of the money-for-stock contract. See supra notes 136-139 and accompanying text.
193 See, e.g., Orchard, 590 F. Supp. at 1552; W&W Equip. Co., Inc. v. Mink, 568 N,E.2d
564, 569 (Ind, Ct. App. 1991); Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657,
662 n.13 (Mass. 1976); Struckhoff v. Echo Ridge Farm, Inc., 833 S.W.2d 963, 465 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1992); In re O'Neill, 626 N.Y.S.2d 813, 814 (App. Div. 1995); In re 7bpper, 433 N.Y.S.2d
at 362; Zidell v. Zidell, Inc., 560 P.2d 1086, 1088 (Or. 1977).
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course of performance evidence for a court to rely on. Third and
finally, the use of pure course of performance evidence may. still be
inadequate for a court wishing to calculate termination-related dam-
ages. Because shareholders of a particular close corporation may have
very different jobs and levels of competence, a court may decide that
the employment term for a discharged shareholder cannot be
gleaned from the lengths of employment of other shareholders in the
venture.194 Thus, although courts applying contract law in a share-
holder oppression context could use course of performance evidence
to help alleviate indefiniteness questions, it is by no means certain
that such evidence will protect oppressed minority shareholders in all
situations."95
2. The Employment at Will Doctrine
Aside from indefiniteness issues, the employment at will doctrine
also presents difficulties for courts attempting to use pattern and
conduct evidence to establish an implied-in-fact contract for employ-
ment. In general, the at will rule "allows an employer to terminate an
employee with or without just cause in the absence of an agreement
limiting the employee's discharge to just cause or specifying the term
of employrnent." 196 The conventional justification for the doctrine is
1st Similarly, if all employees of a close corporation are also founders of the business,
their lengths of employment may be equivalent. In such circumstances, of course, there is
no longer term of employment for a court to use.
195 It is important to recall that the shareholder oppression doctrine does not face the
same indefiniteness concerns that are confronted by traditional contract law. From a dam-
ages standpoint, it has previously been noted that the "fair value" buyout is not dependent
on major terms such as employment and management. See supra notes 128-131 and ac-
companying text. Thus, the terms themselves can be much less definite. From a liability
standpoint, the pattern and conduct evidence, as well as the economic rationale for close
corporation investments, suggests that close corporation shareholders generally expect
permanent and continuous employment and management participation. See supra Parts
11(B) (1)-(2); supra notes 71-76 and accompanying text. Thus, almost any termination of
employment or removal from management will trigger oppression liability. No further
"definiteness" is required. But see Moll, supra note 18, at 800-01 (observing that termina-
tions of employment or removals from management based upon shareholder misconduct
or incompetence should not trigger oppression liability).
196 Schlafge, supra note 115, at 1081; see also Burk v. K-Mart Corp., 770 P.2d 24, 26
(Okla. 1989) Mlle classic statement of the at-will rule was that an employer may discharge
an employee for good cause, for no cause or even for cause morally wrong, without being
thereby guilty of legal wrong."); 1 ROTHSTEIN ET AL., supra note 121, § 1.4, at 13 ('The
doctrine of employment at will prescribed that an employee without a contract for a fixed
term could be hired or fired for any reason or no reason at all."); Frank j. Cavico, Employ-
ment at Will and Public Policy, 25 AKRON L. REV. 497, 498 (1992) (noting that in an at will
employment arrangement, "the employer may discharge an employee or an employee may
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that employers need unimpeded discretion to manage their busi-
nesses and to remain competitive. 197
In many jurisdictions, there is a strong presumption in favor of
an employment at will relationship.'" Nevertheless, the at will doc-
trine can be circumvented by an express or implied agreement that
employment will continue for some fixed period of time or that em-
ployment will not terminate without cause.'" Before such an agree-
ment is recognized, however, the employee must typically establish
specific and definite language by the employer that conveys a promise
of continued employment200 rather than a "mere expression of opti-
mistic hope for a long relationship: 101
 Given that reasonable expecta-
leave at any time, for any reason, without being liable thereby for any legal wrong"); jay M.
Feinman, The Development of the Employment at Will Rule, 20 Am. J. LEGAL HIST. 118, 118
(1976) ("In almost every jurisdiction in the United States an employer can discharge an
employee without notice and without cause unless the duration of the employment rela-
tion is specified in an employment contract."); Cornelius J. Peck, Penetrating Doctrinal
Camouflage: Understanding the Development of the Law of Wrongful Discharge, 66 WASH. L. REV.
719, 720 (1991) ("Pursuant to the [at-will] doctrine, an employer can discharge an em-
ployee for any cause, no cause, or bad cause without liability.").
Of course, if an individual is employed under a contract for a definite term, the
employee "may not be fired before the expiration of the term except for cause (or mate-
rial breach), unless the contract provides otherwise." 2 ROTHSTEIN ET AL., supra note 121,
§ 9.2, at 237.
122 See, e.g., Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Mem'l Hosp., 710 P.2d 1025, 1041 (Ariz. 1985)
("[W] e are concerned not to place undue restrictions on the employer's discretion in
managing his workforce ...."); Hunt v. IBM Mid. Am. Employees Fed. Credit Union, 384
N.W.2d 853, 858-59 (Minn. 1986) ("Imposing a good faith duty to terminate would unduly
restrict an employer's discretion in managing the workforce.") (internal quotation omit-
ted); Michael D. Moberly, Negligent Investigation: Arizona's Fourth Exception to the Employment-
at-Will Rule?, 27 ARIZ. ST. L J. 993, 994 (1995) (noting that the employment at will doctrine
is based upon the assumption that employers need "complete freedom of contract to con-
duct business and [to] promote industrial growth").
198 See, e.g., Priebe v. O'Malley, 623 N.E.2d 573, 576 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993).
I" See, e.g., Pugh, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 924; 1 ROTHSTEIN ET AL., supra note 121, § 2.27, at
135.
20° See 2 ROTHSTEIN ET AL., supra note 121, § 9.4, 250-54 (discussing oral contracts and
the need for the employer's language to be sufficiently clear and definite); cf. Orchard, 590
F. Supp. at 1556 ("One asserting an oral contract must show that the contract was clear and
precise.").
201 2 ROTHSTEIN ET AL., supra note 121, § 9.4, at 251; see, e.g., Kunz v. UFCW Local 876,
5 F.3d 1006, 1008, 1011 (6th Cir. 1993) (concluding that a union representative's assur-
ance that a new union employee would have a job "for as long as [she] wanted it" was in-
sufficient to overcome the at will rule); Ruud v. Great Plains Supply, Inc., 526 N.W.2d 369,
370, 372 (Minn. 1995) (concluding that statements such as "good employees are taken
care of," even in the context of discussions about becoming a store manager, were not
sufficiently definite to establish a contract of continued employment); Taylor v. Nat'l Life
Ins. Co., 652 A.2d 466, 469, 473 (Vt. 1993) (concluding that statements such as a company
was a "stable employer" and that if an employee "did [his] job ... [he] could expect ... to
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tions of employment under the oppression doctrine are often estab-
lished by the conduct of the shareholders, rather than by any express
language of the majority, 202 this exception to the at will doctrine may
be useless to the frozen-out minority shareholder. 203 Contrary to the
shareholder oppression doctrine, in other words, the fact that a
shareholder has worked at a company for some time does not prevent
the majority investor, under the at will rule, from terminating the
shareholder's employment.
Despite the heavy presumption in favor of the at will rule, there
may be ways to overcome it in the context of shareholder oppression.
First, some courts have found terms of an employment contract, espe-
cially terms that deal with job security, by relying on the conduct and
dealings of the parties. 204 In these cases, however, and unlike the typi-
cal close corporation dispute, there is usually other evidence of an
employment contract aside from the conduct of the parties them-
selves. 205 Second, because the capital provided by the close corpora-
tion shareholder can be viewed as consideration for a promise (e.g., a
promise of continued employment),206 courts may conclude that the
stay there" merely expressed hope for a long-term relationship rather than creating an
enforceable promise of lifetime employment).
2°2 See supra notes 68-69 and accompanying text; infra note 215.
"3 In cases involving oral promises, the employee must also give independent consid-
eration for the employer's promise of continued employment. See 2 ROTHSTEIN ET AL.,
supra note 121, § 9.4, at 533. In the close corporation context, of course, this independent
consideration requirement is easily met as the minority investor contributes capital to the
company. See, e.g., Ingle v. Glamore Motor Sales, Inc., 535 N.E.2d 1311, 1321 (N.Y. 1989)
(Hancock, J., dissenting) (observing that, for typical close corporation minority share-
holders, "there is consideration which would support an implied understanding that, at
least, the majority owner will not discharge him arbitrarily or in bad faith and without
some legitimate business reason"); Gigax v. Repka, 615 N.E.2d 644, 650 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1992) (Grady, J., concurring) ("1 would hold that the $70,000 in equity contributions
made to the corporation by Gigax constitute consideration for his employment in addition
to the services he provided, taking the relationship outside the 'at-will' definition ....");
see also Pugh, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 925 ("Hit is more probable that the parties intended a con-
tinuing relationship, with limitations upon the employer's dismissal authority, when the
employee has provided some benefit to the employer, or suffers some detriment, beyond
the usual rendition of service.").
"4 See, e.g., Pugh, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 925-26. See generally 2 ROTHSTEIN ET AL., supra note
121, § 9.5, at 254-56 (describing contracts implied from conduct).
Res See, e.g., Pugh, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 927 (noting that the jury could have determined
that an implied promise of employment existed based on "the duration of appellant's em-
ployment, the commendations and promotions he received, the apparent lack of any di-
rect criticism of his work, the assurances he was given, and the employer's acknowledged
policies").
206 See supra note 203 and accompanying text (discussing consideration).
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at will doctrine is inapplicable.207 The provision of consideration,
however, would not overcome any problems of indefiniteness associ-
ated with the alleged promise. Finally, although the employment at
will doctrine refuses to recognize a protected employment interest in
the job,208 it could be argued that the recognition of an investment in-
terest in the job falls outside of the legitimate coverage of the at will
rule. 2°9
 Because close corporation employment often serves as the ve-
hicle for distributing the business returns, 210
 and because the position
itself has value that often motivates an investment decision, 211 a court
could decide that close corporation shareholders do have an invest-
ment interest in their jobs that makes the at will doctrine inapplica-
ble. 212
 Whether such an argument will be accepted by courts applying
contract law, however; is unclear, particularly in light of the
reaffirmations of the at will rule that have occurred iii several states. 2m 5
As a consequence, under contract law, the at will doctrine will likely
"I See, e.g., Toussaint v Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Mich., 292 N.W.2d 880, 908-09
(Mich. 1980) (Ryan, j., dissenting) (it is well settled that in the absence of distinguishing
features or provisions, or special consideration, such contracts are generally regarded as
indefinite hirings terminable at the will of either party.") (emphasis added) (citation omit-
ted); Cornelius J. Peck, Unjust Discharges from Employment: A Necessary Change in the Law, 40
OHIO ST. U. 1, 1 (1979) (predicting that "American courts will abandon the principle
that, absent some consideration other than the services to be performed, a contract of employment
for an indefinite term is to be considered a contract terminable at will by either party
....") (emphasis added).
208
 Seel ROTHSTEIN ET AL., supra note 121, § 1.4, at 9 (noting that the at will doctrine
"provided that employees categorized as 'at will' had no legal interest in continuing job
security").
209 See Moll, supra note 78, at 536-39 (asserting that the at will doctrine covers termina-
tion-related harms suffered in an employee capacity but not termination-related harms
suffered in a shareholder/investor capacity).
210 See supra notes 37-58 and accompanying text.
211 See supra notes 86-92 and accompanying text.
212 Cf. Ragazzo, supra noto,86, at 1110 (noting that "a shareholder in a closely held
corporation often has a significant investment interest in his job").
213 See, e.g., Arizona Employment Protection Act of 1996, ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 12-
541, 23-1501, 41-1461 (West Supp. 1996) (codifying the common-law employment at will
rule, narrowing the public policy exception to employment at will, and limiting the nature
and scope of claims and remedies available to discharged employees); Montgomery Cty.
Hosp. Dist. v. Brown, 965 S.W.2d 501, 502 (Tex. 1998) (reaffirming the employment at will
doctrine and concluding that oral assurances of job security fail to overcome the at will
rule); see also Jenny Clevenger, Note, Arizona's Employment Protection Act: Drawing a Line in
the Sand Between the Court and the Legislature, 29 ARIZ. ST. U. 605, 614 (1997) ("The effect
of the [1996 Arizona Employment Protection Act], however, is to drastically curtail and, in
some instances, to abrogate entirely, the right of employees to bring actions for wrongful
termination.").
September 20011
	 Shareholder Oppression Doctrine 	 1043
continue to present a significant obstacle when employment dis-
charges are challenged. 214
3. The Statute of Frauds
Because the expectations of close corporation shareholders are
rarely committed to writing, 2 t5 an implied-in-fact contract for em-
ployment, management, or dividends may be unenforceable due to
the statute of frauds. The relevant portion of most state statutes of
frauds provides that an agreement is void if its terms will not be per-
formed within one year from the time the agreement is entered into,
unless the agreement is in writing and is signed by the party to be
charged.216 As commentators have noted, "[t] he general effect of the
2" See, e.g., Orchard, 590 F. Supp. at 1556, 1558 (rejecting a shareholder-employee's
wrongful discharge claim by (1) noting that there was "no evidence of the existence of a
contract for employment, oral or written," (2) stating that the "position as stockholder and
officer of the corporation gave no position of tenured employment," and (3) citing the
at will doctrine); Barris v. Mardan Bus. Sys., Inc., 421 N.W.2d 350, 354 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1988) (agreeing that a shareholder was employed at will and rejecting implied
agreement and promissory estoppel claims); Landorf v. Glottstein, 500 N.Y.S.2d 494, 499
(Sup. Ct. 1986) (noting that a discharged shareholder was subject to termination without
cause pursuant to the at will doctrine); Priebe, 623 N.E.2d at 576 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993) (re-
jecting a shareholder's claim that he had an implied employment contract with the corpo-
ration that overcame the at will doctrine).
2" See, e.g., 1 OPPRESSION, supra note 31, § 2:17, at 46 Mlle litigated cases show that
important arrangements among participants in small business enterprises are often oral
and sometimes nothing more than vague understandings, never even definitely stated
orally."); Cilium., supra note 135, at 160 (noting that the expectations of a close corpora-
tion shareholder "may not be articulated with lawyerly precision"); O'Neal, supra note 135,
at 883-84 ("A person taking a minority position in a close corporation often leaves himself
vulnerable to squeeze-out or oppression by failing to insist upon a shareholders' agree-
ment or appropriate charter or bylaw provisions ...."); id. at 886 ("The participants typi-
cally enter into 'agreements' among themselves, which sometimes are reduced to writing
in the form of a formal preincorporation agreement or a shareholders' agreement, but
which often are oral, perhaps just vague and half-articulated understandings."); see also
Exadaktilos, 400 A.2d at 561 (noting that "(ti he expectations of the parties in the instant
suit with regard to their participation in corporate affairs are not established by any
agreement"); Chinni-, supra note 135, at 131 (observing that "people generally avoid com-
plex and expensive planning in small businesses"); id. at 139 (stating that "inadequately
planned close corporations will always remain part of the picture," and noting that Itlhe
most careful plan may fail to visualize some conflicts, even if it does not generate novel
ones of its own").
516 See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 11-2(8) (Michie 2000) ("No action shall be brought
[ulpon any agreement that is not to be performed within a year 	 [u]nless the ... con-
tract	 or some other memorandum or note thereof, be in writing and signed by the
party to be charged thereby, or his agent."); 2 ROTHSTEIN ET AL., supra note 121, § 9.5, at
534 ("Statutes of frauds provide that agreements, promises, or undertakings are void if the
terms of the agreement are not to be performed within one year from the time of making,
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statute of frauds is to render void oral contracts for longer than one
year."217 In the close corporation context, of course, implied agree-
ments are generally established by pattern, conduct, and economic
evidence—not by written or even oral language. The statute of frauds,
therefore, may pose an obstacle to protecting minority shareholders
under contract law.
Many courts, however, construe the statute of frauds narrowly "by
holding that the statute applies only to those contracts that, at the
time of making, could not possibly or conceivably be completed
within a year."218
 Under this logic, one could argue that an implied-in-
fact contract for continuous employment and management between
close corporation shareholders is capable of performance within one
year. For example, during the relevant one-year period, it is possible
for a shareholder to die or to quit his or her company employment. 219
Similarly, the close corporation may cease operations during the rele-
vant one-year period. 220
Significantly, however, not all courts have adopted such a narrow
construction of the statute of frauds. Some courts have distinguished
between performance of a contract within one year, and termination
of a contract within one year. Whereas performance within a year sa-
tisfies the statute of frauds, termination within a year does not. 221 The
Virginia decision of Graham v. Central Fidelity Bank nicely exemplifies
this distinction. 222 In Graham, the plaintiff asserted that she had an
oral contract for employment that was terminable only for cause. 225
unless the agreement is in writing and signed by the party to be sued."). Under this lan-
guage, an agreement is valid if (1) its terms can be performed within one year from the
time the agreement is entered into; or (2) the agreement is in writing and is signed by the
party to be sued.
217 2 ROTHSTEIN ET AL., SUM note 121, § 9.5, at 534.
218 Id.
219 See, e.g., 11 FARNSWORTH, supra note 119, § 6.4, at 129-30 (noting that "a growing
number of courts (are] coming to regard a contract as not within the statute if one, or
sometimes both, parties can terminate it within a year of its making"); 2 ROTHSTEIN ET AL.,
SUM note 121, § 9.5, at 534; see also Taylor v. Canteen Corp., 69 F.3d 773, 785 (7th Cir.
1995) (stating that "where ... promise of employment is cast in terms of lasting as long as
the employee wants the job, the promise is capable of performance within one year");
Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d 373, 382'(Cal. 1988) ("Because the employee can
quit or the employer can discharge for cause, even an agreement that strictly defines ap-
propriate grounds for discharge can be completely performed within one year—or within
one day for that matter.").
220 See, e.g., 2 ROTHSTEIN ET AL., supra note 121, § 9.5, at 534.
221 See 2 id.
222 See 428 S.E.2d 916 (Va. 1993).
2" See id. at 917-18.
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According to the plaintiff, such a contract satisfied the statute of
frauds because of the possibility that the plaintiffs poor performance
would result in termination for cause within the first year of the con-
tract. 224 The Virginia Supreme Court disagreed, as it observed that a
discharge for cause was not a performance of the contract that would
satisfy the statute of frauds; rather, a discharge for cause was a termina-
tion of the contract due to the plaintiff's breach. 225 The court con-
cluded that the possibility of termination within a year did not satisfy
Virginia's statute of frauds and, as a consequence, the contract for
employment was unenforceable. 226 Depending on the jurisdiction,
therefore, it may be fruitless to argue that the statute of frauds is sa-
tisfied because of the possibility of a shareholder dying or quitting
within a year, or because of the potential failure of the business within
a year. Courts may characterize these contingencies as "terminating"
the contract rather than as completing the "performance" of the con-
tract.
4. Summary
In combination, the indefiniteness of the close corporation bar-
gain, the doctrine of at will employment, and the application of the
statute of frauds will likely prevent a contracts court from using pat-
tern and conduct evidence to establish protective implied-in-fact con-
tracts for the minority shareholder. In theory, however, indefiniteness
could be combated through an expansive view of trade usage and
course of performance, the at will doctrine could be overcome
through conduct evidence or scope arguments, and the statute of
*24 See id. at 918 ("Graham argues, however, that certain contract provisions, viz., the
maximum allowed amounts of total outages within any 90-day period and the probationary
periods of 90 days after certain excess total outages, indicate that she could have per-
formed her contract within one year."); supra note 219 and accompanying text (citing
language from Foley).
22 See Graham, 428 S.E.2d at 918 ("[A] discharge for cause is not a performance of the
contract within the meaning of the statute of frauds, but a termination of the contract by
reason of its breach.").
226 See id. ("Because the possibility of a termination of such a contract for cause within
its first year of performance does not remove it from the requirements of the statute of
frauds, we conclude that the oral assurances alleged by Graham cannot be considered in
deciding whether she had an employment contract that could be terminated only for
cause.") (citation omitted). But see Floors Unlimited v. Fieldcrest Cannon, 55 F.3d 181, 186
(5th Cir. 1995) ("Texas courts would conclude that a contract for an indefinite duration,
terminable only for cause, falls outside the statute of frauds."); II FA RNSWORTI I, supra note
119, § 6.4, at 128 (describing the distinction between contract performance and contract
excuse/termination as "fine and often tenuous"); supra note 219.
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frauds could be satisfied through a characterization of contingencies
as contract "performance." Contract law, in other words, possesses the
tools to combat the indefiniteness, employment at will, and statute of
frauds hurdles. For those tools to be effective in protecting minority
shareholders, however, they must be used in an expansive manner
that, for the most part, goes beyond conventional applications.
C. The Uncertain Role of Economic Understandings
As mentioned, courts applying the shareholder oppression doc-
trine seem to consider the economic rationale for investing in close
corporations as part of their reasonable expectations analysis. 227 It is
unclear, however, whether courts applying contract law would follow a
similar approach as part of their implied-in-fact contract determina-
tion. Judicial opinions often observe, for example, that "courts do not
make contracts for parties."228 Similarly, in some instances, courts re-
jecting a particular interpretation or refusing to imply a term explain
that doing otherwise would constitute an impermissible "rewriting" of
the contract. 229 The worry created by these statements, of course, is
that courts will overuse them and will effectively avoid a deeper con-
tractual analysis. In addressing shareholder oppression issues, for ex-
ample, there is some concern that contracts courts may be hesitant to
consider the economics behind close corporation investments when
the shareholders have not clearly and specifically expressed their ob-
ligations among themselves. Using such economic considerations may
227 See supra Part II (B).
228 In re jack-Rich, Inc., 176 B.R. 476, 480 (C.D. III. 1994); see also Pyeatte, 661 P.2d at
201 ('The court's function ... cannot be that of contract maker. Nor can the court create
a contract simply to accomplish a purportedly good purpose."); Jaffe Commercia4 456
N.E.2d at 229 (noting the trial court's observation that the parties "cannot expect the
Court to find for you a contract that you didn't take the time yourselves to memorialize");
5 MARGARET N. KNIFFIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 24.19, at 184-85 (rev. ed. 1998) (citing
cases).
229 5 KNIFFIN, supra note 228, § 24.19, at 184-85 (citing cases); see Neely, 757 F.2d at 628
("Courts refuse to enforce agreements that contain indefinite promises or terms they
deem essential precisely because judicial clarification of the uncertainty entails great dan-
ger of creating intentions and expectations that the parties themselves never enter-
tained."); Daniels v. Thomas, Dean & Hoskins, Inc., 804 P.2d 359, 364 (Mont. 1990) (not-
ing that "(e]quity can enforce provisions of contracts but it cannot supply them") (internal
quotation omitted); cf. Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 716 F. Stipp. 1504, 1519
(S.D.N.Y. 1989) ("These plaintiffs do not invoke an implied covenant of good faith to pro-
tect a legitimate, mutually contemplated benefit of the indentures; rather, they seek to
have this Court create an additional benefit for which they did not bargain.").
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be viewed as an impermissible "rewriting" of the contract between the
parties.
Despite these concerns, at least some courts applying a contract
analysis do rely on an economic understanding of the particular deal
at issue as part of their contract interpretation or enforcement inquir-
ies. For example, in Stoumbos v. Kilimnik, Kilimnik sold a business to
AAM on May 1, 1982 and retained a security interest in AAM's Inven-
tory and equipment" to secure the payment of the price. 230 The Ninth
Circuit attempted to determine whether the collateral description of
"inventory and equipment" in the security agreement—i.e., in the
contract2"—was meant to encompass inventory and equipment ac-
quired by AAM after the May 1, 1982 sale of the business. In conclud-
ing that the contractual terms "inventory and equipment" were meant
to include after-acquired inventory but not after-acquired equipment,
the court explicitly looked to the economic rationale underlying the
contract for security. As the court noted:
There is substantial support for the proposition that, where a
financing statement or security agreement provides for a se-
curity interest in "all inventory" (or uses similar broad lan-
guage), the document incorporates after-acquired inventory.
The rationale is that inventory' is constantly turning over, and no
creditor could reasonably agree to be secured by an asset that would
vanish in a short time in the normal course of business .....ad-
dition, the rationale of the "automatic" security interest cases does
not apply to after-acquired equipment. Those cases discuss cyclically
depleted and replenished assets such as inventory or accounts receiv-
able. Unlike inventory, equipment is not normally subject to frequent
turnover . . . . Kilimnik would not have had a clear reason to
want after-acquired equipment covered by the purchase
agreement . . .. Even if limited to the equipment on hand at
the time of the sale, his interest would have been secure. 252
Stoumbos is significant because the parties did not expressly mani-
fest an intention to cover after-acquired inventory or equipment in
their contract. Nevertheless, due to the court's understanding of the
economics of the deal, the court effectively concluded that the parties
23u
	 988 F.2d 949,.953 (9th Cir. 1993).
231 See, e.g., Whirlpool Corp. v. Dailey Constr., Inc., 429 S.E.2d 748, 751 (N.C. Ct.
App. 1993) (noting that a security agreement "is essentially a contract between the creditor
and the debtor").
sss Stoumbos, 988 F.2d at 954-56 (emphasis added).
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must have intended such a result (at least with respect to inven-
tory)."3
 Although there was no explicit evidence that the parties ac-
tually discussed the after-acquired inventory issue or reached a "meet-
ing of the minds" on it, the court, by considering the parties'
economic motivations for entering into the contract, proceeded as if
explicit evidence of a mutual understanding (i.e., an after-acquired
inventory understanding) odsted. 234 This approach, of course, is
quite similar to the reasonable expectations analysis of oppression law.
Although explicit evidence of a mutual employment and manage-
ment understanding is generally absent, oppression courts often find
such an understanding (i.e., a reasonable expectation) based, at least
in part, on the economic importance of a job and a management po-
sition to the rational close corporation investor. 233
 Just as the Staumbos
court used its economic understanding to conclude that an after-
acquired inventory term was part of the contract between the par-
ties,236 so too does an oppression court typically use its economic un-
"3 See id.; see also In re Page, 16 U.C.G. Rep. Serv. 501,504 (M.D. Fla. 1974) ("Needless
to say, any reasonable secured party would be fully aware that this type of business presup-
poses a constant change in the inventory. Therefore, it is obviously unreasonable to as-
sume that anyone would have received or acquired or intended to acquire a security inter-
est in an inventory with the rigid limitation that it should be limited to the same items
which made up the inventory on the date the document was executed.").
234
 Similarly, based on its economic understanding of the parties' contract, the Stoum-
bas court concluded that after-acquired equipment was not intended to be covered. See
Stoumbos, 988 F.2d at 954-56. The court understood that the need for security was Kilim:
nik's economic motivation for taking a security interest in AAM's inventory and equip-
ment. See id. More importantly, however, the court understood that Kilimnik's need for
security would be satisfied without an after-acquired equipment clause because of equip-
ment's static nature (as opposed to inventory's "turnover" nature). See id. In short, the
Stoumbos court used its economic understanding of the deal to ascertain the terms that the
parties, as rational actors, must have agreed to. See id.
235 See supra Part II (h); supra notes 66-68 and accompanying text.
236 It should be noted that other courts have also used their economic understanding
of the deal to assist in contract interpretation. In Whirlpool Corp. v. Dailey Construction, Inc.,
429 S.E.2d 748 (N.C. Ct. App. 1993), for example, the North Carolina Court of Appeals
attempted to determine whether Whirlpool, the secured creditor, had authorized the sale
of its collateral—kitchen appliances. See id. at 750. By relying on its economic understand-
ing of the arrangement, the Whirlpool court concluded that Whirlpool had given such
authorization:
Both Braehill and First Union claim that Whirlpool expressly consented to
the transfer of the appliances by the specific language used in the security
agreement .... A fair reading ... leaves no doubt that both Whirlpool and
Dailey Construction knew that the appliances were to be incorporated into
the ... [al partment project and then resold as part of the project. It is clear
that Whirlpool, if not expressly, then at least impliedly consented to the re-
sale. Such a result is mandated not only by the terms of the security agree-
September 20011
	
Shareholder Oppression Doctrine 	 1049
derstanding to conclude that employment and management "terms"
are part of the investment contract in a close corporation. 237
meta, but also by logic because unless the appliances were resold as part of the apart-
ment project, Dailey Construction did not stand to profit from the project and would
have been unable to repay Whirlpool .
Id. at 751 (emphasis added). Similarly, in Cooky v. Big Horn Harvestore Sys., Inc., 813 P.2d
736 (Colo. 1991), the Supreme Court of Colorado relied on its economic understanding
of the purchase contract at issue in concluding that consequential damages were still avail-
able despite the presence of an exclusive remedy provision in the contract:
[T]lie decision of contracting parties to limit potential remedies to the single
remedy to repair or replace defective parts is based on a number of assump-
tions which, if unfounded, fundamentally change the parties' intended allo-
cation of risk. These include the assumptions that the seller will diligently and
in good faith attempt to repair, that the seller will be able to effect repairs
within a reasonable time period, and that any consequential loss sustained
during the period of repair will be minimal. Under the rationale of these cases, a
loss that is itself caused by the failure of the remedy of suit for breach of a warranty to
repair or replace defective parts could not be within the contemplation of the parties,
and therefore should not be prohibited when such bargained-for remedy fails of its essen-
tial purpose. A buyer reasonably expecting to avoid significant consequential
loss through the effective use of such remedy should not be required to ab-
sorb such loss when the remedy fails of its essential purpose .... To the extent
the parties here agreed to limit the availability of consequential damages as a remedy,
they did so on the assumption that the limited warranty to repair or replace would
suffice to protect the plaintiffs from substantial consequential damage losses. The total
inadequacy of that warranty was neither foreseen nor bargained for
Id. at 746-48 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
137 See supra Part II (B). The "economic understanding" discussion in the text reflects
many of the themes that underlie the contract doctrine of frustration of purpose. Such a
claim typically requires proof of the following three elements:
First, the purpose that is frustrated must have been a principal purpose of
that party in making the contract .... The object must be so completely the
basis of the contract that, as both parties understand, without it the transac-
tion would make little sense. Second, the frustration must be substantial. It is
not enough that the transaction has become less profitable for the affected
party or even that he will sustain a loss. The frustration must be so severe that
it is not fairly to be regarded as within the risks that he assumed under the
contract. Third, the non-occurrence of the frustrating event must have been a
basic assumption on which the contract was made.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 265 colt. a (1981). Once again, given the eco-
nomic: importance of a job and a management position to the rational close corporation
investor, see supra Part II (B), a termination of employment or a removal from management
may satisfy the frustration of purpose requirements. A finding of frustration of purpose,
however, "has been limited to instances where a virtually cataclysmic, wholly unforeseeable
event renders the contract valueless to one party." United States v. General Douglas
MacArthur Senior Vill., Inc., 508 F.2d 377, 381 (2d Cir. 1974); see also VJK Prods., Inc., v.
Friedman/Meyer Prods., Inc., 565 F. Stipp. 916, 921 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) ("Mite frustration of
purpose defense is not available where ... the event which allegedly frustrated the pur-
pose of the contract ... was clearly foreseeable.") (citation omitted). Like the economic
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By giving weight to the economic rationale underlying a reason-
able actor's decision to enter into a particular contract, some contract
law decisions have moved beyond maxims and have effectively func-
tioned similarly to oppression law. In protecting reasonable expecta-
tions, however, the shareholder oppression doctrine relies only par-
tially on the economic rationale underlying a shareholder's decision
to invest in a close corporation. As mentioned, the oppression doc-
trine also uses pattern and conduct evidence, as well as the buyout
remedy, to accomplish its protective goal. 258
 Of course, contract law
faces indefiniteness, employment at will, and statute of frauds hurdles
in handling the pattern and conduct aspect of the oppression analy-
sis. Moreover, as will be explained, there are difficulties in using tradi-
tional contract remedies to replicate a buyout. Thus, although there is
some precedent suggesting that conventional contract law may have
the ability to handle the "economics" component of the oppression
analysis, contract law's effectiveness in protecting reasonable expecta-
tions is still suspect.
D. The Remedies for Breach of Contract
L Overview
In general, when a contract has been breached, the available le-
gal remedies seek to "restore [the aggrieved party] to the position it
would have been in had the contract been performed:13g Modern
courts and commentators capture this standard by articulating three
legally protected interests of a contracting party—a restitution inter-
understanding discussion, therefore, it is unclear whether a frustration of purpose argu-
ment would prevail. After all, a court may determine that reasonable close corporation
investors who serve as company employees and managers should foresee, at a minimum,
that the majority may decide to terminate employees and/or remove managers in various
situations (e.g., economic recession, company downsizing, shareholder misconduct).
238 See supra Part II (describing how the oppression doctrine establishes and protects
reasonable expectations).
239
 Interceramic, Inc. v. S. Orient R.R. Co., 999 S.W.2d 920, 927 (Tex. Ct. App. 1999);
see also III FARNSWORTH, Mira note 119, § 12.1, at 147 (noting that ordinarily "courts en-
courage promisees to rely on promises" by '`attempting to put that party in as good a posi-
tion as it would have been in had the contract been performed, that is, had there been no
breach"); U.C.C. § 1-106(1) (2000) (`The remedies provided by this Act shall be liberally
administered to the end that the aggrieved party may be put in as good a position as if the
other party had fully performed ...."). It is worth noting that the expectation interest is
often described as giving the plaintiff the "benefit of the bargain." III FARNSWORTH, supra
note 119, § 12.1, at 147.
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est, a reliance interest, and an expectation interest.m In defining
these three interests, commentators have stated that the restitution
interest "represents the benefits conferred upon the other party,”241
the reliance interest "represents the detriment [the contracting party]
incurred by changing position," 242 and the expectation interest "rep-
resents the prospect of gain from, the contract."243 This more nuanced
articulation of contract damages does not conflict with the general
standard of placing the aggrieved party in the economic position that
would have resulted from performance. Rather, the more nuanced
articulation "merely represents a different breakdown of the same
economic harm suffered."244 As commentators have explained:
Our legal system starts with the premise that the expectation
interest of contracting parties deserves protection. In order
to protect it to the fullest, that is, in order to put the ag-
grieved party in the same economic position he would have
attained upon full performance of the contract, the restitu-
tion and reliance interests need to be protected as well. 245
240 see, e.g, III FARNSWORTH, supra note 119, § 12.1, at 147-48, 151-53; see also L.L.
Fuller & William R. Perdue, Jr., The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages (Parts I and II), 46
YALE L.J. 52, 53-57 (1936-37) (describing the restitution interest, the reliance interest,
and the expectation interest).
241 CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 127, § 14.4, at 545; see Castle v. United States, 48
Fed. Cl. 187, 200 (2000) (defining the restitution interest as the value of the benefit con-
ferred on the breaching party"); see also CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 127, § 15.2, at
600 ( —Restitution', has a very flexible meaning. It encompasses recovery in quasi contract
in which form of action the plaintiff recovers a money judgment. It is also used to encom-
pass equitable remedies for specific relief such as decrees which cancel deeds, or impose
constructive trusts or equitable liens, as well as some recoveries in equity for sums of
money .... The common thread which draws these actions together is that 'one person is
accountable to another on the ground that otherwise he would unjustly benefit or the
other would unjustly suffer loss.") (citations omitted) (footnotes omitted); id. § 15.1, at
599 ("(T] he aim of restitution is to place both of the parties in the position they had prior
to entering into the transaction."); III FARNSWORTH, supra note 119, § 12.1, at 152 ("The
party in breach is required to disgorge what that party has received in money or services
by, for example, returning the benefit to the injured party that conferred it."); id. ("The
focus [of restitution] is,on the party in breach rather than on the injured party, and the
attempt is to put the party in breach back in the position in which that party would have
been had the contract not been made."); id. § 12.19, at 321 (observing that courts "some-
dines refer to the injured party's [restitution] remedy ... as based on `rescission' (i.e.,
avoidance) of the contract").
242 CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 127, § 14.4, at 545.
242 Id.
244 Id.
245 Id.; see id. § 15.7, at 609 ("It should carefully be noted, however, that in an award for
damages, the plaintiff's restitutionary interest is usually protected. The plaintiff is entitled
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Thus, legal remedies for breach of contract center around the
expectation interest—i.e., putting the aggrieved party in the same
economic position as if full performance had occurred. At times,
however, damages for the expectation interest are unavailable due to
a lack of credible evidence or for policy reasons. 246
 When these situa-
tions arise, the injured party can often recover based on one or both
of the other interests. 247 ,
Aside from legal remedies, the courts are also empowered to
grant equitable relief for breach of contract in certain circumstances.
The principal equitable:remedy to enforce a contract "is an order re-
quiring specific performance of the contract . ..." 2" A specific per-
formance order often "take [s] the form of a decree ordering a party
affirmatively to carry out contractual duties or enjoining the party
to losses sustained (benefits conferred on the other and reliance expenditures) as well as
gains prevented."); seellt FARNSWORTH, supra note 119, § 12.1, at 152 (noting that reliance
damages are "a lesser included component" of expectation damages); id. § 12.16, at 277
(suggesting that the "cost of reliance" may be "an appreciable part of the expectation in-
terest"). Professors Calamari and Perillo provide the following example:
P contracts to purchase Blackacre from V for $100,000, subject to obtaining a
mortgage loan, paying V $10,000 as a down payment on contracting. An ap-
praisal commissioned by P's bank shows that Blackacre has a market value of
$120,000. Upon learning of the appraisal, V repudiates. Prior to repudiation,
P expended $500 for a survey of Blackacre and $500 for banking fees for his
loan application, and, as was foreseen by V, $1,000 for an option to purchase
adjoining land which he intended to use to provide additional parking for the
structure on Blackacre. P's expectancy of profit is $20,000. His restitution in-
terest is the $10,000 down payment. His reliance interest is $2,000. His recov-
ery will be $31,000, his expectancy and restitution interests and that part of
his reliance interest (the option money) that would not have to be expended
toward earning his expectancy.
CALAMARI Sc PERILLO, supra note 127, § 14.4, at 545; see also Avila v. Gonzalez, 974 S.W.2d
237, 247 (Tex. Ct. App. 1998) ("Damages for breach of contract protect three interests: a
restitution interest, a reliance interest, and an expectation interest. In order to put the
aggrieved party in the same position he or she would occupy if the other party had fully
performed, each of these interests must be protected.") (citation omitted).
246 See, e.g., ATACS Corp. v. Trans World Communications, Inc., 155 F.3d 659, 669 (3d
Cir. 1998) (noting that in some breach of contract cases, "recovery based on traditional
notions of expectation damages is clouded because of the uncertainty in measuring the
loss in value to the aggrieved contracting party"); Ill FARNSWORTH, supra note 119, § 12.1,
at 152 ("Situations in which damages have been measured by the reliance interest have
characteristically been those in which damages measured by the full expectation are for
some reason regarded as inappropriate ....").
247
 See, e.g., ATACS, 155 F.3d at 669 (noting that "where a court cannot measure lost
profits with certainty," reliance and restitution damages are available).
248
 III FARNSWORTH, supra note 119, § 12.2, at 154.
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from acting where the contract requires forbearance." 249 Instead of
ordering specific performance, of course, a court may also use an in-
junction to "direct a party to refrain from doing a specified act. " 250
These equitable remedies are typically available, however, only when
monetary damages are inadequate. 251
2. Approximating the Buyout
As previously discussed, the buyout remedy has a number of ad-
vantages in the oppression context. It provides a "market" for the op-
pressed investor's holdings; it creates an equitable parting between
the shareholders; and it eliminates the necessity to articulate the
shareholders' bargain with precision. 252 Given these advantages, it is
important to ask whether contract law could provide similar relief to
the oppressed close corporation shareholder.
Initially, it is helpful to deconstruct the buyout remedy into its
primary elements. In a freeze-out situation where the minority is ter-
minated from employment, removed from management, and ex-
cluded from dividends, a buyout award is generally comprised of a
return of the shareholder's original investment as well as a return of
the appreciation or depreciation on the original investment. 255 Such
"9 CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 127, § 16.1, at 612; see also 111 FARNSWORTH, supra
note 119, § 12.5, at 165 ("The most direct form of equitable relief for breach of contract is
specific performance. By ordering the promisor to render the promised performance, the
court attempts to produce, as nearly as is practicable, the same effect as if the contract had
been performed.").
250 III Estuktswotrrit, supra note 119, § 12.5, at 166. Of course, "[i]f the performance
due under the contract consists simply of forbearance, the effect of an injunction is to
order specific performance." Ill Id.
"I See, e.g., III id. § 12.5, at 170 (Ill t came to be recognized that equitable relief would
not be granted if the legal remedy of damages was adequate to protect the injured party.
This historical limitation has persisted in spite of the merger of law and equity."); Ill id.
§ 12.5, at 167 ("A court will not, however, grant an injunction unless the remedy in dam-
ages would be inadequate."). But see III id. § 12.6, at 171 ('The tendency is, however, to
liberalize the granting of specific performance and injunction by enlarging the classes of
cases in which damages are regarded as an inadequate remedy .... The concept of ade-
quacy has thus tended to become relative, and the comparison more often leads to grant-
ing equitable relief than was historically the case."),
2" See supra Part II (C) (describing the advantages of the buyout remedy).
253 Cf. 2 OPPRESSION, supra note 31, § 10:09, at 60 ("The buy-out feature in these stat-
utes is desirable because it permits shareholders who want to preserve the enterprise as a
going concern to buy out dissenters, and at the same time it provides an oppressed share-
holder a fair price for his holdings."); Schlafge, supra note 115, at 1080 n.46 Mlle buy-
out is the preferred remedy for shareholder disputes because it allows a return of the
shareholder's capital while not crippling the business."); infra note 254 and accompanying
text.
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returns stem directly from the fact that the buyout awards the ag-
grieved shareholder an amount equal to his or her proportional share
of the corporation's fair value. 254
 A corresponding result of the buyout
award, of course, is that the aggrieved investor relinquishes his or her
stock (and thereby his or her shareholder status) in the company. 255
Explained in contract terminology, the buyout remedy seems to
function as a hybrid of restitution and expectation awards. The return
of the shareholder's original investment, for example, reflects a resti-
tution award to the extent that the "benefit conferred" upon the ma-
jority shareholder—i.e., the initial investment capital—is repaid to the
oppressed minority shareholder. 256 Compensation for the invest-
ment's appreciation or depreciation, however, suggests an expectation
award. After all, a money-for-stock conceptualization of the invest-
254 See, e.g., supra notes 109
-110 and accompanying text (observing that the buyout
awards the "fair value" of an investor's holdings). For example, assume that a minority
shareholder invests $10,000 at the company's inception and receives a 33% ownership
stake in return. Ten years later, the minority shareholder is unlawfully frozen-out of the
company. Based on an earnings-based valuation of the company, a court concludes that
the "fair value" of the business is $300,000. Because the minority investor is a 33% share-
holder, the court orders the majority to purchase the minority's holdings for $100,000. In
effect, this $100,000 award reflects a return of the minority's $10,000 investment coupled
with $90,000 of appreciation on that investment.
255
 In other words, because the minority's stockholdings are purchased in a buyout,
the minority investor is no longer a shareholder in the corporation. See also infra note 256
(explaining that a buyout award will require the aggrieved shareholder to relinquish his or
her stock certificate(s) to the corporation).
256 See III FARNSWORTH, supra note 119, § 12.20, at 325 (observing that, in a restitution
analysis, the "benefit conferred on the party in breach [can] consist simply of the payment
of money"); id. at 326 (The policy favoring restitution is reinforced by the practical con-
venience to the court of allowing recovery of the very sum of money paid . ...").
Of course, in a restitution action, the aggrieved party also returns what he or she
has received in the transaction. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552C ant. f
("In the traditional restitution action, the plaintiff returns what he has received in the
transaction, and recovers what he has parted with, so that he is in effect restored to the
pecuniary position in which he stood before the transaction."); MURRAY, supra note 156,
§ 126, at 726 ("Since the purpose of restitution is to restore the parties to status quo, if the
party seeking restitution has received a benefit, he must return it or offer to return it, con-
ditional on any restitution to himself."). This proposition supports the notion that an op-
pressed minority shareholder will be required to relinquish his or her stock certificate(s)
to the corporation as a condition of the buyout award. Cf. Bernstein v. Nemeyer, 570 A.2d
164, 169 (Conn. 1990) ("Mt is a condition of rescission and restitution that the plaintiff
offer, as nearly as possible, to place the other party in the same situation that existed prior
to the execution of the contract."); Sneed v. State, 683 P.2d 525, 528 (Okla. 1983) (observ-
ing that a "willingness to restore the opposite party to the status quo is a condition
precedent" to restitution). In effect, therefore, the pre-contract position will be restored-
i.e., the corporation (or the majority shareholder) will return the minority's investment,
and the minority investor will relinquish his or her "shareholder" status in the corporation.
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ment contract between close corporation shareholders involves an
exchange of investment capital for a stock certificate with accompany-
ing terms such as the rights to employment, management, and appre-
ciation/dividends. 257 When the majority's oppressive actions breach
these contractual terms, an expectation-oriented remedy would at-
tempt to provide the aggrieved shareholder with the economic value
of the breached terms (e.g., the value of a lost job, a lost management
position, diverted dividends, and/or captured appreciation). 255 Al-
though the conventional buyout remedy does not award damages for
a lost job, a lost management position, or any diverted dividends, 252 it
does compensate for any appreciation (or depreciation) on the op-
pressed shareholder's investment. 26° Compensation for the invest-
ment's appreciation or depreciation, therefore, does resemble a par-
tial award of expectation damages to the extent that it attempts to put
the minority shareholder in an economic position similar to if the ap-
preciation "term" of the investment contract had not been breached.
In short, the buyout remedy functions as a combination of resti-
tution and expectation awards to the extent that it returns the minor-
ity's investment capital to him or her as well as the appreciation or
depreciation on that investment. Because the buyout remedy can be
deconstructed into these restitution and expectation components, it
157 See supra notes 136-139 and accompanying text.
255 Indeed, expectation damages seek to put the aggrieved party in the same economic
position as if the contract had been performed—i.e., as if the majority shareholder had not
breached the contractual terms by committing oppressive acts.
259 See Bahis, supra note 21, at 298-99 (observing that "[a]warding the fair market
value of a shareholder's interest does not compensate for the loss of an expectation of a
voice in management" because "[p]roblems inherent in quantifying the value of this ex-
pectation to intangible amenities often preclude the court from awarding any value for
loss of the expectation"); Moll, supra note 78, at 568-80 (explaining that a conventional
earnings-based buyout fails to compensate the oppressed shareholder for the employment
and management aspects of his or her investment); Murdock, supra note 39, at 472 (calcu-
lating the losses of a shareholder-employee who earned $250,000 per year in salary before
termination and $100,000 per year in salary after termination, and implying that a stan-
dard buyout is not entirely satisfactory because it does not compensate for this loss); see
also McCauley v. Tom McCauley & Son, Inc., 724 P.2d 232, 240-42 (N.M. Ct. App. 1982)
(noting that the controlling shareholder received a dividend that was "ten (10) times
greater than the amount declared but not paid to [a minority shareholder]," but affirming
the trial court's "fair value" determination that did not include compensation to the mi-
nority investor for the disproportionate dividend); cf. In re Kemp & Beatley, Inc., 473
N.E.2d 1173, 1175-76, 1180-81 (N.Y. 1989) (affirming an award of dissolution in favor of
two minority shareholders who were excluded from the company's de facto dividends, but
failing to award back compensation to the two minority shareholders for the de facto divi-
dends that they never received).
IC° See supra notes 253-254 and accompanying text.
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seems theoretically possible for contract law to award a buyout-
equivalent remedy. Once again, however, limitations that are well-
ingrained in contract law may prevent such a result.
3. The Limitations of Contractual Remedies in an Oppression
Context
a. The Inadequacy of Restitution Damages
If an oppressed close corporation shareholder pursues restitution
damages,261 a court applying contract law would have difficulty provid-
ing a buyout-equivalent remedy. Indeed, a restitutionary recovery is
unlikely to include compensation for the expectation component of
appreciation or depreciation; 262 instead, a court would likely award
damages to the oppressed shareholder equivalent to the amount of
the shareholder's original investment in the company. 265 After all, if a
founding minority shareholder invested $30,000 at the inception of
the venture, that $30,000 investment is arguably the "benefit con-
ferred" upon the majority shareholder, as the majority effectively con-
trols how that money is used. Prior to entering into the close corpora-
tion, in other words, the minority shareholder had $30,000 in
available funds; thus, returning that $30,000 (adjusted for interest)
would restore this initial economic position. Simply put, to the extent
that Title basic aim of restitution is to place the plaintiff in the same
economic position as the plaintiff enjoyed prior to contracting,"2"
261 As a general rule, a plaintiff in a breach of contract action may not recover both
restitution and expectation damages; instead, an election of remedies is typically required.
See CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 127, § 15.7, at 657 ("As a general rule a plaintiff may
not have both restitution and damages for breach of contract."); III FARNSWORTH, supra
note 119, § 12.19, at 320 (observing that restitution "is generally regarded as inconsistent
with relief based on the contract itself").
262 In a restitution action, the common law usually offers no protection to the plain-
tiff's expectation interest. See CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 127, § 15.7, at 609; supra
note 261. As commentators have observed, "[i]f defective machinery were delivered and
the buyer elected to return the machinery, the buyer was entitled to restitution of pay-
ments made and often certain reliance expenditures, but received no compensation for
any additional cost of replacing the machinery." CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 127,
§ 15.7, at 609.
262 Cf. HI FARNSWORTH, supra note 119, § 12.19, at 319 (stating that restitution is .
"[s]onietimes ... accomplished by requiring the party in breach to return the very benefit
received and sometimes by requiring that party instead to pay a sum of money that represents the
value of that benefit") (emphasis added).
264 CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 127, § 15.4, at 603; see also III FARNSWORTH, supra
note 119, § 12.20, at 324 ("Restitution as a remedy for breach of contract is limited to
September 2001]	 Shareholder Oppression Doctrine	 1057
compensation for appreciation or depreciation on the investment
does not seem necessary. A mere $30,000 award (plus some market
rate of interest) would probably accomplish this aim. 265
Moreover, under mainstream contract doctrine, restitution is
only available in the event of a total breach of contract. 2  If the close
corporation investment contract is conceptualized as money-for-stock
with accompanying employment, management, and other terms, this
common-law restriction may prevent contract remedies from ap-
proximating the restitutionary aspect of the buyout remedy. For ex-
ample, assume that a close corporation stockholder was unjustifiably
terminated from employment but retained a management position
and continued to receive a proportionate share of dividends. As a
consequence, assume that the shareholder's reasonable expectation
of employment was the only expectation that was frustrated by the
majority's actions. In this partial freeze-out situation, a court applying
contract law would have difficulty awarding restitution damages.
While some of the terms of the contract have been breached (i.e.,
employment), other terms have been followed (i.e., management,
benefits that are regarded as having somehow flowed from the injured party, a party that
can be said to have 'lost' something that the party in breach is being asked to 'restore.'").
265 Although it is likely a stretch, one could argue that a return of appreciation or de-
predation on the original investment should be part of a restitution recovery. Given that a
restitution award will require the oppressed investor to relinquish his or her rights as a
shareholder, see supra notes 255-256 and accompanying text, such au award is probably the
stockholder's last chance to recover an increase in the value of his or her investment.
Courts recognizing this fact may lean towards providing a broader restitution award—i.e.,
one that includes appreciation or depreciation.
In addition, restitution damages are based on the "reasonable value" of the
benefit conferred. CALAMAR,I & PERILLO, supra note 127, § 15.4, at 603. "Reasonable
value," of course, is not a far cry from "fair value," so perhaps a contracts court would
award the appreciated value of the investment as restitution damages. Of course, the
"benefit conferred" to the majority shareholder is simply the dollar value of the initial
investment. That initial investment has not appreciated; rather, it is the corresponding
value of the minority's stock that has appreciated. In other words, assuming a $10,000 ini-
tial minority investment, the majority has been enriched only by that $10,000 (plus, pre-
sumably, interest)—not by the appreciation in the stock of the minority. Nevertheless,
depending on the situation, this argument may be worth making.
266 See III FARNSWORTH, supra note 119, § 12.19, at 320 ("Restitution as a remedy for
breach is therefore limited to cases in which the injured party has a claim for damages for
total breach, so that that party's remaining duties are discharged. If the claim is only one
for damages for partial breach, the injured party's remaining duties are not discharged,
and restitution is not available as an alternative."); see also Hibiscus Assocs. Ltd. v. Bd. of
Trs. of Policemen and Firemen Ret. Sys., 50 F.3d 908, 916 (11th Cir. 1995) (noting that,
under Florida law, the breached term must be an "essential part of the bargain ... such
that its breach destroys the entire contract"); Harris v. Metro. Mall, 334 N.W.2c1 519, 524
(Wis. 1983) (observing that the breach "must be a 'total breach'" for a restitution remedy).
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dividends). The "total breach" required for a restitution award would
presumably require a complete freeze-out where every critical term of
the contract is breached—i.e., where the minority shareholder is ter-
minated from employment, removed from management, and ex-
cluded from dividends. Thus, in a partial freeze-out situation, contract
law may not be able to replicate the restitutionary component of the
buyout remedy. •
The invocation of this common-law rule, however, may depend
upon how the court defines the investment contract between the
close corporation shareholders. As mentioned, rather than one
money-for-stock contract with a number of accompanying terms, a
court may conceptualize the close corporation investment bargain as
a number of smaller contracts—e.g., a money-for-employment con-
tract, or a money-for-management contract. 267 Such a conception
makes it possible to award restitution damages in a partial freeze-out
situation. If the majority's oppressive conduct consisted solely of the
unjustified termination of the minority's employment, the termina-
tion may be characterized as a total breach of the money-for-
employment contract, rather than as a partial breach of the money-
for-stock contract. Thus, depending upon how a court views the close
corporation investment contract, the "total breach" limitation on res-
titution damages may not preclude contract law from awarding resti-
tutionary compensation in an oppression context. 268 As explained,
however, such a restitutionary award is unlikely to reflect a buyout-
equivalent remedy given that appreciation on the investment will
probably not be included. 269
b. The Problems with an Expectation Recovery
If an oppressed shareholder seeks an expectation recovery under
contract law, receiving a buyout-equivalent remedy will still be prob-
lematic. For example, assume that a founding minority shareholder
267
 See supra notes 140-141 and accompanying text.
268 0f course, it is unclear whether courts applying contract law will adopt this multiple
contract conception. At the very least, however, one can fairly assert that this "total breach"
restriction raises some doubt about whether contract law can protect the restitutionary
interest of an oppressed close corporation shareholder.
269
 See supra notes 262-265 and accompanying text. Where the invested capital has
continuously depreciated from the time the capital was committed, of course, a restitution
award of the initial investment would provide a larger recovery than the buyout's grant of
the depreciated fair value of the investment. CI III FARNSWORTH, supra note 119, § 12.20,
at 326-28 (observing that restitution damages will exceed expectation damages in situa-
tions where the contract is unprofitable).
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invests $40,000 at the inception of a venture. Three years later, the
majority shareholder commences a conventional freeze-out by un-
justifiably terminating the minority shareholder from employment
and management and by excluding the minority from dividends.
Based on the money-for-stock contract and its accompanying em-
ployment, management, and dividend terms, 2" an expectation award
designed to put the minority shareholder in the same economic posi-
tion as if the contract had been performed would require the court to
remedy these employment, management, and dividend injuries. In
operation, the terminations of employment and management would
presumably be remedied by orders of reinstatement or by damages
equivalent to the lost employment and management positions. 211
Similarly, the dividends that were wrongfully diverted from the minor-
ity shareholder would probably be remedied through a damages
award equivalent to the amount of the lost dividends, or by an injunc-
tion specifying that the amount of the diverted dividends shall be paid
to the minority.272 By addressing the losses of employment, manage-
ment, and dividends, the court remedies the breached terms and puts
the oppressed shareholder in the same economic position as if the
terms of the contract had been performed.
Conspicuously absent from this expectation damages scheme,
however, is a return of the oppressed shareholder's investment capital
(i.e., the restitutionary interest) along with any appreciation or de-
preciation on that investment. The rationale for this absence is im-
plicit in the goal of expectation damages, which is to put the op-
pressed shareholder in the same economic position as if the contract
had been fully performed. After all, if the contract had been fully per-
formed, the typical minority investor would own stock in a close cor-
poration (representing the value of his or her financial investment)
and would receive employment, management responsibilities, and
proportional dividend payments (if any) from the company. While the
typical freeze-out scenario does breach the employment, manage-
ment, and dividend terms of the close corporation investment con-
r° See supra notes 136-139 and accompanying text.
rnSee supra notes 120-123 and accompanying text (discussing compensation for
wrongful termination).
212 See, e.g., Patton v. Nicholas, 279 S.W.2d 848,857 (Tex. 1955) (issuing an injunction
that required a corporation and a controlling shareholder to pay a reasonable dividend "at
the earliest practical date" and that ordered "reasonable dividends to be thereafter de-
clared annually from future profits of the corporation"); id. (noting that "the amount of
such dividend ... shall take into consideration ... the fact that respondents have been
wrongfully deprived of their dividends since the beginning").
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tract, the freeze-out does not generally affect the investor's stockhold-
ings in the company. Indeed, a freeze-out generally leaves the investor
owning stock in the close corporation (just as he or she did before
the oppressive conduct), but the investor is stripped of his or her ac-
companying employment, management, and dividend rights. 273 Thus,
an expectation award need only rectify the employment, manage-
ment, and dividend harms to put the minority in the same economic
position as if the contract had been fully performed. 274 Put differently,
in the typical freeze-out scenario, the shareholder's invested capital is
not harmed—i.e., the investor retains his or her share ownership and
can still theoretically recover his or her investment (with appreciation
or depreciation) through a sale of his or her holdings. Because the
minority's stock ownership is retained and, in theory, is not harmed
by the majority's conduct, an expectation award in a typical oppres-
sion context is not likely to include compensation for the initial in-
vestment or for any accompanying appreciation. 275 Correspondingly,
273 See, e.g., In re Topper, 433 N.Y.S.2d at 362 (involving a close corporation that paid no
dividends and a minority shareholder who was discharged from employment and removed
as an officer); id. (noting that "the controlling shareholders continue to maintain [that the
minority investor] has suffered no harm because his one-third (1/3) interest remains in-
tact").
274 In fact, an expectation award that remedied the loss of employment, management,
and dividends and that returned the original investment (with appreciation) would put
the oppressed shareholder in a better position than if full performance had occurred. The
aggrieved shareholder's employment, management, and dividend rights would be reme-
died and he or she would receive the cash value of his or her otherwise illiquid stockhold-
ings. See supra notes 41-42 and accompanying text (discussing the lack of a market for
close corporation stock).
213 It is possible to argue that the typical freeze-out does harm the minority's stock
ownership in the company. Although a close corporation has no established market for its
stock, investors can occasionally sell their holdings to private parties. See, e.g., Wilkes, 353
N.E.2d at 660 (noting that a founding investor sold his shares in the corporation to an
outside party). Prior to a freeze-out, therefore, there is a possibility of the minority selling
its shares to a third party. Such a sale, however, might be subject to a minority discount on
the theory that outside investors will pay less for a minority stake in a close corporation
because of their inability to control management. See infra text accompanying note 276
(defining minority discount). To some extent, therefore, the minority discount represents
the chance that the majority may act oppressively towards the minority because of the mi-
nority's lack of control.
When oppressive conduct has already occurred, however, the chance of oppres-
sion has become a certainty. As a consequence, the pre-oppression possibility of selling the
minority's holdings to a third party is likely eliminated. After all, a minority stake in a close
corporation is surely unattractive to outside buyers when a track record of oppressive ma-
jority conduct exists in the company. In effect, therefore, oppression can result in the mi-
nority's stockholdings becoming relatively worthless to outsiders. The only prospective
purchaser is the majority itself, and it is unlikely that a fair price will be offered. See, e.g.,
Wilkes, 353 N.E.2d at 664 n.14 (noting that the controlling shareholders offered to pur-
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in a typical oppression context, the minority investor will maintain, at
the very least, his nr her shareholder status in the company. In addi-
tion, if the minority investor is reinstated to his or her employment or
management positions (rather than awarded damages), the minority
maintains his or her employee or manager status as well.
Even if a contracts court did provide compensation for the initial
investment and any appreciation—an unlikely scenario given the
above-mentioned discussion—the expectation award will still be prob-
lematic in light of the minority and marketability discounts that such
a contract award is likely to include. A minority discount signifies that
"investors will pay less for (a minority stake) in a close corporation
because of the inability to elect i a sufficient number of directors to
rncontrol anagement."276 A marketability discount, in contrast, is
based on the notion that "shares in a closely held corporation cannot
be sold as readily as shares in a corporation with securities traded over
an exchange or in an established , market and therefore investors tend
to pay less, and sometimes significantly less, for such shares." 277 Taken
together, these discounts reflect the notion that, if the majority's op-
pressive conduct had not breached the implied-in-fact investment
contract among the shareholders, the minority, investor would hold a
non-controlling and relatively illiquid position in the close corpora-
tion. If a court awarded expectation damages to replicate this "no
breach" economic position, the . award would presumably have to
reflect these lack of control and illiquidity factors. Otherwise, the
compensation awarded to the minority investor for his or her hold-
chase the minority's shares for a price that One of the controlling shareholders "admittedly
would not have accepted for his own shares"); Ragazzo, supra note 86, at 1117 (stating that
an oppressive majority shareholder "often; administers the coup de grace by offering to
purchase the minority's stock at a fraction of its true worth"). Thus, even though a freeze-
out will generally leave the minority with its stockholdings, the minority's ownership stake
is still arguably harmed.' The freeze-out actions virtually eliminate the possibility of a third-
party sale which, in turn, effectively cripples the value of the stock. As a consequence, to
put the minority in the same economic position as if the contract had been fully per-
formed (i.e., as if a freeze-out had not occurred), an expectation recovery in a typical
freeze-out situation could arguably include: some amount for the diminished value of the
investment.
27s Bahls, supra note 21, at 301.
2" Advanced ComMunication Design, Inc. v. Follett, 615 N.W.2d 285, 291 (Minn.
2000); see id, ("A marketability discount adjusts for a lack of liquidity in one's interest in an
entity and should be distinguished from a minority discount, which adjusts for lack of con-
trol of the corporation.") (internal quotation omitted); cf. Bahls, supra note 21, at 302
(noting that a marketability discount is often imposed because, "due to the difficulty and
expense associated with selling the stock at a later date, investors are not willing to pay as
much for close corporation stock").
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ings would arguably have a higher value than if the majority's conduct
had not run afoul of the.investment contract. 278
When a buyout is awarded in a shareholder oppression context,
however, oppression courts have generally avoided a minority dis-
count.279
 The conventional rationale for such a decision is often ex-
plained as follows:
Sale of the minority shareholders' stock to the corporation
or majority shareholders is unlike a sale to third parties.
When a shareholder sells his or her shares to third parties,
the value of the shares sold by shareholders to third parties is
indeed diminished because the third party has no right to
control management. A sale to majority shareholders of a
corporation, however, simply serves to consolidate the inter-
ests of those already in control. To require application of a
minority discount in this case would result in a windfall for
majority shareholders which is inequitable particularly when
it is the majority shareholder who initially acted oppres-
sively.28°
178
 For example, assume that a minority investor contributes $40,000 to a close corpo-
ration. If a court was to determine the value of the shareholder's financial investment in
the company, it would presumably be based on what a willing buyer would pay the minority
for its stake in the business. See, e.g., ROBERT W. HAMILTON, BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS:
UNINCORPORATED BUSINESSES AND CLOSELY HELD CORPORATIONS § 14.6, at 405-06 (ob-
serving that "fair value" has no inherent meaning and that, at best, it is merely a synonym
"for the basic definition of value, namely the price on which a willing buyer and willing
seller agree"). Because such a stake is non-controlling and is relatively difficult to transfer,
a willing buyer is unlikely to offer the full $40,000 to the minority. Instead, some dis-
counted offer would probably:be made. The court's determination of value, therefore,
would be less than $40,000; moreover, that lower amount would represent the value of the
minority's financial investment in the company if no oppressive conduct had occurred.
Thus, a full award of $40,000 would overcompensate the minority given that the value of its
holdings would be less than $40,000 if the investment contract had been performed (i.e.,
if the majority had not acted oppressively).
279 See Thompson, supra note 30, at 234 ("[C]ourts generally have not discounted stock
because it contains a minority interest . . . .").
ISO Bahls, supra note 21, at 302; see also Blake v. Blake Agency, Inc., 486 N.Y.S.2d 341,
349 (App. Div. 1985) ("[The dissolution statute] was enacted for the protection of minority
shareholders, and the corporation should therefore not receive a windfall in the form of a
discount because it elected to purchase the minority interest .... [A] minority interest in
closely held corporate stock should not be discounted solely because it is a minority inter-
est."); Thompson, supra note 30, at 234 ("[S]uch a [minority] discount would be inappro-
priate since the [buyout] purchase is by controlling shareholders or the corporation; to
apply such a discount would be to further oppress minority shareholders aggrieved by the
controlling shareholders' misconduct.") (citing Brown v. Allied Corrugated Box Co., 154
Cal. Rptr. 170, 175-76 (Ct. App. 1979)).
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Oppression courts . are more willing, however, to apply a marketability
discount in a buyout proceeding.281 For example, some courts have
cited the absence of a market for a close corporation's shares as a
justification for applying a marketability discount to the valuation of
both minority and majority shares.282 Nevertheless, many oppression
courts choose not to apply a marketability discount. In fact, "some
courts reject marketability discounts for reasons similar to those given
for refusing minority discounts."283 As one commentator observed:
It seems particularly inappropriate to apply such a [market-
ability] discount when a shareholder is selling to a person or
family that owns all or most of the other shares of the corpo-
ration. While the lack of a market affects the ability to sell
minority shares in a company, the market for all of a com-
pany's assets or shares or for a controlling interest operates
differently and may not be adversely influenced by the fact
that the company's shares are not traded on a securities
market.284
281 See Thompson, supra note 30, at 234 (noting that courts generally forego a minority
discount in a buyout context, but observing that courts "have not demonstrated the same
reluctance in applying a discount for lack of marketability").
282 See, e.g., Blake, 986 N.YS.2d at 349 ("A discount for lack of marketability is properly
factored into the equation because the shares of a closely held corporation cannot be
readily sold on a public market. Such a discount bears no relation to the fact that the peti-
tioner's shares in the corporation represent a minority interest."); In re Fleischer, 486
N.Y.S.2d 272, 275 (App. Div. 1985) ("In determining the 'fair value' of the shares of a
closely held corporation, discounts for the lack of marketability of such shares are appro-
priate and do not provide a windfall to the majority shareholders merely because the
shares to be purchased by the majority ... constitute a minority interest in the corpora-
tion").
283 2 OPPRESSION, supra note 31, § 7:21, at 115; see, e.g., Charland v. Country View Golf
Club, Inc., 588 A.2t1 609, 612-13 (RI. 1991); cf. Hendley v. Lee, 676 F. Supp. 1317, 1330
(D.S.C. 1987) ("Discounts properly apply to the total value of the company in a 'willing
buyer/willing seller' context, but do not apply at all when neither party is willing and the
transaction is between insiders.").
284 Thompson, supra note 30, at 235. Similarly, as Professor Bahls observes:
If, however, a minority block of shares is sold to a shareholder who will be a
controlling shareholder after the sale, the full discount for lack of marketabil-
ity may be inappropriate. To the extent that the purchase allows the share-
holder to consolidate control, there may be a ready market for the subse-
quent resale of the majority shareholder's stock. While a minority interest in a
close corporation is difficult to sell, a majority interest might be sold much
easier. Likewise, consolidating control may enable the majority shareholder to
realize a control premium.
Mils, supra note 21, at 303.
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In a shareholder oppression analysis, therefore, there is a good
chance that discounts for minority status and stock illiquidity will not
be applied to a buyout award. Perhaps this absence of discounts is due
simply to the differences between an oppression context and a willing
buyer/willing seller context. 285
 Perhaps, in some sense, the absence of
discounts is an effort to punish the majority shareholder for causing
the oppressive situation.286
 Alternatively, because the buyout remedy is
essentially offered in lieu of the dissolution of the company, 287 per-
haps the lack of discounts is an appropriate effort to mirror the
straight pro rata distribution that would occur in a corporate dissolu-
tion proceeding. 2" Finally, given that the conventional buyout pro-
vides no compensation to an oppressed minority for many of the
terms of the investment contract (e.g., no lost job or lost management
compensation) ,289 perhaps the absence of discounts is "overcompen-
sation" that is tolerated in a freeze-out context. In other words, to off-
set the freeze-out harms that are undercompensated or not compen-
sated at all, courts may be willing to overcompensate in other damage
areas (e.g., by avoiding minority and illiquidity discounts when award-
ing the "fair value" of a stock). 290 Ultimately, all of these rationales are
persuasive to some degree. More importantly, they highlight the in-
appropriateness of contract law's likely use of discounts in a share-
holder oppression situation.
285 See supra notes 280,284 and accompanying text.
288 See supra note 280 and accompanying text.
287 See supra notes 43-46 and accompanying text (describing the statutory cause of ac-
tion for oppression).
288 See, e.g., Charland, 588 A.2d at 613 ("In dissolution cases, strong reasons support the
use of pro rata value without a discount .... A minority shareholder seeking dissolution
claims that majority shareholders have engaged in some unfair, possibly tortious, action. If
the minority shareholder succeeds in having the company dissolved, all shareholders will
receive their pro rata share of the assets, with no account given to the minority [or illiquid-
ity] status of their shares. Minority shareholders should not receive less than this value if,
instead of fighting the dissolution action, the majority decides to seek appraisal of minority
shares in order to buy out the minority and reduce corporate discord.").
288
 See supra notes 128-129,259 and accompanying text.
285
 Relatedly, the buyout's undiscounted return of the invested capital (plus apprecia-
tion or depreciation) may simply serve as a proxy for the lost job and lost management
compensation that a true expectation recovery would award in a freeze-out context.
Even if a conventional buyout did provide lost job" or lost management" com-
pensation to an oppressed minority, it may be difficult to calculate such damages with rea-
sonable certainty. For example, the loss of prestige and independence that potentially
results from a termination of etnployment and a removal from management may be
difficult to quantity. See supra notes 88-89,123 and accompanying text. As a consequence,
the absence of discounts may again serve as overcompensation that is tolerated by courts
given the other legitimate minority harms that are too uncertain to be remedied.
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In short, several critical points are apparent from this discussion.
First, because a typical freeze-out does not directly affect the minor-
ity's stockholdings in a corporation, an expectation award is probably
unable to provide a return of the invested capital (or any appreciation
on that investment). Such a result, of course, cripples the ability of an
expectation award to serve as a buyout-equivalent remedy. Second,
and relatedly, an expectation-oriented award is likely subject to the
above-mentioned shortcomings of reinstatement, damages, and in-
junctive orders in a close corporation setting. 291 In contrast to the
buyout, the problems of deteriorating personal relationships, distrust
of the majority, and judicial reluctance to supervise can all be present,
given that an expectation recovery is apt to keep the investor in the
company in some capacity. 292 Finally, even in the unlikely event that
an expectation recovery did provide compensation for the value of a
minority's financial investment (and, therefore, did "cash out" the
minority from the company), a contracts court would probably apply
minority and marketability discounts to the awarded sum.
Despite these deficiencies, an expectation recovery in a freeze-
out scenario may provide greater damages than a buyout under cer-
tain circumstances. For example, where an investment has appreci-
ated minimally (or not at all), a buyout awarding an aggrieved share-
holder the "fair value" of his or her invested capital may provide a
smaller recovery than an expectation award that provides compensa-
tory damages for a lost job, a lost management position, and/or any
diverted dividends. 295 In such a situation, contract remedies could
theoretically provide a superior recovery to a frozen-out minority
shareholder.294 Such a result, however, presumes that the compensa-
tory damages for the lost job, lost management position, and/or di-
verted dividends can be measured with some degree of certainty—a
dubious proposition given the indefinite nature of the typical close
corporation investment bargain. Moreover, because the other liability
hurdles of contract law (e.g., employment at will, statute of frauds)
591 See supra notes 115-127 and accompanying text.
2" See supra notes 274-276 and accompanying text.
2" Moreover, and as mentioned, it is possible (although unlikely) for an expectation
award to include a "cash-out" amount for the value of the aggrieved shareholder's financial
investment. See supra notes 276-278 and accompanying text. That amount—even with mi-
nority and marketability discounts—would add to the compensatory damages of an expec-
tation award and would remove the minority from the company.
294 Of course, if the value of the investment's appreciation is substantial relative to the
quantifiable value of the employment, management, and dividend harms, the buyout
would provide greater compensation than an expectation recovery under contract law.
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will likely pose difficulties for oppressed close corporation sharehold-
ers attempting to establish implied-in-fact contracts, these remedy
considerations may have little practical significance.
IV. JUSTIFYING THE SHAREHOLDER OPPRESSION DOCTRINE
Although both oppression precedents and contract precedents
base their decisions on breached "agreements" and "understandings"
between the parties, it is clear that different meanings are ascribed to
these terms. For example, whereas an enforceable "understanding"
under oppression law requires little more than the fact that the
shareholders at issue were founders who served as employees and
managers since the company's inception, an enforceable "under-
standing" under contract law requires much more definiteness re-
garding the details of the arrangement. 295 Simply put, although con-
tractually-rooted concepts are the focal point of oppression's
reasonable expectations analysis, there are significant differences in
how oppression law and contract law apply those concepts.
This analysis, of course, raises a critical question: what justifies
the existence of the shareholder oppression doctrine? After all, if this
Article's discussion is taken to its logical extreme, reasonable (and
enforceable) expectations under oppression law could simply be
characterized as failed contracts. The above-mentioned question,
therefore, can be reformulated as follows: why should failed contracts
be protected in the oppression context? In my opinion, at least two
arguments help to answer this inquiry.
A. The Existence of a Bargain
In most oppression disputes, the evidence reveals that close cor-
poration shareholders strike an actual bargain between themselves
when the minority decides to commit capital to the venture. To use
employment as an example, assume a typical close corporation sce-
nario where (1) all of the shareholders invest a substantial part of
their savings in the business, quit their prior employment, and imme-
diately begin working for the company in an employment and man-
agement role; and (2) the corporation pays no dividends—instead, all
of the profits are distributed as salary to the shareholders.296 Even
"5 See supra Part 11I(B) (1) (b) (discussing the definiteness of the close corporation
bargain); supra notes 77-78 and accompanying text.
255 See supra notes 37, 71 and accompanying text.
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without an explicit agreement, it, is a fair inference from this scenario
that the shareholders bargained, perhaps implicitly, for an under-
standing that their investments entitled them to continued employ-
ment with the company. Because the shareholders left their prior em-
ployment positions, the minority and the majority shareholders likely
understood that the close corporation jobs would become their pri-
mary (if not sole) sources of livelihood. 297 Similarly, because of the
absence of dividends, they all likely understood that a job with the
corporation and its accompanying salary would be the only vehicles
for distributing the profits of the.business and for earning a return on
their investments. 299 Evidence stemming from the parties' own ac-
tions, therefore, suggests that an implicit bargain was struck between
the majority and minority investors—i.e., the minority agrees to con-
tribute capital and, in return, the majority agrees to limit its discretion
to terminate the minority's employment. 299
Aside from evidence of the parties' conduct, the economics be-
hind close corporation investments also supports the proposition that
an actual bargain has been struck between the investors. Once again,
employment provides a helpful example. As mentioned, employment
is typically the principal enticement motivating a stockholder's deci-
sion to invest in a closely-held venture.m Given the significance of
2147 See supra note 92 and accompanying text; see also Harris v. Mardan Bus. Sys., Inc.,
421 N.W.2d 350, 352 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988) (involving a close corporation majority share-
holder who left prior employment with a large public company to form the close corpora-
tion); Moll, supra note 18, at 817 ("['The typical majority shareholder has often left prior
employment herself to join the speculative start-up business.").
298 See Nagy v. Riblet Prods. Corp., 79 F.3d 572, 577 (7th Cir. 1996) ("Many closely held
firms endeavor to show no profits (to minimize their taxes) and to distribute the real eco-
nomic returns of the business to the investors as salary. When firms are organized in this
way, firing an employee is little different from canceling his shares.") (emphasis added); Landorf v.
Glottstein, 500 N.Y.S.2d 494, 499 (Sup. Ct. 1986) ("In a close corporation, since dividends
are often provided by means of salaries to shareholders, loss of salary may be the func-
tional equivalent of the denial of participation in dividends."); Balvik v. Sylvester, 411
N.W.2d 383, 388 (N.D. 1987) ("Balvik was ultimately fired as an employee of the corpora-
tion, thus destroying the primary mode of return on his investment."); see also I CLOSE
CORPORATIONS, supra note 15, § 1.15, at 89 ("An investor taking a minority investment
position in a close corporation, expecting to receive a return on the investment in the
form of a regular salary, would face the risk that, after a falling out among the participants,
the directors would terminate the minority shareholder's employment and deprive that
investor of any return on the investment in the corporation."); supra note 37 and accom-
panying text.
299 See supra notes 74, 116 and accompanying text; cf. Hillman, supra note 25, at 78
("That assumptions are not made explicit does not require that they be disregarded when
they are accepted or assumed by the other participants.").
"0 See supra notes 86, 92 and accompanying text.
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employment, rational close corporation shareholders would likely be
unwilling to commit their capital unless a bargain was struck for the
protection of their employment."' Stated more broadly, because close
corporation shareholders consider their investments to be comprised
of employment, management, and a proportionate share of the cor-
porate profits,302 a minority shareholder would likely avoid investing
in a close corporation unless a bargain was struck with the majority
shareholder for the protection of these investment components. 303
The economics behind the decision to invest in a close corporation,
therefore, suggest that an actual (albeit implicit) bargain must have
been struck between the majority and minority investors in order to
induce the minority to commit his or her capital to the close corpora-
tion.30
30[ In theory, there are situations where investors might purchase a minority stake in a
close corporation even if they had not bargained for continuous employment. For exam-
ple, there may he some close corporations that are likely to experience significant stock
appreciation in a relatively short time period (e.g., Internet companies). For these compa-
nies, the potential upside from the stock appreciation may dwarf the employment benefits
that an investor receives. As a consequence, an investor may be willing to risk his or her
termination of employment in order to become a shareholder in the company. In addi-
tion, an investor might purchase a minority stake, even without an employment bargain,
due to the investor's failure to appreciate his or her potential freeze-out risks. See, e.g., Wil-
liam Carney, The Theory of the Firm: Investor Coordination Costs, Control Premiums and Capital
Structure, 65 WASH. U.L.Q. 1, 59-60 (1987) ("Investors in closely held enterprises are likely
to be subject to conditions of bounded rationality, under which they either fail to perceive
the complete set of problems that may occur later, or underestimate the probability of
their occurrence."); Thompson, supra note 28, at 705 ("Investors often fail to anticipate
the failure of their enterprise, or demonstrate an overly optimistic trust in those with
whom they are undertaking the venture."); Thompson, supra note 30, at 224 ('Parties en-
tering into a business relationship are not always willing to fully explore the ramifications
of possible disputes if things were to go wrong."). Finally, even without a bargain for con-
tinuous employment, some minority investors may wind up in a close corporation because
they received their stock through a gift or an inheritance. See, e.g., Gimpel v. Bolstein, 477
N.Y.S.2d 1014, 1017 (Sup. Ct. 1984) (involving a shareholder whose stock was received "by
gift and bequest from his father").
502 See Moll, supra note 18, at 794 ("In a close corporation, however, the shareholder
typically commits his or her capital with the expectation that his or her investment entitles
him or her to employment and to a management role, as well as to a proportionate share
of the company's earnings. Thus, a close corporation shareholder usually understands that
his or her investment return will be comprised of employment benefits, management par-
ticipation, and financial sums reflecting a share of the company's earnings.") (footnote
omitted).
"3 Cf. Bahls, supra note 21, at . 325 (noting that "participation and rights in a closely
held corporation are normally negotiated").
"4 Stated differently, to convince a rational minority investor to commit a substantial
part of his or her savings to a close corporation, it is likely that the majority shareholder
and the minority shareholder reached mutual understandings that restricted the majority's
ability to harm the minority's investment—i.e., the minority's employment, management
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Based on evidence of the parties' conduct and an understanding
of the economics behind close corporation investments, therefore, a
bargain exists between close corporation shareholders—i.e., a bargain
that protects the investment components (employment, management,
proportionate share of company earnings) of close corporation
stockholders.305 Under contract law, of course, the existence of a bar-
gain itself is of great importance. Indeed, as long as an actual bargain
exists, even a "failed contract" can be deserving of some protection
under contract doctrines. For example, although indefiniteness or the
statute of frauds can prohibit enforcement of an actual bargain under
its terms,306 such a "failed contract" can be protected in an "off-the-
contract" manner to the extent that compensation is often provided
for the unjust enrichment of the breaching party—i.e., for the
benefits that the injured party has conferred upon the breaching
party (restitution). 507 Such an award signifies that the existence of the
position, and share of profits. Cf. Edwin J. Bradley, An Analysis of the Model Close Corporation
Act and a Proposed Legislative Strategy, 10 J. CORP. L. 817, 840 (1985) (`'Fhe majority share-
holders understand that the minority shareholders have not entered the venture know-
ingly taking the investment risk that they may have to suffer the deprivation of any mean-
ingful governance input or share in economic return because they have submitted to the
exercise of an undiluted and mitempered majority power short of fraud, misappropria-
dons or breach of fiduciary duty.").
305 See In re Topper, 433 Isl.Y.S.2d 359, 365 (Sup. Ct. 1980) ('These reasonable expecta-
tions constitute the bargain of the parties in light of which subsequent conduct must be
appraised."); Sandra K. Miller, A Note on the Definition of Oppressive Conduct by Majority Share-
holders: How Can the Reasonable Expectations Standard be Reasonably Applied in Pennsylvania 7,
& Coat. 51, 54 (1992) (describing the reasonable expectations approach as a "de-
parture from the bargain struck by the majority and minority shareholders"); supra note 22
and accompanying text; cf. Bahls, supra note 21, at 325 ("Because participation and rights
in a closely held corporation are normally negotiated, expectations are reasonable when
they provide a basis for the bargain."); Murdock, supra note 39, at 465 (noting that when
applying the reasonable expectations standard, "the crux is not identifying a traditional
wrong but rather identifying the basis of the bargain—what were the explicit or implicit
conditions pursuant to which the parties associated themselves together in the corporate
form"); Peeples, .supra note 20, at 504 ("If a shareholder's reasonable expectations have
been frustrated, the shareholder has lost the benefit of the original bargain.").
"5 See supra Parts III (13) (1) (a) (discussing indefiniteness), III (11)(3) (discussing statute
of frauds). It is important to remember that in the shareholder oppression context,
indefiniteness and statute of frauds concerns are much less significant. With respect to
indefiniteness, it has previously been noted that the "fair value" buyout is not dependent
on major terms such as employment and management. Because the compensation
awarded through a buyout is unrelated to the terms that trigger oppression liability, the
terms themselves can be much less definite. See supra notes 128-131, 195 and accompany-
ing text. Furthermore, the investment bargain of close corporation shareholders may very
well satisfy the statute of frauds. See supra notes 218-220 and accompanying text.
"7 See II FARNSWORICH, supra note 119, 3.30, at 413 ("Part performance of an agree-
ment that is unenforceable for indefiniteness may ... result in a claim in restitution."); id.
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bargain itself—regardless of whether that bargain could be literally
enforced—is a compelling factor that weighs towards the granting of
some type of remedy. To a large degree, oppression law follows the
same logic. Because both evidence and economics indicate that an
actual bargain exists between close corporation investors, the share-
holder oppression doctrine operates to provide some degree of pro-
tection to this particular bargain.
In short, the societal justification for contract law—i.e., the no-
tion that protecting private bargains is valuable—provides an equal
justification for the shareholder oppression doctrine. Just as contract
law seeks to safeguard bargains—even if the bargains fail to constitute
enforceable contractss 08—oppression law seeks to provide the close
corporation investment bargain with some level of protection." 9
§ 6.11, at 187 ("Even though the statute of frauds may prevent an injured party from en-
forcing the contract when the other party unjustifiably refuses to perform, courts generally
allow the injured party restitution of any benefit that the injured party has conferred on
the other by part performance or otherwise.").
Allowing an oppressed minority shareholder to sue "off-the-contract" for unjust
enrichment would not fully protect the shareholder's interests. As the above citations indi-
cate, the remedy for unjust enrichment is restitutionary in nature. See also CAIAMARI &
FERILLO, supra note 127, § 15.2, at 648-49 (noting that restitution encompasses recoveries
for unjust enrichment). As a consequence, all of the problems associated with awarding
restitution damages are present in the unjust enrichment context. See supra Part
III (D) (3) (a) (noting the problems with restitution damages); infra notes 311-316 and
accompanying text.
"3 It is true, of course, that contract law does not provide a level of protection for all
bargains. In some situations, for example, public policy may prohibit contract law from
awarding any relief for a broken bargain, even though the evidence reveals that an actual
bargain did exist between the parties. See, e.g., 11 FARNSWORTH, supra note 119, § 5.9, at 87-
88 ("Courts generally do not grant restitution under agreements that are unenforceable
on grounds of public policy .... In general, a court will simply leave the parties as it finds
them, even though this may result in a benefit to one of them."). In the shareholder op-
pression context, however, this concern is much less acute. There is no public policy rea-
son for refusing to enforce the investment bargain; indeed, to the extent that shareholder
oppression involves the "theft" of one's investment, public policy would presumably be in
favor of enforcing such a bargain. See infra Part IV(B). Moreover, given that "a potential
source of much-needed risk capital for small business enterprises is threatened by the
prevalence of squeeze-outs," 1 OPPRESSION, supra note 31, § 1:04, at 8, public policy would
likely support efforts to combat squeeze-outs through judicial protection of the close cor-
poration investment bargain.
3°9 Cf. Merola v. Exergen Corp., 648 N.E.2d 1301, 1305 (Mass. App. Ct. 1995) ("[A]
stockholder's expectations may arise from an express or implied understanding that falls
short of an enforceable contract, The rightful expectations of the parties, not contract law,
are controlling.").
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B. The Need to Combat Theft
The existence of a close corporation investment bargain is im-
portant but, standing alone, it is insufficient to justify the remedial
aspect of the shareholder oppression doctrine. Although the bargain
itself justifies some level of protection, there is still a question as to why
the oppression doctrine provides enhanced protection through its buy-
out remedy. After all, in contrast to the restitutionary award that con-
tract law often provides when a bargain, for some reason, is unen-
forceable,"° the buyout remedy awards more than mere restitutionary
damages for a breach of the close corporation investment bargain."'
The critical point to understand is that a mere award of restitu-
tionary damages to an oppressed close corporation shareholder
would effectively permit the majority to steal the investment value of
the minority. A simple example helps to flesh out this point. Assume
that a 60% majority shareholder and a 40% minority shareholder op-
erate a close corporation. At the time of founding the business, the
majority committed $60,000 to the venture, while the minority con-
tributed a $40,000 sum. Over the next few years, the business pros-
pers. Unfortunately, tensions between the shareholders develop and
the majority, without justification, ultimately terminates the minority
from employment, removes him or her from management, and ex-
cludes him or her from dividends. At the time of the oppressive con-
duct, assume that the company's value had risen from $100,000 (the
initial contributed capital) to $1,000,000.
With a $1,000,000 company value, of course, the 60% majority
shareholder effectively owns a stake in the business worth $600,000.
Similarly, the 40% minority investor owns a share of the company
worth $400,000. By freezing-out the minority shareholder and by
counting on a restitutionary remedy, however, the majority can in-
crease the size and the value of its stake in the company.' After all, if a
restitutionary award were granted to the oppressed minority, the mi-
nority would presumably forfeit its ownership stake in return for the
$40,000 that it originally invested in the company. 312 Such a result, of
course, leaves the oppressive majority owning 100% of a company
worth $960,000. 313 In other words, by acting illegally (i.e., oppres-
310 See supra notes 306407 and accompanying text.
si I See supra Part III (D) (2).
332 See supra note 256 and accompanying text.
313 That is, the company worth $1,000,000 paid out $40,000 to the oppressed minority
shareholder. As a consequence, the company's value has decreased to $960,000.
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sively), the majority has increased the value of its stake in the com-
pany from $600,000 to $960,000. Correspondingly, as a result of the
majority's misconduct, the value of the minority's stake in the business
has decreased from $400,000 to $40,000. If such a limited award is
allowed to stand, the majority, by acting oppressively, is effectively
permitted to break a bargain and to confiscate $360,000 of the minor-
ity's investment value.314
 In contrast, the buyout remedy of the op-
pression doctrine would award the minority its proportionate share of
the company's "fair value." 313
 With a company value of $1,000,000,
such an award would approximate $400,000. 316
 Through the buyout
remedy, therefore, the majority is unable to profit from its oppressive
actions.
In short, although the investment bargain struck between close
corporation shareholders may not rise to the level of an enforceable
contract, it is an actual, existing bargain that is deserving of protec-
tion. Because a mere restitutionary award would sanction the major-
ity's theft of the minority's investment (effectively rewarding the ma-
jority for its "bargain-breaching" oppressive conduct), however, a
broad measure of relief is needed. 317 The shareholder oppression
doctrine—along with its accompanying buyout remedy—justifies itself
by accomplishing this purpose. It is possible, of course, to envision
contract law functioning in the same manner. Indeed, in the share-
holder oppression context, contract law could presumably overcome
indefiniteness and other problems to recognize an investment bar-
gain established by conduct and economic evidence. In addition, con-
tract law could potentially recognize that a broader remedy is needed
in the oppression context given that a sole award of restitution dam-
314
 The minority owned a 40% stake of a $1,000,000 company, yielding an ownership
stake worth $400,000. With a restitutionary award, however, the minority gives up its own-
ership stake and receives damages only in the amount of $40,000. Thus, the majority—at
the minority's expense—has captured $360,000 of the minority's investment value. See, e.g.,
Bradley, supra note 304, at 840 ("Never should the minority participant be understood as
assenting to the effective confiscation of his or her investment ..."); Moll, supra note 18,
at 817 n.267 (IT] he majority shareholder should be viewed as simply appropriating a
portion of the minority's investment to further the majority's own interests.").
315 See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
316 That is, 40% of a $1,000,000 company is worth $400,000.
317 See O'Neal, supra note 135, at 887 ("Not to provide a remedy in circumstances of
this kind is to permit the majority shareholders to exploit the minority shareholder's in-
vestment solely for their own benefit."); Prentice, supra note 135, at 134 (same); cf. 2 OP-
PRESSION, supra note 31, § 10:07, at 36 ("Flexibility of remedy tailored to all the facts and
circumstances of the case, including the shareholder's conflicting interests and motiva-
tions, is the key.").
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ages leads to an unjust result. It is hard to believe, however, that con-
tract law, as presently applied, would allow such a liberal approach to
its fundamental premises. As a consequence, it is fair to assert that
oppression law is doing what contract law should be doing if contract
law took a broader perspective when identifying and enforcing bar-
gains.
V. EXTENDING THE OPPRESSION FRAMEWORK
Because the shareholder oppression doctrine steps in for con-
tract law to protect the close corporation investment bargain, it is
worth asking whether bargains in other contexts exist—bargains that
contract law does not typically safeguard—that warrant protection on
the same grounds that underlie the oppression doctrine. Stated dif-
ferently, are there other relationships or contexts where an actual
bargain is revealed by pattern, conduct, and economic evidence, and
where contract law's failure to protect this bargain results in some
level of theft or unjust enrichment?
Perhaps one such relationship is the employer-employee relation-
ship in the at will employment context. 318 The employment at will
doctrine can be criticized on the ', ground that it creates opportunities
for the employer to unjustly enrich itself by capturing the investments
of "human capital" that employees make in a particular business. 519
318 For general background on the employment at will doctrine, see supra Part
III (B) (2) .
319 See, e.g., Ingle v. Glamore Motor Sales, Inc., 535 N.E.2d 1311, 1317 (N.Y. 1989)
(Hancock, J., dissenting) ("[P]laintiff alleges ... that he would never have made the sa-
crifices and investments of time, effort and money in the business had he known that the
buy-back provision would be interpreted to make him subject to summary firing at the
whim of the co-owner."); Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Conception that the Corporation is a Nexus
of Contracts, and the Dual Nature of the Firm, 24J. CORP. L. 819, 827 (1998) (characterizing
the "firm-specific skills" of an employee as "benefit[s] that will be lost if he resigns"). The
idea, to some extent, is that the employer benefits from (i.e., is enriched by) the em-
ployee's efforts to learn the skills necessary for that particular employer's work. Neverthe-
less, because of the at will doctrine, the employer can terminate a long-term employee
without compensating him or her for the' loss of employment options that often results
from such skill-building. See Peter Linzer, The Decline of Assent: At-Will Employment as a Case
Study of the Breakdown of Private Law Theory, 20 GA, L. REV, 323, 407 (1986) rile fact re-
mains that nonunion private sector employees often make a critical commitment of their
skills and their mobility. If they can be discharged at will, much of their investment of
these 'transaction-specific assets' will be lost, especially as they age and industries migrate
and change technologically.") (footnote omitted); id. at 408-09 ("The longer the em-
ployee has worked for a company, the more specific his job skills have become, the less
mobile he is, and the more his investment in the firm becomes his only means of liveli-
hood and self-respect."); Schmedemann, supra note 119, at 1438 ("Losing one's job is
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Even if a notion of "theft" could be extended from financial capital to
human capital, howevei., it is not necessarily clear that pattern, con-
duct, and economic evidence would establish an actual bargain be-
tween the employer and the employee for continued employment
(i.e., not at will employment). For example, even if courts followed
the shareholder oppression model by considering the economics be-
hind a pure employee's decision (i.e., a nonshareholder employee's
decision) to accept a job, such considerations may ultimately support
the employment at will arrangement due to the bargaining power dis-
tinctions between the "shareholder employee" in the oppression con-
text and the "pure employee" in the employment context. While it
may be true that rational close corporation shareholders would not
invest unless they received employment and struck a bargain for its
protection,32° such a proposition is tenable only because the close
corporation investor, ex ante, has the bargaining leverage to demand
such terms. After all, a .prospective shareholder-employee of a close
corporation has viable alternative options if the majority shareholder
refuses to enter into a protective bargain. For . example, the prospec-
tive shareholder-employee can invest his or her capital in other close
corporations willing to provide more favorable terms, or the share-
holder-employee can avoid close corporations all together by simply
entrusting his or her capital to the stock or bond markets. 321
 In addi-
difficult because, with time, employees become bound to employers .... Employees de-
velop job skills of little use to other employers."); J. Peter Shapiro & James F. Tune, Note,
Implied Contract Rights to Job Security, 26 STAN. L. REV. 335, 339 (1974) ("[Als the length of
service in any particular employment increases, other options for employees in the job
market may diminish."); id. at 339 n.35 ("To a certain extent, of course, job experience is
an asset to an employee in procuring employment. However, the employee who has been
at a particular job for many years may no longer possess skills that are readily transferable
. . . ."); id. at 364 ("[T] he District of Columbia Court of Appeals has accepted the idea that
a worker's suitability for employment elsewhere may be destroyed in part by continuation
in the service of a company for a number of years.") (citing Maloney v. E.I. Du Pont de
Nemours & Co., 352 F.2d 936 (D.C. Cir. 1965)); cf. Ian R. MacNeil, Contracts: Adjustment of
LontTerna Economic Relations Under Classica4 Neoclassical, and Relational Contract Law, 72 Nw.
U. L. REV. 854, 862 (1978) ("[C]onsider an employee of a small business who has been
treated very decently by his employer for thirty years. He quite naturally comes to expect
decent treatment throughout the relation including through retirement. Moreover, he
relies on that expectation; and if that expectation is not realized, the employer may very well have
derived benefits from the reliance by the employee that, in terms of the relation as it existed, are un-
justified.") (emphasis added).
320
 Once again, this proposition is based on the importance of employment in a close
corporation setting. See supra Part 11(13) (1) (discussing the employment interest).
321 See O'Neill, supra note 21, at 663 ("At the outset, the shareholder faces an ex-
tremely diverse array of other .. . investment opportunities encompassing not only stock in
other ... corporations, but also interests in mutual funds and debt securities of corpora-
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don, given that the pool of potential investors for a particular close
corporation (with its own particular line of business) is, presumably,
relatively small, the majority shareholder has an incentive to make
concessions to secure the potential investor's much-needed capital, as
another prospective investor for that particular venture may not come
along for quite some time (if ever). Simply put, because the bargain-
ing leverage at the outset favors the prospective shareholder-
employee, nothing compels the shareholder-employee to invest on
unfavorable terms.. Thus, to induce the minority to commit his or her
capital to a close corporation, it is fair to assert that an actual protec-
tive bargain must have been struck between the majority and minority
investors. 922
When "pure employees" are at issue, however, the bargaining
power is often not in their favor. For example, if a lower-level prospec-
tive worker attempted to bargain with an employer for job protection,
it is likely that most employers would refuse to offer such protection
based on their desire to retain managerial flexibility. 925
 Indeed, the
pool of prospective employees is, relatively speaking, larger than the
pool of prospective close corporation investors. Employers, therefore,
have less of an incentive to bargain with a particular employee, as in
many cases there will be a large number of alternative candidates who
are also looking for employment. Moreover, to the extent that many
employers share this viewpoint—i.e., refusing to offer employment
protection to their non-managerial employees—pure employees in
this category are likely to discover that they, unlike potential investors
in a close corporation, lack reasonable alternative options. If most
employers, in other words, offer similar non-protective employment
terms (i.e., offer at will employment arrangements), the need to earn
a living at some occupation may lead a pure employee to accept a job
without striking a bargain for its protection. Put simply, the pure em-
ployee, if he or she desires to work, may have little or no choice at any
employer other than accepting an at will employment arrangement. 324
tions, financial institutions and governmental authorities."); Ragazzo, supra note 80, at
1109 (noting that close corporation investors "would seem well advised to trust their capi-
tal to diversified mutual funds rather than a small corporation").
322 See supra Part IV(A).
323 See, e.g., Schmedemann, supra note 119, at 1439 ("[A]n employer providing job se-
curity ... reduces its flexibility somewhat."); supra note 197 and accompanying text.
324 Of course, one can directly challenge the disparity of bargaining power between
the employer and the employee. Perhaps one could argue that the disparity itself warrants
an alteration of the at will employment arrangement or, relatedly, one could assert that the
employer should not be permitted to use its bargaining power. A further discussion of
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Thus, unlike the shareholder oppression context where the economic
evidence suggests that a protective employment bargain has been
struck, the economic evidence in the pure employment context raises
the possibility that a bargain for unprotected employment has been
struck.325
 In short, although the shareholder oppression framework
could arguably be transported to the at will employment relationship,
an application of the framework may lead to the same results as the
present employment at will doctrine.
In contrast to the employer-employee relationship, an application
of the shareholder oppression framework may produce a different
legal outcome in conflicts between bondholders and stockholders.
Bondholders, like stockholders, provide companies with capital in
exchange for a rate of return that is generated by cash flows from the
assets of the business. 326
 When some corporate transactions are en-
tered into, the effect is to transfer a portion of the bondholders' value
to the shareholders, even if the bondholders object. Such events re-
sult in the shareholders profiting at the expense of the bondhold-
ers.'" To some extent, therefore, the bondholder-shareholder conflict
these issues is beyond the scope of this Article. Even in the absence of bargaining power
disparities, however, some employees may still prefer an at will employment arrangement
to the extent that the arrangement provides employees with the freedom to quit and move
on at any time. See, e.g., Murphy v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 448 N.E.2d 86, 89 (N.Y. 1983)
("[W]here an employment is for an indefinite term it is presumed to be a hiring at will
which may be freely terminated by either party at any time for any reason or even for no
reason."). Employees with skills that are greatly in demand, for example, may have the
ability to take advantage of a number of superior employment opportunities. As a conse-
quence, they may prefer an at will employment arrangement that allows a relatively quick
and hassle-free departure from their existing employer.
325 Stated differently, the economic evidence underlying the pure employment context
suggests that an at will relationship was the actual bargain of the parties. See supra note 324.
326 See McDaniel, supra note 140, at 416. In other words, the bondholder is making a
capital investment and it expects to get its money back plus a return on its investment. See
id. at 417.
327 As one commentator observed:
A company may make an extraordinary distribution to all of its stockholders,
or it may make such a distribution to only some of them, as in a major share
repurchase or self-tender. If it is a cash distribution, the company may raise
the cash by selling off assets. If it is a noncash distribution, the company sim-
ply declares a dividend in kind. Whether the distribution is to all of the
stockholders or only some of them and whether it is in cash or in kind, the ef-
fect on bondholders is the same: the ratio of debt to equity increases and
fewer assets remain to satisfy bondholder claims. Since the bonds are riskier,
their price declines.
McDaniel, supra note 140, at 419; see also Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 716 F.
Supp. 1504, 1506 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) ("Plaintiffs now allege, in short, that RJR Nabisco's ac-
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can also be characterized as a relationship involving "theft" by one
party at the expense of the other party. Just like the shareholder op-
pression context, a notion of unjust enrichment is present. 328
Unfortunately, bondholders can be unsuccessful in their attempts
to use contract law to challenge the theft of their investment value. 529
A different outcome might result, however, if the oppression frame-
work was applied. For example, because default risk is a significant, if
not primary, concern of bondholders,"° one could argue that the
economic evidence suggests that a rational bondholder would not
commit significant sums of capital to a company331 unless a bargain
was struck—i.e., a bargain limiting the company's ability to engage in
Lions have drastically impaired the value of bonds previously issued to plaintiffs by, in ef-
fect, misappropriating the value of those bonds to help finance the LBO and to distribute
an enormous windfall to the company's shareholders. As a result, plaintiffs argue, they
have unfairly suffered a multimillion dollar loss in the value of their bonds."); McDaniel,
supra note 140, at 418 ("Managers may make dividend, financing, and investment deci-
sions that transfer wealth from bondholders to stockholders. Such decisions create gains
for stockholders and capital losses for bondholders.").
525 See, eg., Van Gernert v. Boeing Co., 520 F.2d 1373, 1385 (2d Cir. 1975) ("[T]he cor-
porate stockholders benefited by not having their stock watered down by the number of
shares necessary to convert [the bondholders'] debentures. But an award against Boeing
will in effect tend to reduce pro tanto the equity of shareholders in the corporation and
thus to a large extent those who were benefited, one might almost say unjustly enriched, will be
the ones who pay [the bondholders') loss.") (emphasis added); McDaniel, supra note 140,
at 445 ("The court in Boeing also noted that stockholders were unjustly enriched at the
expense of nonconverting bondholders, and a judgment against the corporation would
retrieve the benefit. In economic terms, a wealth transfer from bondholders to stockhold-
ers would be reversed and given back to the bondholders.") (footnote omitted).
529 See, e.g., Metro. Life, 716 F. Supp. at 1508 ("There being no express covenant be-
tween the parties that would restrict the incurrence of new debt, and no perceived direc-
tion to that end from covenants that are express, this Court will not imply a covenant to
prevent the recent LBO and thereby create an indenture term that, while bargained for in
other contexts, was not bargained for here and was not even within the mutual contetnpla-
don of the parties."); see also McDaniel, supra note 140, at 413 n.1 ("A bondholder's rights
are largely a matter of contract."). But see Van Gernert, 520 F.2d at 1383-85 (concluding that
the issuing corporation breached a duty of reasonable notice that was owed to debenture
holders—a duty that arose out of the contract between the issuer and the debenture hold-
ers).
5" See, e.g., Metro. Life, 716 F, Stipp, at 1518 ("[T] he typical investor in a long-term debt
security is primarily interested in every reasonable assurance that the principal and inter-
est will be paid when due.") (internal quotation omitted); cf. McDaniel, supra note 140, at
418 ("Institutional investors employ bond analysts or purchase bond research to assess the
risk of default. The price an institution is willing to pay for bonds reflects its assessment of
the default risk based on circumstances known or anticipated at the time .... Losses in
bond value reflect a greater risk of default, a smaller payoff to bondholders if default. oc-
curs, or both.").
331 See, e.g., Metro. Life, 716 F. Stipp. at 1507 (noting that plaintiff bondholders invested
"roughly $350 million in RJR Nabisco").
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transactions that are likely to favor stockholders at the expense of
bondholders. A court accepting this suggestion may decide that an
implied term in the bondholders' investment contract has been
breached when a company's board decides to enter into a bond-
holder-risky transaction. Such a judicial outcome, of course, is by no
means certain. Given that bonds are traded on an established market,
perhaps the price of the bonds already reflects the anticipated default
risk of the issuer." 2
 A court may decide, therefore, that no further
bondholder protection is warranted." 3 Nevertheless, the possibility of
332 See, e.g., id. at 1520 ("This Court has no reason to believe that the market, in evalu-
ating bonds such as those at issue here, did not discount for the possibility that any com-
pany, even one the size of RJR Nabisco, might engage in an LBO heavily financed by
debt."); McDaniel, supra note 140, at 418 ("A small investor need not make his own as-
sessment of the default risk because in an efficient bond market the anticipated default
risk is impounded in the price. Therefore, all bondholders are compensated ex ante for
any anticipated risk of default ex post.").
333 In addition, and similar to the employment relationship, the large number of po-
tential bondholders for creditworthy firms may lead a specific company to reject any par-
ticular bondholder's demand that affects the company's ability to enter into particular
transactions. See, e.g., Metro. Life, 716 F. Supp. at 1513 ("While it would be possible to
broaden the change in ownership covenant to cover any acquisitionoriented transaction,
[prospective bondholders] might well encounter significant resistance in implementation
with larger public companies .... [1]t would seem that management of larger public
companies would be particularly opposed to such a covenant since its effect would be to
increase the cost of an acquisition (due to an assumed debt repayment), a factor that
could well lower the price of any tender offer (thereby impacting shareholders)."); id.
("[1[t would be very difficult for [MetLife] to demand takeover protection in public
bonds. Such a requirement would effectively take [MetLife] out of the public industrial
market."); id. at 1521 ("[lit is undisputed that investors like plaintiffs recognized that
companies like RJR Nabisco strenuously opposed additional restrictive covenants that
might limit the incurrence of new debt or the company's ability to engage in a merger.").
To the extent that many companies share this view, it may be untenable for a court to con-
clude that bondholders would not have committed their capital unless a bargain was
struck for a protective term.
Furthermore, courts are often reluctant to imply terms when there are explicit terms
that are relevant to the issue in dispute. See, e.g., id. at 1517 (noting that an implied cove-
nant in a contract 'will only aid and further the explicit terms of the agreement and will
never impose an obligation which would be inconsistent with other terms of the contrac-
tual relationship") (internal quotation omitted); cf. Woodard v. Southwest States, Inc., 384
S.W.2d 674, 674 (Tex. 1964) ("Where there exists a valid express contract covering the
subject matter, there can be no implied contract."); supra note 78 (noting that express
agreements can trump any alleged reasonable expectation). Although written agreements
are rare in the close corporation context, see supra note 215 and accompanying text, a writ-
ten indenture agreement is present whenever bonds are issued. See, e.g., Metropolitan Life,
716 F. Stipp. at 1509 rile bonds implicated by this suit are governed by long, detailed
indentures, which in turn are governed by New York contract law."); CARY & EISENBERG,
supra note 26, at 110 ("An indenture is a contract entered into between the borrowing
corporation and a trustee. The trustee administers the payments of interest and principal,
and monitors and enforces compliance with other obligations on behalf of the bondhold-
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such a bondholder-friendly outcome illustrates that components of
the shareholder oppression framework may have significance outside
of the close corporation setting. In other contexts, therefore, the op-
pression framework may also alter the results that are presently gen-
erated by conventional legal doctrines.
CONCLUSION
Although both courts and commentators compare oppression's
reasonable expectations inquiry to an implied-in-fact contract analy-
sis, such a comparison is too readily made. The similarity between the
two frameworks is, at best, present in spirit rather than in letter. While
it is true that contractual themes are echoed by oppression law's in-
quiry into shareholders' "understandings" and "bargains," it is equally
true that contract law and oppression law differ in the level of protec-
tion they offer to shareholders. Although contract law has the tools to
safeguard the close corporation investor, this Article has argued that
the liability restrictions and damages limitations associated with the'
application of modern contract law will likely leave the minority
shareholder vulnerable to oppressive majority conduct. In contrast, by
focusing on what is actually transpiring in oppression decisions, this
Article has shown that the oppression doctrine's use of pattern and
conduct evidence, economic understandings, and buyout remedies
results in vastly superior shareholder protection.
At bottom, the plight of the close corporation minority share-
holder is real. Oppressive conduct breaches an actual bargain be-
tween the shareholders—a bargain that typically induces the minor-
ity's initial commitment of capital to the venture—and it provides an
opportunity for an unchecked majority to steal the investment of the
minority. Despite this broken "deal" and the potential for theft, how-
ever, contract law is unlikely to take the broader perspective that is
necessary to adequately protect the minority investor. As a conse-
quence, there is a need for the shareholder oppression doctrine and
for the protection that it offers. Moreover, as this Article has noted,
there may be bargains outside of the shareholder oppression context
that are worthy of similar protection.
ers as a group. The indenture defines the assorted obligations of the borrower, the rights
and remedies of the holders of the bonds, and the role of the trustee.").
To the extent that the indenture contains explicit terms that can reasonably be con-
strued to cover the situation, implying a protective term will be difficult. CI Metro. 1.4i, 716
F. Stipp, at 1508 ("RJR Nabisco defends the LBO by pointing to express provisions in the
bond indentures that, inter alia, permit mergers and the assumption of additional debt.").
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In short, the fundamental question of whether the shareholder
oppression doctrine is needed in light of the established principles of
contract law can now be answered. By picking up where contract law
leaves off, the shareholder oppression doctrine serves a critical pro-
tective function that justifies its independent existence.
